SECTION l

INTRODUCTION

This workbook is for those individuals that are serious about their
declaration : "I Wants To Own My Land" is by no means a complete work
on the Allodial Land issue. Many people and sources contributed to the
creation and to all of them and from whatever source, I am grateful.
This book, by its collection and information presented to the reader,
is intended to introduce you to the subject. To bring you up to date
with an understanding and knowledge of the Allodial Land issue. You
will learn not only what it is but that it is an integral part of our
American Land/Law system. We hope this book sparks the desire for the
reader to go forward with an inquisitive mind and the necessary
belligerent attitude. . .  to confront those whom by deceit, have
stolen your land . . . Yours and your grandchildren's inheritance!

You will need to read more, research more, document more, and of
course, share your results with others. There are many Cites
throughout the workbook...and that is what this is...a Workbook. Take
it and research the cites...learn them and...USE THEM!

However, you will have to get angry - at your public servants, demand
by what authority they do these things. Not until 51% of your
Community, moves upon the County Courthouse to demand answers and to
void this unlawful Taxation not much will happen But it Only takes one
to start!  GO GET 'EM!

WHAT IS A LAND PATENT?

Essentially, a Land Patent is the first conveyance of title ownership
to land which the U.S. Government grants a Citizen who applies for
one.  One of the earliest laws for granting Land Patents was passed by
Congress on April 24, 1820, Among other things, Congress set up
Government Land officers, now known as the Bureau of Land Management.
Land was usually sold in parcels of 180 acres for $1.25 per acre. The
law in 1820 prohibited the borrowing or use of "credit"' for the
purchase of government land. In the debates in Congress prior to
passage of this act, Senator King of New York said in March 1830 ...
"it was calculated to plant in the new country a population of
independent unembarrassed freeholder...that it would place, in every
man, the Power to Purchase a freehold the price of which could be
cleared in 3 years... that it would cut up speculation and
monopoly...that it would prevent the accumulation of alarming debt,
which experience proved never would and never could be paid"!!!
(emphasis added) Later on , in 1862, a Homestead Act stated in
Section 4: "That no lands acquired under the provisions of this act
Shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or
debts contracted prior to the issuing of the patent therefor".

It can be clearly seen that the intent of these early lawmakers was
for the people of this country to be FREEMEN AND FREEHOLDERS of their
land, and not ever be subject to have it taken from them by any
government, feudal authority or banker or any other party who might
have a claim against the person who owned the land. In plain English,
a Land Patent which gave you an allodial freehold, that was judgement
proof and yes, even immune from tax liens. In effect, the only
authority over you or your land was GOD himself. In England, a man,
who owned free from authority of the King, was known as a freeholder
and his land as a freehold or allodial freehold. Most landpatents in
the U.S. were issued prior to 1900.  However, even today, new land
Patents continue to be issued, mostly for gas, oil and mineral rights
on public lands. For this reason, there are several land offices that
remain open in the United States.

WHAT IS THE VALUE OF A LAND PATENT?

On the basis of all the case law I have seen, there is no doubt in my
mind that a land patent issued by the Bureau of Land Management which
gives you a title at law is far superior to any title acquired in
equity, such as a sheriff's deed. The land patent will, therefore,
prevent your ejectment and removal from the land or the property you
occupy on the land. The debts or claims of other parties will remain,
but the land will be removed from assets which they can attach. The
law is on the books today which says that any debts, which lie against
the land, that existed prior to the land patent being issued, are
removed from the land.

The next question is; if the land patents were issued 100 or more
years ago to persons who are no longer alive, and if I now reside on
only a portion of the land that was originally described in the
original land patent, then how do I bring up the land patent in my
name?  And if I bring it up in my name, will it remove the land as
security which the Bank or Mortgage Company can sell and seize in a
foreclosure action?

DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT
The procedures which I will describe are not time tested, as they have
not worked their way through the U.S. Supreme Court. This does not
mean that these procedures will not ultimately be successful. Any
basis for a legal approach must be supported by a legal theory. We
already know and can substantiate that an original land patent will
protect your land from any equitable or collateral attack.  However,
we do not know for certain that the existing procedures will vest in
us the same rights and immunities by filing a DECLARATION OF LAND
PATENT, and updating it in your name. However since there is little to
lose and possibly much to gain, it would be wise to file a DECLARATION
OF LAND PATENT, in the future event that it is sustained.

The theory is based on two premises. First, in the original land
patent, that was granted, lets say 100 years ago the land patent
document itself says that this patent is granted to the original party
AS WELL AS TO THEIR HEIRS AND ASSIGNS FOREVER. While most 
of us are not heirs, ARE NOT WE ALL ASSIGNS?

Since land patents were originally issued, nearly all conveyances of
title were done by the use of deeds, like Quit Claim Deeds and
Warranty Deeds.  However, the money lenders found a way around land
patents by creating new paper instruments like deeds of trust and
mortgages, all of which convey equitable interests.  However, the land
patent itself remains the highest title at law, and few persons have
updated a land patent in their name.  Where a land patent exists, no
lien or mortgage could be ever placed on the land.

Since the intent of the lawmakers is the law, historic evidence shows
that our founding fathers wanted us to own the land in its entirety,
and subject to the claims of no other man or government or other
institution.  Because the laws were passed by Congress setting up Land
Offices to grant land patents, the best jurisdiction in which to raise
these issues are the Federal Courts.

In the Declaration of Land Patent, we then declare that we are the
ASSIGNEE'S of the original land patent, even though we may be 2nd,
3rd, 4th, etc., after the party to whom the original patent was
issued.

After the review of several different land patents, the one enclosed
in this paper is, considered the one that best sums up what is to be
said.

The one major pitfall, that must be avoided, is that when filing the
declaration of land patents, do not place the same legal description
in the declarations that was in the original land patent issued by the
Bureau of Land Management. What this does is cloud the title to the
property of other persons who are living in properties that are part
of the legal description of the original land patent. As a result,
Several lawsuits were filed to quiet title. To prevent this from
happening, you must write in your Declaration of Land Patent only the
legal description of the property to which you are an assignee. In
other words, the legal description from your deed or abstract is what
you must use. For this reason, the enclosed Declaration of Land Patent
has in it, adequate language for this Purpose. Along with the
declaration of Land Patent a certified copy of the original land
patent which you can obtain from your nearest land office must be
attached. These papers are all stapled together and filed in either
your County Recorder's office or with the Register of Deeds.

After you receive your copy of the original Land Patent or Land Grant,
then staple it to a Declaration of Land Patent and file it in your
County Recorder's office or Register of Deeds. You now have your
allodial title.  A Land Patent can only be filed on property that has
been assigned to you.  You don't file one on your neighbor's property
or they can sue you for slandering his title.

The Land Patents you get from the BLM must be certified.

After your Land Patent is filed, you must send a photocopy by
Certified Mail Return Receipt Requested to your bank or mortgage
Company, FLB, FR, PCA, etc . and to any and all parties that may have
an equitable interest in your property so they have been placed on
NOTICE that you are updating the Land Patent in your name and they
will have 60 days to challenge your claim to your allodial title in a
court of law or forever keep their silence. Be sure to keep your green
tickets when they come back.  GIVING NOTICE IS A BASIC PRINCIPLE
OF LAW. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT LAND OFFICES ORIGINALLY
ISSUED THE LAND PATENTS, THEY PUBLISHED THE LAND PATENT
WITH LEGAL DESCRIPTION FOR 60 DAYS: WHEN NOT CHALLENGED 
BY ANYONE, THE LAND PATENT WAS THEN GRANTED.
AN ALTERNATIVE WAY TO GIVE THE OTHER PARTY NOTICE IS TO 
PUBLISH A "'NOTICE OF DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT"" in a legal
publication in your county of residence. Include the legal description on your
property in the ad with this warning: "If any party having a claim,
lien or debt or other equitable interest fails to file a suit in a
court of law within 60 days from the date of filing or on (insert
date), then they shall waive all future claims against this land and
it will become the property and allodial freehold of the Assignee to
said Patent. (your name - Assignee)


QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. Why must we give the other side NOTICE?

A. Giving NOTICE is a basic principle of common law. If someone
was going to file a claim against property that you thought was
yours, would you not want to be given NOTICE?  If they fail to file
a suit in court within the 60 days, the case is Substantially
weakened if they file it later. Also, filing the Land Patent is an
excellent diversionary tactic, Since the focus of the court battle
shifts to who has the best title. Remember, you are an Assignee to
that original patent, and your claim is valid. The U.S. Government
signed a contract granting that Land Patent to the original party,
their heirs or assigns. YOU ARE AN ASSIGNS to all allodial title or
freehold. The original contract does not specify any expiration
date. It is still in force. If the original land patent is immune
from equitable or collateral attack, then so is yours.

Q. Where can I find more case law on Land Patents?

A. At your local library at your Courthouse or university. Look up
the Supreme Court Digests On Land Patents, also a set of books called
43 USCS 17. Also books on State Law Digests. Look under the section
on Land Patents. There is also material in Bovier's Law Dictionary.
Also look under the term "Bureau of Land Management".

Q. Why send the Bureau of Land Management $10.00?

A. This is the approximate cost for most copies of the original
patents. The cost is actually $1.10 per page plus $.25 for the
certification. A one page patent Will cost $1.10 + $.25 or $1.35,
five pages will cost $5.50 + $.25 or $5.75. The BLM will send you
a refund if you sent too much and they have sent the patent and a
bill for a balance if you have not sent enough. A land Patent is
generally l to 3 pages. I have seen some that run 21 pages. In your
letter, BE SURE TO ASK FOR A CERTIFIED COPY. You should 
receive it in 4 to 6 weeks. You can go directly to the office in your
area and get the Patent in l or 2 hours.

WHO OWNS THE LAND

While it is generally believed in America today that the purpose
of the American revolution was to resist taxation without
representation. The primary reason for the revolution was to deliver
America's Land Titles out of the hands of Great Britain and return
them to the people.

It was assumed by many, before the Revolution, that England
rightfully "owned"' America. It was because of this assumption that
she gave grants of land to supportive Colonists, then taxed the
Colonists as subjects. But, the patriots, of that day, insisted that
the King of England did not own the land... so it was not his to
grant.  After the Revolution, the land became the property of
each state's people, with the authority in the people to parcel out
the land to claimants in a fair and equitable manner. If some land
remained unoccupied, Jefferson said: that anyone occupying it had
possession, the right of ownership.

Land title, was then to be held by way of ALLODIAL TITLE. That
simply meant that there was "No Superior" to the land owner. He was
the Superior, the Sovereign On his land.

To encourage railroad growth and provide transportation for over
three million new Settlers that had immigrated from the East into a
wilderness devoid of roads, the government gave the first railroad
land grant... 2,595,000 acres of federal land, six alternate
numbered sections (640 acres in a section) of un-preempted, land for
every mile of track built, to be issued to fund the building of the
Illinois Central, with a branch to Chicago. The contract said that
it should be completed in six years and that seven percent of the
company's gross should be paid to the state in perpetuity. Also,
Uncle Sam was permitted to set his own charge for carrying troops,
freight and mail, and eventually settled on fifty percent for the
first two and eighty percent for the mail. The Illinois Central,
then the longest line in the world, was completed three days before
the deadline set in 1856.

One of the earliest laws for granting patents was passed by an
Act of Congress an April 24, 1820. The law in 1820 prohibited the
borrowing or use of credit for the purchase of government land. In
the debates in Congress prior to the passage of this Act, Senator
King of New York said...it (the Act) is Calculated to plant, in
the new country, a population of independent, unembarrassed
freeholders...it will put the power in every man to purchase a
freehold, the price of which can be cleared in three years...it Will
cut up speculation and monopoly...it Will prevent the accumulation of
an alarming debt, which experience proves never could or would be
paid." In 1862, the Homestead Act, in Section 4, provided that "no
lands acquired under the provisions of this Act Shall in any event
become liable to the satisfaction of any debts contracted prior to
the issuing of the land patent".

When taxation of real property began (and the people did not
object) they voluntarily accepted the premise that government was
the Superiors and the land owner a mere serf in a feudal relationship
to his master. And the whole process helped to contribute to an ever
increasing control by Lawless Government.

This Lawless Government has been preparing America for the time
when the land will be confiscated to pay off the indebtedness to the
Federal Reserve that has America on the verge of financial collapse.

Democrats and Republicans alike have allowed this policy to
march forward, annihilating not only the family farm, but the
freedoms of all Americans.

So the mortgage foreclosures, in the words of the great
thinkers, will deliver the landed resources of the United States into
a few strong hands. Thomas Jefferson would have called it "landed
aristocracy."The founding fathers knew that free men could survive
only as long as they owned property, because it was this ownership
that accounted for broad spectrum distribution of income and
preservation of the jury system. They also knew that manipulation of
the money supply, via debt, would ultimately take from the people
their substances, by concentrating the property into the hands of a
few, which is now the curse of the majority of the world.

Thomas Jefferson wrote: "If the American people ever allow the
banks to control issuance of their currency, first by inflation and
then by deflation, the banks and corporations that grow up around
them will deprive the people of all property until their children
will wake up homeless on the continent their fathers occupied."

"DO I OWN MY LAND?"

Taken from a letter/notice from the United States Department of
the Interior, it stated:

"the United States has paramount title in the land."

The legal definition of Paramount is as follows:

Paramount Title: "In the law of real property one which is
superior to the title with which it is compared, it is used to denote
a title which is better or stronger than another,.... (Black's Law,
4 Ed. pg 1267)

Under the National Constitution, Article IV, Section III, Clause
2, Congress was given power (by the people) to dispose of its
territory and the land acquired for the people of the United States
by Purchase and by Treaty. The Administration (government) holds
this land as TRUSTEE for the people!

After the Declaration of Independence and the "REVOLUTION", the
land was to be held by everyone (landowners) in/by Allodial Title,
which simply means there is no superior or "overlord" to or over the
landowner.

Before we get into what Allodial Titles, and Land Patents are,
let's go to the first U.S. Supreme Court case on land titles for a
clearer and basic understanding as to what our forefathers
established through their experience and sacrifice for their progeny.

The case is Wallace v Harmstad, S Ct 492 (1863), and the
opinion of the Court was delivered, May 6th 1863, by Justice
Woodward, and in part, he stated:

"I see no way of solving this question, except by determining
whether our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal. It seems
strange that so fundamental a question as this should be in doubt at
this day, but it has never had, so far as I know, a direct judicial
decision. In a valuable note by Judge Sharswood to the opening
passage of Blackstone's Chapter on Modern English Tenures.
(2 Sharswood's Black. 77), it is said, "that though there are some
opinions that feudal tenures fell with the Revolution, yet all agree
that they existed before, and the better opinion appears to be that
they still exist. "In support of this statement, the feudal principals
that have entered into our conveyancing are alluded to, and several
cases are cited in which the consequences and qualities of feudal
tenures have been recognized in our estates, although generally, in
these very cases, it has been assumed that our property is allodial.

I venture to suggest that much of the confusion of ideas that prevails
on this subject has come from our retaining, since the American
Revolution, the feudal nomenclature of estates and tenures, as fee,
freehold, heirs, feoffment, and the like.

Our question, then, narrows itself down to this: is fealty a part of
our land tenures? What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands by
"Openly and-Humbly kneeling before his lord, being un-grit, uncovered,
and holding up his hands together between those of the lord, who sat
before him, and there professing that he did become his man from that
day forth, for life and limb, and earthly honor, and then receiving a
kiss from his lord?" This was the oath of fealty which was, according
to Sir Martin Wright, the essential feudal bond so necessary to the
very notion of a feud.

But then came the Revolution, which threw off the dominion of the
mother country, and established the independent sovereignty of the
state (the people, and on the 27th day of November 1779 (1 Smith's
Laws 480), an act was passed for vesting the estates of the late
proprietaries of Pennsylvanian in the Commonwealth.

Another act on the 9th of April 1781, (2 Smith 532), provided for
opening the land office and granting lands to purchasers: and, says
the 11th section, "all and every land or lands - granted in pursuance
of this act shall be free and clear of all reservations and
restrictions as to mines, royalties, quit-rents or otherwise, so that
the owners thereof respectively shall be entitled to hold the same in
absolute and unconditional property , to all intents and purposes
whatsoever, and to all and all manner of profits, privileges, and
advantages belonging to or occurring from the same, and that clear and
exonerated from any charge or encumbrance whatever, excepting the
debts of said owner,...

The province was a fief held immediately from the Crown, and the
Revolution would have operated very inefficiently towards complete
emancipation, if the feudal relation had been suffered to remain. It
was therefore necessary to extinguish all foreign interest in the
soil, as well as foreign jurisdiction in the manner of government.

We are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of Assembly as
emancipating every acre of the soil of Pennsylvania from the grand
characteristic of the feudal system. Even as to the lands held by
the proprietaries themselves, they held them as other citizens held,
under the Commonwealth, and that by a title purely allodial. All our
lands are held mediately or immediately of the state, by the titles
purged of all the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting only the feudal
names of things not any longer feudal.

Under the Acts of Assembly I have alluded to, the state became the
proprietor of all lands, but instead of giving them like a feudal
lord to an enslaved tenantry, she has sold them for the best price,
she could get, and conferred on the purchaser the same absolute estate
she held herself,... and these have been reserved, as everything else
has been granted, by CONTRACT. "

To get a better understanding of this issue, We must take a look at
certain definition, from Black's Law, as follows:

"ALLODIAL. Free; not holden of any lord or superior, owned without
obligation of vassalage of fealty; the opposite of feudal."

"ALLODIUM. Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any
lord of superior; Land not subject to feudal duties or burdens."
(Emphasis added)

Take note that Allodial is the opposite of Feudal!

"FEUDAL. Pertaining to feuds, fees; relating to or growing out of the
feudal system or feudal law; having the quality of a feud, as
distinguished from 'allodial'" (Emphasis added)

"FEUD. An estate in the land held of a superior on condition of
rendering him services. An inheritable right to the use and occupation
of lands, held on condition of rendering services to the lord or
proprietor, who himself retains the property in the lands.  In this
sense the word is the same as "feod", "feodum", "feudom", "fief', or
"FEE". (Emphasis added)

To simplify, one can have two different and opposite titles of land,
one of 'Feudal, nature - owing a fee or duty to another who actually
retains or own the land or the other being 'Allodial', Where the land
is held absolutely in one's own right, not subject to another, a fee
or a duty!

So the..term "OWNERSHIP" may take on a totally different meaning,
dependant upon the type of title one has in the land. 'OWNERSHIP' is
a key principle as it Pertains to the rights to acquire and use
property as well as rights in the land as well.  Ownership is defined
as follows:

"OWNERSHIP: The complete dominion, title, or proprietary right in
a thing or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and disposal by
law - The exclusive right of possession, enjoyment, and disposal.
Ownership of property is absolute or qualified.  The ownership of
property is absolute when a single person has absolute dominion over
the property. The ownership is qualified when... use, of the property
is restricted." (Emphasis added)

The Act of Congress of April 24, 1820 was one of the earliest statutes
passed for granted land Patents, along with the Homestead Act, Sec. 4
in 1862 and as stated earlier, the disposal of its territory and land
acquired for the people is by purchase and by TREATY (Contract of and
by the People) to wit:

l) Northwest Ordinance (1787)
2) Treaty of Peace, 8 STAT, 80 (1783)
3) Treaty of Ghent, 8 STAT. 218 (1818)
4) Oregon Treaty, 9 STAT. 869 (June 15, 1846)
5) Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 STAT. 922 (1848)
6) Treaty of Cession, 8 STAT. 200 (1863)

The Treaty (Contract) Law cannot be interfered with, as the Supreme
Court has held that 'Treaties' are the 'supreme law of the land', See
also Article 6, Sec. 2 of the U.S. Constitution.  the Treaty is
declared the will of the People of the United States and shall be
superior to the Constitution and � the laws of if any individual
State.

It was through the 'experiences' of our Founding Fathers, coming from
a Feudal system, that they desired that in the new country, the United
States, that all men would own their land, in its entirety,
absolutely, with full dominion, and subject to the claims of no man or
government! This was done through grant or purchase.

Black's Law, 4th Ed. pg.829, defines Grant as a conveyance(?),

same reference, pg. 402 under general, to wit:

Absolute or Conditional Conveyance. Absolute conveyance is one by
which the right or property in a thing is transferred, by which it
might be defeated or changed; as an ordinary deed of lands, in contra-
distinction to a mortgage, which is a conditional conveyance.

Now under the term 'Grant' it shows 'Private Land Grant' as: A grant
by a public authority vesting title, to public land in a private
(natural) person.

Public Grant: A grant from the public; A grant off a power, license,
privilege, or property, from the state or government to one or more
individuals, contained in or shown by a record, conveyance, Patent,
charter, etc.

Before we go on to Patents, and with a little understanding of
"Grants', we will take a little time to touch up on the 'Purchase' of
land as it affects title. Two point are raised or established, the
first, from a court case, called Stank v White, 215 N.W. 784
(1927),states:

"There is a distinction between a debt discharged and one paid.  When
discharged, the debt still exists, though divested of its character as
a legal obligation during the operation of the discharge." (Emphasis
added)

How does this affect your land purchase?  Very simple. When Congress,
in 1933, suspended the gold standard (Art.I, Sec. 10) which denied you
the right to PAY YOUR DEBTS AT LAW (which extinguishes the debt), to a
system where you can only discharge your debts, but the debt still
exists. This may be where your duty or fee comes from in the form of
your property tax. But there may also be a distinction in the form or
type of payment that you made in and for the land. The courts have
ruled that the Federal Reserve Bank/System is not an agency of the
U.S. Government, but rather a Private Corporation!

Therefor, when you participate in the Federal Banking System, you are
participating in a private money system, which is a privilege, and
therefore a duty and fee is extracted, in the form of a tax, but since
Federal Reserve Notes are not Lawful Money (no substance backing it!)
you cannot pay your debts at law, they are only pieces of paper of
which a debt attaches

To prove this, we go to the second point, the definition of Title, as
found in Bovier's Dictionary of Law:

"The means whereby the owner....hath just  possession of his property.

Title to Personal property may accrue in three different ways: by
original acquisition, by transfer by act of law, by transfer by act of
the parties.

THE LAWFUL COIN OF THE UNITED STATES WILL PASS THE PROPERTY
ALONG WITH THE POSSESSION." (Emphasis added)

The Lawful coin of the United States was Gold and Silver which is
'substance'. In olden days, one got gold from the land and one could
buy land with gold. But back then, the conveyance of land through
purchase was honored (in the law) and full and absolute possession and
ownership was transferred!

So what we have covered so far, you can see that perhaps you don't own
your land. Merely compare your so-called title or deed to the points
of law as brought forth herein. In mid stream we ask you the question,
"Is property tax evidence of ownership?"' We'll let you also answer
that question.

Now on to Land Patents. Because all Federal Land Patents flow from
Treaties that fall under the "Supremacy Clause," no state, private
banking corporation or other federal agency can question the
superiority of title to land owners who have perfected their land by
Federal Land Patent. Public lands, as found in 42 American
Jurisprudence, Sec. 781 thru 873, shows that a Patent of land is to
be the title to land and anything else is FRAUD. Transfer of a patent
is by release of patent Interest Right and not by some form of 'USURY
INSTRUMENT' of Trust or Warranty. (See also 40 Am Jur, 577 thru 688)

A Land Patent issued by the United States is legal and conclusive
evidence of title to the land conveyed. (Opinion of U.S.  Attorney
General Sept. 1869). A Land Patent is the highest evidence of title.
Since Land Patents cannot be collaterally attacked as to their
"Validity" or "Authenticity' as the highest evidence of title; Federal
Land Patents were given free and clear 'ALLODIAL Title' with no
encumbrances then and now. Can you say the same about your land title?

The Patent alone passes land from the United States to the grantee and
nothing passes a perfect title to land but a Patent (Wilcox v Jackson,
13 Peter (U.S.) 498, 10 L.ed 264)

           * . . . with no fee or duty (TAX)!!!

Since a Land Patent is not a conveyance of title by someone assigning
their equity interest over to you, but a Land Patent is a TITLE AT
LAW, which establishes an ALLODIAL FREEHOLD that is Judgement proof
and even immune from tax liens! Again, can you say the same thing
about your land title? "THE PROPERTY TAX SCHOOL FUNDING ISSUE."

"OWNERSHIP VS FRAUD" IS IT A MASTER SLAVE RELATIONSHIP???"

Well there's a lot of emotions flowing out and about, around this here
Property Tax School Funding Issue! Within the State of Oregon, there
was more than a lot of talk about a sales tax, which would accordingly
lower property taxes. Following that, the people voted in the Lottery.
With the promise that funds would or could go to lower property taxes.
Time will tell on that one just don't hold your breath! Most
Oregonians don't want that sales tax! (Nor does any other person in
this country, unless they are a politician.) And if school funding
issues are brought into any discussion, in relation to or based on
property taxes, watch out, 'fur can fly'!

Many people, with good intentions, support the schools, to a point,
irrespective of the poor quality (the results) and the underlying
goals of such controlled education. It seems that every year, along
with teacher strikes, the property tax issue arises, with all the pros
and cons. Seems to just get worse than better! And haven't you
noticed, that all the politicians ever do, at any level, is to raise
taxes...then again, maybe you haven't noticed!

But then it's a 'Catch 2 Situation. To support the schools,
financially, property taxes must go up! Vote property taxes down, and
the schools must suffer! It's really a no win situation.  Maybe the
solution lies within QUESTIONS, or to put it another way, YOU may have
to go back to the beginning and find or discover the ANSWERS!

In order to get the right answer(s), one must ask the right questions,
like:  Are property taxes necessary?  Are property taxes lawful?


But the most important question is, "Is property tax indicia
(evidence) of true ownership"?

Well now, let's do some investigating! What does 'ownership' really
mean? "The complete dominion, title, or proprietary right in a thing
or claim. The entirety of the powers of use and disposal by law. The
exclusive right of Possession, enjoyment, and disposal.  Ownership of
property is absolute or qualified. Ownership of property is Absolute
when a single person has absolute dominion over it.  The ownership is
qualified when... use is restricted"!  (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th
Ed., pg.979) (Emphasis Added)

So what does his tell us? Ownership in land is: "THE COMPLETE
DOMINION, TITLE, EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF POSSESSION, ENJOYMENT,
RIGHT TO CONTROL WITH ABSOLUTE DOMINION OVER IT!!

That statement seems to be meaningless in view of the compelling of
PERMITS, and of course PROPERTY TAXES! Kind of like there's somebody
watching over you,, controlling or dictating what you can or cannot do
on your land, and then demanding "TAXES" as well.


It Would then appear that most people who have bought (paid off) their
land (with or without a home on it) do not have absolute control,
dominion, use, or even full enjoyment of it, when the individual and
land is RESTRICTED by local permits and property taxes!

Then it also follows that, if there are such restrictions on your
land, that you do not have 'absolute title'. Maybe then... you are not
really an owner, in the true sense of the word. I guess you would be
called a quasi owner. That defines you as "something like' an owner!
Maybe there is a 'SUPERIOR' above you, controlling the use of the land
and compelling a duty of fee for the 'interest' or 'use' of the
land... called property taxes! In the old days, way back in time, it
was called "FEUDALISM".

"The system was based upon a servile relationship between a "vassal"
and "'lord". The vassal paid homage and service to the lord and the
lord provided land and protection." (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed,,
pg. 559)

 Well now, not too bad, but let's take a look at "FEUDUM", defined as:

"A feud, fief, or fee (tax). A right of using and enjoying forever the
lands of another, which the lord (superior) grants on condition that
the tenant shall render fealty (duty or tax) military duty, and other
services. It is not properly the land, but a right in the land."
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg. 560) (Emphasis added)

So what you may be involved in, as a so called 'property owner', is a
form of feudalism, which is basically in modern terms:

"A system based upon a servant relationship between the servant and a
superior (State, Banking Co., Corporation, or other).  The servant for
the payment of a property tax (fee) has a right to use the land on
conditions!"

For today,, those conditions are the property tax, land use laws and
permits. It Should be noted however that if the servant fails to pay
the property taxes or violates any of the conditions, the servant will
be removed off the land and another servant will be allowed to use the
land...on the same conditions! One must remember, however, the state
will use any means to remove a servant/slave who fails to pay the
taxes, even to the point of using a SWAT TEAM!

The right to use the land does not grant absolute title. The servant
is without and is denied the true title, and is involved in what is
called simply a 'feudal system'. Please bear with me, my leading is
not in vain!

Let us now look at and define the word "FEUDAL", it is:

"Pertaining to feuds or fees; relating to or growing out of the feudal
system or feudal law; having the quality of a feud, as distinguished
from "Allodial". (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg.559) (Emphasis
added)

Well now, that's darn right interesting. This thing called "ALLODIAL",
which is distinguished (opposite) from the "Feudal system" of the use
of land without true ownership - for a fee!  well, we're going to take
a good look at this 'Allodial' thing.

But now those people who are in the know, or supposed to be, from REAL
ESTATE AGENTS, STATE OFFICIALS, to POLITICIANS, Obviously are not
directed to this information, or most likely this information has been
suppressed or even denied, not only from them...but from you to, the
so called property owner!!! Could it be that those we elect(?) or the
powers that are in the 'mushroom business', keeping everyone in the
dark and feeding them 'bull'?

Well hang on, we're getting warm. I now direct you to the definition
of Allodial, it is:

" Free; not holden of any lord or superior; owned without obligation
of vassalage of fealty; the opposite of feudal." (Black's Law
Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg.70) (Emphasis added)

Can you believe, a title of land where you are not beholden' to
anybody', owned without any 'obligation', of any duty or fee...
a property tax? Amazing but true!

Strictly speaking, in regards to land, we go to yet another
definition, and that is of land being held in ALLODIUM, as!

"Land held absolutely in one's own right, and not of any lord or
superior; land not subject to feudal duties or burdens. An estate held
by absolute ownership, with out recognizing any superior to whom any
duty is due on account there of'.. (Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.,
pg 70)

Therefore, if any title on land would be wanted or sought after, as a
treasure, it would certainly be an 'Allodial Title' would it not?

Imagine a 'Title', on your land, where you are not subject to duties,
fees, or taxes! Land held in absolute ownership with no superior above
you! That means (what should have happened) when you paid off the debt
on your land, the State, the Bank or the party holding the contract
until full payment, should of then transferred the proper true title,
an Allodial Title. You would then own your land free and clear, fee
simple, absolutely! It could then be said, that you held your land in
"PARAMOUNT", as in holding paramount title. Paramount being defined
as:

"In the law of real property, one which is superior to the title with
which it is compared, in the sense that the former is the source of
the later. It is, however, frequently used to denote a title which is
simply better or stronger than another, or will prevail over it."
(Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., pg. 1001)

So now the question is, does the title you hold, or will receive, give
you full absolute ownership, free and clear, fee simple, not subject
to any duty or tax....do you hold your land in Allodium with a
paramount title???

In the old days, it is my understanding, that land held under these
titles could not be liened, seized, or taxed! Of course this applied
to the land as well because of the "STATUS" of not only the land, but
the owners" as well. The land was owned, and nobody else had any
control, what so ever! The land represented the wealth of the family,
it was the family! Irrespective of hardships, family members could
always go back to the land, the family farm,, to survive and rebuild
any monetary loss and self esteem!

But no so today! With the many restrictions laced upon the land, and
of course with the State owning the land (State holds true titles) the
people cannot use the land for their needs, purposes, or desires.

Many people have been forced onto the welfare system as a result of
this modern day 'Feudal System' The land is simply...  not yours!

But now the question is this; "Why do you, the so called property
owner, do not have and hold an 'Allodial/ Paramount Title" to the land
(and home) that you THINK you own ?"

Why are you, the individual(s), the true substance and strength of
this country, denied the proper lawful title to your land? Why are you
denied the full enjoyment, from the use and ownership of your land? Is
the quest for control and power, by those in authority over you, worth
the violation of your "Life", "Liberty", and "Pursuit of Happiness".
Why are you led to believe that you own the land?  Why are you called
a landowner, when you are compelled to duties, fees, and taxes? When
you bought your property, did you understand and agree to having a
'superior' above you, controlling the use of your land? Why has the
State denied you true title to your property?

It is because the need and greed for power and control over the masses
that necessitates the fraud and scams to keep the State coffers full
and the sheep in line, thinking and believing that they own their
land, thereby making it a little easier to fleece!  State dictatorial
control, under the guise of permits, property taxes, and school
funding, in relation to the ownership of land" necessitates..."the end
justifies the means!"

This "Citizen", having an interest in the basic land/title issue, and
fully understanding the principles involved, the truth that "we are
merely serfs upon the land," that no one really owns their land, and
having no need  participate in "their" deceitful fraud...has turned
his energy toward other interests.

One such interest was 'prospecting' and its related area of
information. That of course led to collecting and reading books and
information about mining claims and U.S. regulations on mining claims
from the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). One of the letter documents
that I had received was quite a surprise, since I had skimmed over it
some time back.

The letter was from the "United States Department of the Interior",
"Bureau of Land Management", titled "Notice to Mining Claimant", 2nd.
paragraph, and in part said:

"Since a mining claimant has merely a possessory interest in the
location, the United States has PARAMOUNT TITLE in the land..."
(Emphasis added) this statement could apply to so called  Property
owners!

NOW THE QUESTION IS! "By what authority does the U.S. Government and
your State Government hold land in paramount title (un-taxable,
unalienable, and unseizable) and yet denies the very people of this
country (the RIGHT to hold their land in same status . . . in
Allodium?"

Get the people to 'believe' that 'they' own their own land and they
will pay the taxes on it, most of them, with a smile on their face!
Get the people to 'believe' they need to pay a property tax to support
the schools (free education) and the Government can add another link
in the chain...in the enslavement of the people in this "Land of the
Free!"

One might ask now, "How do the schools get funding"? Well, that's
simple. Since the monetary system of this country is run by a "Private
Corporation" circulating 'Bills', 'Notes', and 'Checks' (credit)
without substance and in violation of U.S. and every State
Constitutions (U.S. Art. l Sec, 10) (Look up your own States'
Constitution Article and Section). Since most taxing schemes are based
upon fraud and theft, demand your public servants to return the power
and authority to regulate the money system back to the U.S. Treasury,
and then demand the Treasury to turn on the printing presses. I mean
it's not really money, there's no substance, it's just paper! It's one
of those 'belief scams', you believe its money, that it has value, and
your 'confidence' thus makes it so!  But it's just paper with nothing
of value for support! Since your Government can and should operate
honestly, they can just send the 'cash' directly to the schools!

Of course, the other alternative is to shut all the schools down and
turn over the education to 'private enterprise' and 'home schools'!

But remember, the issue here is "That you don't own your land!" And
that's why you are compelled to pay property taxes...to support the
schools. Now I realize that every point cannot be raised here, either
in support or otherwise, but you must start with the basics.

"Get your land back, under a lawful, paramount, Allodial Title whereby
you own it free and clear, fee-simple, ABSOLUTELY, owing nothing to
nobody!" To do this, there's a price to be paid, and it is; Turn off
the boob tube , put the beer down, read the Constitution, study the
points raised herein, write some demanding letters to your public
servants, get together in your local and MAKE it
happen."

"Yes, we may not know what the future lies, but MAYBE IT'S TIME FOR
OUR EXODUS!"

 PROPERTY OWNERSHIP

When you buy property, you must know the difference between Allodium
and Feudal, and the various kinds of Titles.

When you own property, Allodial, no one can claim any control over
your property but you. When you own property Feudally, you do not
really own it, but are only renting it, and the owner has control of
the use of the property. Feudal ownership is a deception, because you
have, in actuality, contracted for a third party to own the property.

Therefore, you must abide by the provisions of the contract, and pay
the third party a rent for the use of the property. If you do not pay
that rent or tax, you will be removed from it and it will be "sold" to
someone who will pay. Property is "sold" on the courthouse steps every
day of the year, except weekends. You ask "Why on the courthouse steps
and not in the courthouse?"  This is because the property is "sold"
under color of law, and not according to the Common Law.

In order to own the property Allodial, you must make a Bill of
Conveyance to contract with the seller of the property, get the
property surveyed, do a Title search, and file those documents with
the Recorder in the Judicial Circuit or District in which the property
is located.

If you do not file for "homestead" exemption or make any other
contracts with the County or State, then you cannot be assessed any
tax or be forced to obtain permits to improve upon your property.
This means that the property is yours and no one else's and that you
are the only one in control of your property. I feel that every
property owner should have a copy of "Blacks Law Dictionary".

When you buy, make sure that the seller includes "ALL RIGHTS to the
property in the Bill of Conveyance including mineral rights.

You must also obey the statutes of the Corporate State and all the
regulations that go along with them, so the Corporate State can
keep their large greedy hands deep into your pockets.

You must also Know the difference between paying and discharging
a debt. When you pay a debt, you must pay with value or substance.
(see Art. I, Sect. 8, Cl. 5 and Art. I Sect. 10, Constitution for
the United States of America). YOU pay debt with Gold and/or Silver
coin, but you can only discharge a debt with "Federal Reserve
Notes"... Gold and Silver coins are value, if coined by Congress at
the U.S. Mint. (Art, I, Sect. 8, Cl. 5), and only Gold and Silver
coin can be used to pay debts. (Art. l, Sect. 10. When you use Gold
and Silver coin to pay a debt, it is paid in full. A Federal Reserve
Note cannot pay a debt, because it is only BANK CREDIT, or a debt in
itself.  How can you pay a debt with a debt?  You Cannot!  You can
only discharge the debt with Federal Reserve Notes. The debt still
exists and is not paid.

Article I, Section 8, Cl.17, of the Constitution for the united States
of America, establishes the District Of Colombia as a DIFFERENT and
SEPARATE NATION from the Republic of the united States of America .
The Congress has the EXCLUSIVE RULE OVER THE Citizens of the District
of Columbia, it's territories, Insular possessions and Federal
enclaves.  Those people have no RIGHTS, WHATSOEVER, other than what
Congress gives them. The Social Security Number is the Main Contract
with this Foreign government that creates this status of slavery.

The way to own property in a Freehold status is to rescind ALL
CONTRACTS with the Foreign Corporate Federal Government and the
Corporate Regional State, county and municipality.

When you "'buy'" property today, you do not buy the property, you
buy a lease from the County! Think about it for a minute. If the
county can tax the property, require a permit to improve it, take it
away from you if you do not pay the tax, who owns it? (see Blacks
Law Dictionary definitions, included).

If you PAY for it in Gold Coin, and on a Bill of Conveyance, do your
Title search, and survey, file those three documents with the clerk of
Circuit Court and the county recorders office, then you own allodial
your property and the county cannot tax it, make you get any permits,
take it from you, or even zone it, because the county does not own it
anymore. Make sure that you retain ALL rights to the property on the
Bill of Conveyance.

As for payment, you cannot pay a debt with a check or Federal Reserve
Notes (FRAUDS). They only, discharge the debt and the debt still
exists. To PAY a debt, you must barter, or pay in Gold or Silver Coin,
which cancels the debt. The Federal Reserve Note is debt and you
cannot pay a debt with a debt! (see Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 5 and Sec. 10,
Constitution for the United States of America)

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AND IT'S REGIONAL STATE WANTS TO 
BE YOUR GOD, BUT YOU CANNOT BE A U.S. CITIZEN (under the U.S.
Code and statutes passed by Congress and the regional State legislators)
and an American (under the Constitution and Gods Laws) at the same time,
You cannot serve two masters. YOU HAVE THE CHOICE, MAKE IT!

WALLACE V HARMSTAD

Ground-rent Deed invalid for fraudulent Alternation in hands of
Purchaser for Value without Notice, Effect of Alternation on the
parties and those claiming them. Ground-rents are Rents Service.
Statute of quia emptores not in force in Pennsylvania. Titles to Land
in Pennsylvania are allodial.

l. Where a landlord after a sale of lots reserving ground-rents, and
   delivery of the deeds, obtained possession of them, and having
   fraudulently altered the causes reserving the rents, sold them: the
   purchaser, though bona fide and without notice of the fraud, cannot
   recover, either by action at law or by distress.

2 . A vested estate will survive the loss of the instrument by which
it is created, for the deed may be proved by secondary evidence or
presumed from prescription; but if destroyed by the fraudulent act of
the party claiming under it, it cannot be then proved or supplied by
any presumption in his behalf.3. Ground-rents are rents service of
which distress is  a necessary incident: but a grantor who has not
reserved his rent by a valid deed cannot enforce it, because the
statute of quia emptores, which would have converted the rent-service
into a rent-charge is not in force here, and it cannot exist
independently of the deed, because Pennsylvania titles are allodial
and not feudal.

ERROR to the District of Philadelphia.

This was an action of replevin, by Edwin Harmstad against Mrs.  Alice
Wallace, who avowed for rent in arrear as reserved in one of the four
ground-rent deeds, the validity of which was passed upon by this court
in the cases of Arrison v Harmstad, 2 Barr 191, and Wallace v
Harmstad, 3 Harris 462.

The material facts connected with these cases will be found in the
reports of these cases, and are in substance as follows:

In the fall of 1838 Mathew Arrison agreed to sell to four brothers
Harmstad, four adjoining lots of ground, reserving out of each lot a
yearly rent of $60, payable half yearly on January 1st and July 1st,
in every year; the first half-yearly payment was to fall due on the
1st of July 1839. Under the deeds executed in accordance with this
agreement, each of the Harmstads entered upon his lot and built a
house thereon. The deeds were executed in duplicate, each deed was
signed by both parties; a part of the bargain was that the grantees
might extinguish their ground rents at par whenever they pleased. When
the deeds came to be executed, one of the four brothers discovered an
"open space, or unfilled blank, in all eight of the deeds and in
answer to his inquiry, was told by the alderman, that it meant that
there was to be no limit of time within which the rents should be
extinguished. This being in accordance  with their understanding, the
deeds were executed and delivered - the Harmstads took away their four
deeds, while Arrison took away the four counterparts.

Some time afterwards an agent of Arrison procured from the Harmstads
their four deeds, for the alleged purpose of getting them recorded,
and while they were with Arrison, or another party  beneficially
interested in the ground-rents, the same, together with the four
counterparts, were, either by Arrison or by some one under him,
altered, by the filling up of the blank in each of them with the words
"within ten years from the date thereof." In the mean time the first
half year's ground rent falling due July 1st 1839, was paid by the
Harmstads without any knowledge of the alternation. When they paid it
they asked for their deeds, and found they have not been recorded.
Another agent of the grantor, or of his cestui queuse, then carried
the deeds to the recorder's office, left them there, and gave the
Harmstads the recorder's receipts therefor; and it was not until some
weeks afterwards, when the deeds came back, that they discovered the
alternation. Since that time they refused to pay any more ground-rent.

The case of Arrison v Harmstad, 2 Barr 191, and Wallace v Harmstad, 3
Harris 462, having settled that an action of debt on such ground-rent
deed, or on the original contract prior to the deed, but supposed to
be executed by possession, or for use and occupation, or of covenant
on the ground-rent deed, will not lie--that all the covenants in the
deed are gone, and that the estate in the land is vested in the
grantee, freed and discharged therefrom--that the spoliator may lose,
but could not gain from his wrongful act, and that any innocent
purchaser of the rent is in no better condition, having bought from
the spoliator nothing at all, and that there is no similitude between
these cases and the case of negotiable paper in third hands, the owner
of this deed, Mrs. Wallace, resorted to a distress for rent, on which
distress this action of replevin was founded, as above stated.

Under the ruling of the court below there was a verdict and judgement
for plaintiff; whereupon the defendant sued out this writ, assigning
the judgement of the court below for error. E.S. Miller, for plaintiff
in error. J.A. Phillips, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered, May 6th 1863, by Woodward, J.
It is not to be doubted that the cases of Arrison v Harmstad, 2 Barr
191, and Wallace v Harmstad, 3 Barr 462, do decide that by reason of
the fraudulent alternation of the deed, reserving the ground-rent in
question, neither an action of debt or covenant would lie on any one
of the deeds for recovery of the rent, nor is it recoverable in an
action on the verbal contract  under which possession was obtained,
nor in any action for use and occupation of the premises. Setting
aside all the obiter dictum of those cases, they clearly established
these several conclusions, grounding them all on the policy of the law
which altogether forbids parties from tampering with written
instruments or deeds, and which, in its application to the deed in
question here, avoids the covenant reserving rent in favor of the
fraudulent grantor, but preserves the fee simple to the innocent
grantee, discharged from the covenants in the deed, When it was said
in the argument of the first of the above cases that equity would
reform the instrument in favor of a purchaser, Chief Justice Gibson
replied, "Show a case; the deed is dead, and equity cannot Put life
into it."

The stern ruling in those cases was applied without hesitation to a
bona fide purchaser of the ground-rent without notice of the fraud, so
that, as far as concerns Arrison, and all persons claiming under him,
the part of the deed which was intended to enure to his benefit, may
indeed be said to be dead. It was not merely a voidable instrument, it
was void. It was called a forgery, and treated as such, and neither
law nor equity would tolerate it even in the hands of an innocent
purchaser.

The question presented now is whether a ground rent so emphatically
condemned, and denied all remedy, both at law and equity, can be
enforced by distress. Mrs. Wallace having executed a distress, was
sued in this action of replevin, when she avowed for rent in arrear,
as reserved by one of the four deeds which were the subjects of
animadversion in the above cited cases. Her learned counsel does not
impugn those cases, but he seeks to parry the authority of them by a
distinction so nice as to be highly creditable to his acumen, even if
it be not well founded in law. Let me try to state it distinctly.

He says that a ground-rent reserved in a deed by a grantor is an
estate which vests in him the instant the fee simple in the land vests
in the grantee; that estate is a rent-service; that it continues to
exist, though the instrument reserving it be destroyed; and that a
right of distress is one of the necessary legal incidents of the
estate. Then he argues that the plaintiff's distress was not by virtue
of the deed, but was founded on the intrinsic and essential qualities
of the estate in the grantor, and that the reference to the deed in
the avowry was only for the purpose of defining the estate and the
amount of the rent.

I think the defect of the argument will be found to consist in the
third proposition. Not that it is untrue as a general position that a
vested estate will survive the instrument of its creation, but that
the position is too broadly stated when it is made to include an
incorporeaI hereditament which lies in grant, and can only exist by
virtue of a deed, devise, or record, or by prescription, which is
rather to be considered as an evidence of a former acquisition, than
as an acquisition de nora: 2 Black 66.

That ground-rent is a rent-service was demonstrated in Ingersoll v
Sergeant, l Wh. 337, a case which has been so often recognized and
followed as to have become a rule of property. Rent-service was the
only kind of rent originally known to the common law; a right of
distress was inseparably incident to it so long as it was payable to
the lord who was entitled to the fealty; and it was called a rent-
service because it was given as a compensation for the military or
other services for which the land was originally liable. When a rent
was granted out of lands by deed, the grantee had no power to distrain
for it, because there was no fealty annexed to such grant.  To remedy
this inconvenience an express power of distress was inserted in grants
of this kind, and it was thence called a rent charge, because the
lands were charged with a distress. Rent-seek, or barren-rent, is in
effect nothing more than a rent for the recovery of which no power of
distress is given, either by rules of the common law or the argument
of the parties: 1 Co. Lit. (Thomas' ed.) star p. 443, in note, and 2
Black. (Sharswood's) 42, and note.  Blackstone ranks all of these
rents as incorporeal hereditament, and Coke, commenting on Littleton's
distinction between feoffment and grants, says, here is implied a
division of fees into corporeal, as lands and tenements which lie in
livery, comprehended in this word feoffment, and may pass by livery
with or without deed, and incorporeal, which lie in grant, and cannot
pass by livery but by deed, as advowson, commons, etc: 2 Coke Lit.
(Thomas' ed), star page 333. Rent belongs to this category, and is
implied by Lord Coke's "etc.," and is indeed the most perfect
illustration of an incorporeal hereditamint, for it issues directly
out of the thing corporate, without being any part of it.

But suppose the deed by which an incorporeal hereditament was granted
be lost or destroyed, must the grantee lose his estate? Lord Chief
Justice Eyre answers this question in Bolton v The Bishop of Carlisle,
2 H. Black. 23, Where he says, "In pleading a grant the allegation is
that the party at such time did grant, but if by accident the deed be
lost, there are authorities enough to show that other proof may be
admitted; the question in that case is whether the parties did grant?
To prove this, the best evidence must be produced, which is the deed,
but if that be destroyed, other evidence may be received to show that
the thing was once granted. "So in Reed v Brookman, 3 T.R. 151, where
a lost release of an annuity was pleaded without profert, the King's
Bench sustained the plea and overruled the demurrer to it.

These cases, and others cited in the argument to the same effect,
assert nothing more than a rule of evidence in very familiar practice
with us, that secondary evidence will be received where the party
shows it is out of his power, without any fault of his, to produce the
primary, but they establish no exception to the general rule that
incorporeal estates must be evidence by a grant. If the best evidence
of the grant cannot be had, the next best will be received; but the
result of the evidence must be to establish the grant. Even when an
easement is to be sustained by prescription, or a right of way by
necessity, a grant is presumed from long enjoyment, of the easement,
or from the necessity for the right of way, and thus again the result
of the evidence is to establish the grant. So true is the maxim that
incorporeal hereditament lie only in grant.

But what is to be said to a party who is unable to produce the
original grant because he has himself fraudulently altered it? Shall
he or his alienee be permitted to go into secondary evidence? When
the law has refused him all its forms of action on such a mutilated
instrument, will it allow him to take redress into his own hands and
levy a distress for himself? This would be to reverse the maxim, in
idiom spoliatoris, omniapraesumuntur. In accordance with the maxim,
we ought rather to presume that he never had a grant, and therefore
no estate which carried with it the incidental right of distress.

It is apparent that this view of the case places the plaintiff in
error upon the arisen deed just as much as she stood upon it in her
former action of covenant, and it has been suggested, not in
forgetfulness that it is not the position chosen for her by her
consul, but by way of showing that his main proposition was too
broadly stated for the case in hand, and that, holding only an
incorporeal hereditament, he cannot get her case away from the deed.
It seems to me that her right of distress must be judged by the deed,
and that the deed is no more available for this purpose than it was
for the actions of debt and covenant.

But now let the case be looked at from another stand-point.  By the
common law, before the statute of quia emptores (18 Edw. l, c. l, A.D.
1290), according to the text of Littleton, "if s man made a feoffment
in fee simple, by deed or without deed, yielding to him and his heirs
a certain rent, this was a rent service, and for this he might
distrain of common right; and if there were no reservation of any
rent, nor of any service, yet the feoffee held of the feoffor by the
same service as the feoffor did hold over of his lord next paramount."
Upon which latter clause beginning with the words "and if there were
no reservation," Lord Cokes's comment is, "This is evident, and
agreeth with our books that in this case the law created the tenure,"
and on the words "by deed or without deed," he observes, "for all
rent-services may be reserved without deed; and at the common law, if
man made a feoffment in fee by parol, he might upon that feoffment
reserve a rent to him and his heirs; because it was a rent-service,
and a tenure thereby created:

Rent-service, then, was an essential element of the feudal tenure. It
did not depend on contract, it resulted necessarily out of the grant
of the feud. The services which the vassal was bound to preform were
indeed declared by the lord at the time of the investiture in the
presence of the other vassals: 1 Craise's Digest 9, and were assented
to of course by the vassal: but as these were to a great extent
uncertain, they could not be specified, and were only declared in a
general way, as to attend on the lord in war, and on his courts in
times of peace; to defend his person, and aid him to pay his debts,
etc.; terms not agreed upon as between contracting parties, but terms
dictated by a superior to an inferior. And by the old feudal law, the
nonperformance of these services was not redressed by distress, but by
forfeiture of the feud. Baron Gilbert, in his excellent little work on
the "Law of Replevins, "tells us that the distress came from the civil
law into the common law, and that there appear no footsteps of it in
the feudal authors. He admits, however, that it is immemorial in the
common law and was at first as burdensome and grievous to tenants as
the feudal forfeiture; for to the tenant there was no difference
between the lord's seizing the land itself, or stripping him of the
whole produce and fruits of it at his pleasure. But these oppression
ended with the wars of the Barons, and towards the end of the reign of
Henry III. particular laws were made to regulate the manner of
distressing, and not to suffer the lords to extend this remedy beyond
the mischief it was first introduced for, which was no more than to
empower the lord, by seizing the chattels, to oblige the tenant to
preform the feudal services: Gilbert's Law of Replevin, pp, 4-6.
Fealty to him from whom the lands were holden was the great
characteristic of feudal tenures: the services of fealty were enforced
by distress, and hence, although a feud were granted absolutely, in
fee simile, by livery of seisin only, and without a word of
reservation expressed, the lord had his right of distress for the
rent, which came to be the substitute of the feudal services. That
right depended not on contract, or the terms of the feoffment, but was
a condition of the tenure. It is very clear that it would have been no
answer to a distress to tell the lord that he had lost, or by his
wrongful act avoided, the deed which expressed the reservation of his
rent service. The reply could have been that the rent-service depended
on no formal reservation, but that it resulted by inherent necessity
out of the tenure, and that distress was its inseparable incident.
This is the ground on which the present case is attempted to be
supported, Let us proceed carefully in tracing the principles of the
law that must determine whether it can be placed on this ground.

The statute of guia emptores destroyed subinfeudation in England.
Saith Littleton (speaking of the effect of the statute), "where a man
upon a gift in tail, or a lease for life, will reserve to himself a
rent-service, it behoveth that the reversion of the lands and
tenements be in the donor or lessor, for if a man will make a
feoffment in fee, or will give lands in tail, the remainder over in
fee simple, without deed reserving to him a certain rent, this
reversion is void; for that no reversion remains in the donor, and
such tenant holds his lands immediately of the lord of whom his donor
held:" 1 Thomas, Coke Litt. star p. 444. Such was the effect of the
statute.


I find the best explication of this subject in Comyn on Landlord and
Tenant, p. 97, to the effect following: "The statute guia emptores
having abolished all intermediate tenures, and the reversion of every
fee being by the feoffment divested out of the feoffor, and
transferred to the original lord of the fee: the fealty and rent, as
incident thereto, were likewise transferred. The fealty was
inseparably incident to the reversion, and therefore never could be
lost to the ultimate lord. But the rent, though generally incident
to the reversion, might, at the will of the feoffor, be so separated
from it, and reserved to the feoffor himself,  provided such
reservation were by deed. But the fealty being now severed from the
rent, the remedy by distress, which was only given in respect of the
fealty, became lost to the feoffor; and therefore such rent stood
precisely in the same situation as other rents before the statute;
and could only be distrained for by being charged upon the land by a
special clause in the deed of reservation.  When, therefore, a man
aliens all his estate, and leaves no reservation in him, as if tenant
in fee make a feoffment, or tenant for life alien his life estate, no
rent can be reserved, except it be by a deed.  On the other hand, a
lease for years not being alienation of the freehold, but a mere
contract for a temporary enjoyment of the land, a rent might well be
reserved by parol upon such a contract."

The effect of the statute, to state it more briefly, was to take the
rent-service out of the tenure, upon subinfeudation, and to convert it
into a rent-charge, which must have a contract to support it. Now it
is apparent that any right of distress which Arrison or his alienee,
Mrs. Wallace, possessed, would in England be referred to the deed,
because the reversion was gone from them, and all the essential
qualities of the tenure went with the reversion. But the statute of
guia emptores was never in force in Pennsylvania, Ingersoll v
Sergeant, 1 Wh. 337, and therefore this rent-service is not converted
into a rent charge.  Can it exist then independently of the deed? It
certainly can, in the absence of the statute quia emptares, if our
titles be feudal: it as certainly cannot, if our titles be allodial.

I see no way of solving this question, except by determining whether
our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal. It seems strange that
so fundamental a question as this should be in doubt at this day, but
it has never had, so far as I know, a direct judicial decision. In a
valuable note by Judge Sharswood to the opening passage of
Blackstone's Chapter on Modern English Tenures (2 Sharswood's Black.
77), it is said, "that though there are some opinions that feudal
tenures fell with the Revolution, yet all agree that they existed
before, and the better opinion appears to be that they still exist."
In support of this statement, the feudal principles that have entered
into our conveyancing are alluded to, and several cases are cited in
which the consequences and qualities of feudal tenures have been
recognized in our estates, although generally, in these very cases, it
has been assumed that our property is allodial. I venture to suggest
that much of the confusion of ideas that prevails on this subject has
come from our retaining, since the American Revolution, the feudal
nomenclature of estates and tenures, as feel, freehold, heirs,
feoffment, and the like. This term "'rent-service"' is feudal
language, as we have seen, and yet there is nothing in the application
of such terms to determine the quality of the tenure; for Cruise tells
us, 1 Digest 7, that the circumstance of annexing a condition of
military service to a grant of lands does not imply that they are held
by a feudal tenure:  for the possessors of allodial property, who were
called in France liberi homines, were bound to the performance of
military service. He defines a feud as a tract of land held by a
voluntary and gratuitous donation, on condition of fidelity and
certain services, and allodial lands as those whereof the owner had
the dominium directum et verum, the complete and absolute property,
free from all services to any particular lord. And yet the accident of
services being annexed to an allodial grant, did not make it feudal,
which shows that the genuine distinction consisted in fealty, and not
in services.  Fealty, says Christian, in his note to 2 Black. 46,
quoting Wright's Law of Tenures 35: "Fealty, the essential feudal
bond, is so necessary to the very notion of a feud, that it is a
downright contradiction to suppose the most improper feud to subsist
without it; but the other properties or obligations of an original
feud may be qualified or varied by the tenure or express terms of the
feudal donation."

Our question, then narrows itself down to this: is fealty any part of
our land tenures? What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands by
"openly and humbly kneeling before his lord, being ungrit, uncovered,
and holding up his hands both together between those of the lord, who
sat before him, and there professing that he did become his man from
that day forth, for life and limb, and earthly honor, and then
receiving a kiss from his lord?"  This was the oath of fealty which
was, according to Sir Martin Wright, the essential feudal bond so
necessary to the very notion of a feud.

I grant that the charter to Penn was in free and common socage, to
which feudal tenures had at that time been reduced in England, and
that the oath of fealty belonged to socage tenures as much as to
original feuds, and was expressly recognized in the charter. But
then came the Revolution, which threw off the dominion of the mother
country, and established the independent sovereignty of the state and
on the 27th day of November 1779 (1 Smith's Laws, 480), an act was
passed for vesting the estates of the late proprietaries of
Pennsylvania in the Commonwealth. This act, after reciting in, four
sections the rights and duties of a sovereign state, proceeded in
sec. 5 to transfer to the Commonwealth every estate, right, title,
interest, property, claim, and demand of the proprietaries, as fully
as they hold them on the 4th day of July 1776, and all royalties,
franchises, and lordships, granted in the Charter of King Charles the
Second, were vested in the state. The manors and lands which had been
surveyed for the proprietaries were excepted, and a pecuniary
compensation to them was provided.  Another Act of 9th of April 1781,
2 Smith 532, provided for opening the land office and granting lands
to purchasers; and, says the 11th section, "all be free and clear of
all reservations and restrictions as to mines, royalties, quit-rents,
or otherwise, so that the owners thereof respectively shall be
entitled to hold the same in absolute and unconditional property, to
all intents and purposes whatsoever, belonging to or accruing from
the same, and that clear and exonerated from any charge or encumbrance
whatever, excepting the doubts of the said owner, and excepting and
reserving only the fifth part of all gold and silver ore for the use
of the Commonwealth, to be delivered at the pit's mouth, clear of all
charges.

If it should be suggested that these acts were inapplicable to the
city of Philadelphia, because it had been laid out by the
proprietaries before the opening of the land office by the state, I
would refer to Judge Gibson's observations in Bubley v Vanhorn, 7 S.
& R. 184, Where he says, to have suffered the Penn family to retain
those rights which they held strictly in their proprietary character,
would have been inconsistent with the complete political independence
of the state. The province was a fief hold immediately from the Crown,
and the Revolution would have operated very inefficiently towards
complete emancipation, if the feudal relation had boon suffered to
remain. It was therefore necessary to extinguish all foreign interest
in the soil, as well as foreign jurisdiction in the matter of
government.

We are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of Assembly as
emancipating every acre of the soil of Pennsylvania from the grand
characteristic of the feudal system. Even as to the lands held by the
proprietaries themselves, they held them as other citizens held, under
the Commonwealth, and that by a title purely allodial.  All our lands
are held mediately or immediately of the state, but by titles purged
of all the rubbish of the dark ages, excepting only the feudal names
of things not any longer feudal.

Escheat, which was one of the incidents of feudal tenures, is
sometimes mentioned as making the feudal origin of our titles, and
the allegiance which we owe to the state is also often spoken of as
fealty. Escheat, with us, depends on positive statute, which makes
the state the heir of property on defect of known kindred of the
decedent.  Nothing about it but the name is feudal, and this is
another instance in which a word applied in a sense different from
its original meaning, suggests ideas which have been exploded. As
to allegiance, it is indeed due from every citizen to the state, but
it is a political obligation, and is as binding on him who enjoys the
protection of the Commonwealth, without owning a foot of soil, as on
him who counts his acres by hundreds and thousands. So also it is
due to the Feudal Government, through which none of our titles have
been derived. The truth is, that this obligation, which is reciprocaI
to the right of protection, results out of the political relations
between the government and the citizen, and bears no relation whatever
to his land titles any more than to his personal property.

Under the Acts of Assembly I have alluded to, the state became the
proprietor of all lands, but instead of giving them like a feudal lord
to an enslaved tenantry, she has sold them for the best rice she could
get, and conferred on the purchaser the same absolute estate she held
herself, except the fifth of gold and silver, and six acres in the
hundred for roads, and these have been reserved, as everything else
has been granted, by contract. Her patents all acknowledge a pecuniary
consideration, and they stipulate for no fealty, no escheat, rent-
service, or other feudal incident. I conclude, therefore, that the
state is lord paramount as to no man's land. When any of it is wanted
for public purposes, the state, in virtue of her political
sovereignty, takes it, but she compels herself, or those who claim
under her, to make full compensation to the owner.

Now, if the state was not paramount lord of the lots which Arrison
possessed, how could he become the lord of his grantee? How could he
receive anything out of those lots, against his absolute deed in fee
simple, except, by an express reservation? To do so, he must ignore
the American Revolution, and all our legislation about lands, and
place himself back upon the common law, as it stood in the thirteenth
century, before the statute of quia emptores was passed.  But if he is
not permitted to do all this, then he must show a deed for what he
claims, and this brings us back to the first conclusion, that the
present right of distress depends on a deed rio less than the previous
actions at law.

There is in the English reports a long line of cases terminating in
Ward v Lumley, decided in the Exchequer in 1860, and reported in 5
Hurlstone, Young & Gordon, wherein it was held that canceling a lease
by mutual consent of both parties, does not destroy the estate vested
in the lessee, and the lessor may therefore maintain an action of debt
on the demise for the recovery of the rent, a case which is a fair
type of its class and which it is said rules the present case in favor
of the plaintiff in error.

An obvious distinction betwixt that case and the present is the
absence of all fraudulent intent in the destruction of the lease; but
not to insist on this, let me say that all cases of that sort proceed
on the ground that, the lease leaves a reversion in the lessor, in
virtue of which he may sue for rent. That this in that ground of
recovery in such instances, is shown by the cases in which it has been
held that a lessor cannot bring an action of covenant, after he has
assigned the reversion for any breach subsequent to the assignment,
but the action can only be brought by the assignee of the reversion.
Consequently, if the assignee of the reversion sue the assignee of the
term, or the assignee of the term sue the lessor, the action is local,
and must be brought in the county where the land lies: Thursby v
Plant, 1 Saund. Rep. 241, and notes.

Now, whoever will turn back and read the extract I made from Comyn,
will see that the statute quia emptores did not affect leases of
chattel interests, but only feoffment by mesne lords.  Subinfeudation
was what the statute destroyed, and it destroyed it by vesting the
reversion in the ultimate signory. But in leases for years, the
reversion remains in the lessor, and goes by assignment, to his
assignee, and carries with it the right of action.  The case, is that
here was a conveyance in fee simple of an allodial estate, without any
reversion remaining in the grantor, and therefore all his remedies for
rent on his contract.  If the estate were feudal the absence of the
statute would lead to a different conclusion; but with great deference
to all counter opinions, I hold that the estate was strictly allodial,
and that Arrison retained only what was expressed in the deed. If the
question were up for the first time, we might perhaps doubt whether
the alteration made by Arrison was fatal to Mrs.  Wallace's rights;
but we consider ourselves concluded on that question by the previous
decisions, and have not therefore discussed it. Taking the doctrine of
those cases, the only question left has seemed to us to be, whether
Mrs. Wallace had any remedy by virtue of the estate that is in her,
and independently of the deed; and all we have said must be understood
as applying to that question.

We have not thought it worth while to consider the case in connection
with the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, for if that statute should
be found to be applicable, it would only bring us to the conclusion
which we reach without it.

The judgment is affirmed.

               LAND PATENTS AND ALLODIAL TITLES

                  Part I: Introduction

If the American people ever allow the banks to control issuance of
their currency, first by inflation and then by deflation, the banks
and corporations that grow up around them will deprive the people of
all property until their children will wake up homeless on the
continent their father occupied. [Thomas Jefferson]

While it is generally believed in America today that the purpose of
the American Revolution was to resist taxation without representation,
the actual reason was to eliminate the cause of this and many other
injustices, and that cause was the admiralty jurisdiction imposed
within the bodies of the counties. A major effect of this cause was a
contractual feudal/serf relationship between the colonial landholders
and the Crown - legal title being held by Great Britain and an
equitable title being held by the colonist/serf in possession of and
working the land.

This presumption of rightful legal title was challenged by the
colonists, who insisted that the King of England did not own the land
and, therefore, it was not his to grant to supportive colonists.
After the Revolution, the land became the property of each State's
people, with the authority of the people to parcel out the land to
claimants in a fair and equitable manner. If some land remained
unoccupied, Jefferson said that anyone occupying it has, by
possession, the right of ownership. Land was to be held by allodial
title, which simply means there is "No superior or overlord" to the
land owner. He was Sovereign on his land.

One of the earliest statutes for granting land patents was passed
by an Act of Congress, April 24, 1820, which prohibited the use of
credit for the purchase of government land.  In the debates in
Congress prior to the passage of this Act, Senator King of New York
said:

It (the Act) is calculated to plant in the new county a population
of independent, unembarrassed freeholders...it will put it in the
power of every one to purchase a freehold, the price of which can be
cleared in three years... it will prevent the accumulation of an
alarming debt, which experience proves never could or would be paid.

In 1862, the Homestead Act, Section 4, provided that:

No lands acquired under the provisions of this Act shall in any event
become liable to the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted
prior to the issuing of the land patent.

The issue of allodial v feudal land titles in Africa was addressed by
the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania in the case of Wallace
v Harmstad in 1863:

I see no way of solving this question, except by determining whether
our Pennsylvania titles are allodial or feudal...

I venture to suggest that much of the confusion of ideas that prevails
on this subject has come from our retaining, since the American
Revolution, the feudal nomenclature of estates and tenures, as fee,
freehold, heirs, feoffment and the like.

Our question, then, narrows itself down to this:  is fealty any
part of our land tenures?

What Pennsylvanian ever obtained his lands by openly and humbly
kneeling before his lord, being un-girt, uncovered, and holding up
his hands both together between those of the Lord, who sat before
him, and there professing that he did become his man from that day
forth, for life and limb, and certainly honor, and then receiving a
kiss from his lord?  This was the oath of fealty which was, according
to Sir Martin Wright, the essential feudal bond so necessary to the
very notion of a feud.

We are then to regard the Revolution and these Acts of Assembly as
emancipating every acre of soil of Pennsylvania from the grand
characteristics of the feudal system.  Even as to the lands held by
the proprietaries (City of Philadelphia) themselves, they held them as
other citizens held, under the Commonwealth, and that by a title
purely allodial.  Wallace v Harmstad, 44 Pa. 492, (1863)

So, the people had a right to allodial land titles as a direct result
of the Declaration of Independence and the War for Independence that
followed.  A holder of an allodial title (i.e., there being no
Superior or overlord) cannot taxed on that property against his
consent.  There could be a transfer or sales tax imposed by the State
at the time of purchase, but no taxation of the property itself
against the owner's consent.  And yet, the taxation of property soon
became the custom, and not the exception, in this country.  Why and
How?

When taxation of real property began, because of "the confusion of
ideas that prevails on this subject," the people unknowingly, and
voluntarily accepted the premise that government was the Superior
and the legal title holder; and their interest in the land was merely
an equitable one. This voluntary acceptance constituted tacit consent
to a feudal contract. King George, once again, was back in America.

When the gigantic public trust was implemented in 1913 via the Federal
Reserve Act, no immediate changes with regard to this master/serf
relationship between government and landholder were necessary. Life
went on as usual with no clues to the fact that all property had been
hypothecated to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve; and as
trustees, they held legal title. This was accomplished by allowing the
same taxing agencies to act as administrating agents for this newly
formed trust.

With the feudal tenant registered as a beneficiary of this trust via a
Birth Certificate, and title to the land held in trust, further
involvement and the consequent subjection to the controls of
management was left to the individual. For example: The farmer/tenant
was left to his own devices and discretion as to what to plant, when
to plant, how much to plant, etc., as long as he paid his tithes to
the tax collector (now, in actuality, a collector of interest and/or
insurance, premiums. However, when he applied, for, and received, such
"benefits" as farm subsidy, government supported grain storage, etc.,
he became further bound to the trust and incurred certain additional
obligations and duties, he voluntarily subjected himself to the
coercive terms of adhesion contracts. Now, he could be ordered and
directed as what to plant, where to plant, when to plant, how much of
each crop, and even be ordered to destroy crops already in existence.
If he thought that such coercive, and apparently insane, actions were
violative of his rights to due process of law and went to court, as
many farmers did, he lost; and the court did not tell him why, that a
contract was being enforced against him in which he had voluntarily
subjected himself to its coercive terms.

If he had understood the facts and the applicable law, as it applies
to those facts, he could have used the law to extricate himself from
such an intolerable situation, in lieu of having the law used against
him.


The founding fathers knew free men could survive only as long as they
owned allodial title to property, because it is this type of ownership
that accounted for broad spectrum distribution of income and
preservation of the common law jury system, which they referred to as
the "palladium," or the very cornerstone, of liberty. They also knew
that manipulation of the money supply, via debt, would ultimately take
from the people their substance by concentrating the property into the
hands of a few.

Mortgage foreclosures of equitable title interests are on the
increase, and are the means of implementing this public policy.


The best title one can acquire from a title company today is a "Fee
Simple Absolute" defined as:

A fee simple absolute is an estate limited absolutely to a man and his
heirs and assigns forever without limitation or condition.

At first blush it would appear that this is the same title as
"allodial" defined as:

Free, not holden to any lot or superior; Black's Law Dictionary

In order to discover the legal distinction between the terms
"allodial", and "fee simple absolute,"  we must define the word
"estate" as used in the definition of "fee simple absolute."

ESTATE: The degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest which a
person has in real property is usually referred to as an estate, and
it varies from absolute ownership down to naked possession. Black's
Law Dictionary

Thus, "fee simple absolute" is an over broad, catch all, phrase that
encompasses all interests in land from allodial down to naked
possession. It in no way describes or defines your vested interest
in the land. Clearly, if the land is in trust, with legal title being
held by the trustees of that trust, you do not possess allodial title.
In order to discover your particular interest in this "fee simple
absolute" (your degree of serfdom), we must know of all adhesion
contracts you have consummated, placing additional burdens and
restrictions upon your use of that land.

Maybe we are beginning to understand the legal basis for planning
commissions, land use permits, building permits, etc., etc... The
bottom line is the degree, quantity, nature, and extent of interest;
and which party to the contract(s) possesses what.

What we are going to examine now is how one, as a free sovereign, can
claim allodial title to property hypothecated to a trust governed by
the Monetary Power.

The formula of the Monetary Povier for a world program to deprive
landowners of their lands has been stated thus:

We shall soon begin, to establish huge monopolies, colossal reservoirs
of wealth, upon which even the big... properties will be dependent to
such an extent that they will all fall together with the government
credit on the day following the political catastrophe.  The economists
here present, must carefully weigh the significance of this
combination. We must develop, by every means, the importance of OUR
SUPER GOVERNMENT, REPRESENTING IT AS THE PROTECTOR AND
BENEFACTOR OF ALL WHO VOLUNTARILY SUBMIT TO US. (Join the 
Trust wherein "US" are the trustees)

The aristocracy... as a political force has passed away. We need not
take theirs into consideration. But, as owners of land, they are
harmful to us in that they are independent in their sources of
livelihood. THEREFORE, AT ALL COSTS, WE MUST DEPRIVE THEM
OF THEIR LAND.

THE BEST MEANS TO ATTAIN THIS, IS TO INCREASE THE TAXES 
AND MORTGAGE INDEBTEDNESS. These measures will keep land
ownership in a state of unconditional subordination...

At the same time, IT IS NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE... ESPECIALLY...
SPECULATION... Without Speculation industry will cause private capital
to increase and tend to improve the condition of Agriculture by
freeing the land from indebtedness for loans by the land banks.
It is necessary for industry to deplete the land both of and through
speculations, transfer all the money of the world into our hands....

To destroy... industry, we shall, as an  incentive to this
speculation, encourage a strong demand for luxuries, all enticing
luxuries.

We will force up wages, which however will be of no benefit to the
workers, for we will at the same time cause a rise in the prices of
prime necessities, pretending that this is due to the decline of
agriculture and cattle raising....That THE TRUE SITUATION SHALL NOT
BE NOTICED PREMATURELY, (before recognition of the Anti-Christ), WE
WILL MASK IT, BE A PRETENDED EFFORT TO SERVE THE WORKING 
CLASS AND PROMOTE GREAT ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, FOR WHICH
AN ACTIVE PROPAGANDA WILL BE CARRIED ON THROUGH OUR
ECONOMIC THEORIES.

Part II: Color of Title

Today, the American based system establishing land ownership consists
of three key requirements. These three are the warranty deed or some
other type of deed purporting to convey ownership of land, title
abstracts to chronologically follow the development of these different
types of deeds to a piece of property, and title insurance to protect
the ownership of that land. These three ingredients must work together
to ensure a systematic and orderly conveyance of a piece of property.
None of these three by itself can act to completely convey possession
of the land from one person to another. At least two of the three are
always deemed necessary to adequately satisfy the legal system and
real estate agents that the title to title property has been placed in
the hands of the purchaser.  Often, all three are necessary to
properly pass the ownership of the land to the purchaser. Yet does the
absolute title and the ownership of the land really pass from the
seller to purchaser with the use of any one of these three instruments
or in any combination thereof?  None of the three by itself passes the
absolute or allodial title to the land, the system of land ownership
in America originally operated under, and even combined, all three can
not convey this absolute type of ownership. What then, is the function
of these three instruments that are used in land conveyances; and what
type of title is conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces
the title and the title insurance only insures the title, the most
important and therefore the first group to examine are the deeds that
purportedly convey the fee from seller to purchaser.

These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, quit claim
deed, sheriff's deed, trustee's deed, judicial deed, tax deed, will,
or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the title.  Each of
these documents state that it conveys the ownership to the land. Each
of these, however, is actually a color of title. [G.  Thompson, Title
to Real Property, Preparation and Examination of Abstracts, Ch. 3,
Section 73, p.93 (1919.]

A color of title is that which in appearance is title but which in
reality is not title; and, in fact, any instrument may constitute
color of title when it purports to convey title to the land, as well
as the land itself, although it is void as a muniment of title. The
Supreme Court of Missouri has stated:

[When we say a person has a color of title, whatever way be the
meaning of the phrase, we express the idea, at least, that act has
been previously done... by which some title, good or bad, to a parcel
of land of definite extent has been conveyed to him. St. Louis v
Gorman, 29 Mo. 593 (1860)

In other words, a color of title is an appearance of apparent title,
an "image" of the true title, hence the qualification "color of"
which, when coupled with possession, purports to convey the ownership
of the land to the purchaser. However, this does not say the color of
title is the actual or true title itself, nor does it say the color of
title itself actually conveys ownership. In fact the claimant or
holder of a color of title is not even required to trace the title
through the chain down to his instrument. Rather it may be said a
color of title is prima facie evidence of ownership of land, and
rights to possession of the land until such time as that presumption
of ownership is disproved by a better title or the actual title
itself. If such cannot be proven to the contrary, then ownership of
the land is assumed to have passed to the occupier of the land. To
further strengthen a color of title holder's position, courts have
held that the good faith of the holder of a color of title is presumed
in the absence of evidence to, the contrary.

With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is interesting to
discover what constitutes colors of title:

1. Warranty deed - A warranty deed is like any other deed or
conveyance, and a warranty deed or conveyance is a color of title.


2. Deeds generally - Deeds constitute colors of title and a deed that
purports to convey interest in land is a color of title.  A deed
which, on its face, purports to convey a title constitutes a claim and
color of title.

3 . Quit-claim deeds - A quit-claim deed is a color of title and
can pass the title as effectively as a warranty with full covenants.


4. Sheriff's deeds, Judicial deeds, and tax deeds are also colors of
title. The Illinois Supreme Court Went into detail in its
determination that a tax deed is only a color of title:

There the complainant seems to have relied upon the tax deed as
conveyinq to him the fee, and to sustain such a bill, it was
incumbent of him to show that all the requirements of the law had been
complied with. Huls v Buntin, 47 ILL- 396 (1865)

A simple tax deed by itself is only a color of title and does not meet
all the requirements of the law for a fee simple, allodial title. Thus
any tax deed which purports, on its face, to convey title is a good
color of title.

5 . Wills - A will passes only a color of title and can pass only so
much as the testator owns, though it may attempt to pass more.

6. Trustee's deed, mortgage and foreclosure - A trustee's deed, a
mortgage and strict foreclosure or any document defining the extent of
a disseisor's Claim or purported claim have all been held to be colors
of title:

[t]here is nothing here requiring a deed, to establish a color of
title, and under the former decisions of this court, color of title
may exist without a deed. Baldwin v Ratcliff, 125 ILL. 376 (1888)

Thus, a color of title does not mean the actual title, nor does the
question of notice of outstanding title effect a color of title.

None of these cases have been overruled and are still valid, well
established, law. All of the documents described in these cases are
the main avenues of claimed land ownership in America today: yet, none
actually conveys the true and allodial title. They in fact convey
something quite different.

When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an appearance of
title, such a statement is correct but, perhaps, too vague to be
properly understood in its correct legal context. Of better use are
the more pragmatic statements concerning title. A title, or color of
title, in order to be effective in transferring the ownership, or
purported ownership, of the land must be a marketable or merchantable
title.

A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably free from
doubt. This title must be reasonably free from doubts as necessary to
not affect the marketability or salability of the property, and must
be a title a reasonably prudent person would be willing to accept.
Such a title is often described as one which would ensure to the
purchaser a peaceful enjoyment of the property;  and it is stated that
such a title must be obvious, evident. apparent, certain, sure or
indubitable.

Marketable Title Acts adopted in several states generally do not lend
themselves to an interpretation that they might operate to provide a
new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or interlopinq
conveyance. Their object is to provide for the recorded, fee simple
ownership an exemption from the burdens of old conditions,, which at
each transfer of the property interferes with its marketability. What
each of these legal statements in the various factual situations says
is that the color of title is never described as the absolute or
actual title, rather each says that is one of the types of titles
necessary to convey ownership or apparent ownership. In order for a
title to be effective it must be marketable - it must be a title which
is good of recent record even if it may not be the actual title in
fact.

Authorities hold that to render a title marketable, it is not only
necessary that it shall be free from reasonable doubt; in other words,
that a purchaser is not entitled to demand a title absolutely free
from every possible suspicion. Cummings v Dolan, 52 Wash. 496, 100 P
989 (1909)

The record referred to is the title of abstract and all documentary
evidence pertaining to it:

It is an axiom of hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of
recorded instruments that are within his chain of title. (1 R, Patton
& C. Patton, Patton on Land Titles. Section 69, at 230-233.  (2nd ed.
1957); Sabo v Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038 (AK. 1976) ]

Title insurance then guarantees that a title is marketable but not
absolutely free from doubt, and under the color of title system used
most often in this country today, no individual operating under this
type of title system has the absolute or allodial title.  All that is
really necessary to have a valid title is to have a relative clean
abstract with a recognizable color of title as the operative
marketable title within the chain of title. It therefore becomes
necessarily difficult, if not impossible after a number of years,
considering the inevitable contingencies that must arise and the title
disputes that will occur, to ever properly guarantee an absolute
title. This is not necessarily the fault of the seller, but it is the
fault of the legal and real estate systems for allowing such a diluted
form of title to be controlling in an area where it is imperative to
have the absolute title. In order to correct this problem, it is
important to return to those documents the early leaders of the nation
created to properly ensure that property remained one of the
inalienable rights the newly established sovereign freeholders could
rely on to always exist.  This correction must be in the form of
restricting or perhaps eliminating the widespread use of a marketable
title and returning to the absolute title.

Part III: LAND Patents - Why They Were Created

The Americans had a choice as to how they wanted their new government
and country to be formed. Having broken away from the English
sovereignty and establishing themselves as their own sovereigns, they
had their choice of types of taxation, freedom of religion, and most
importantly ownership of land. The Founding Fathers chose allodial
ownership of land for the system of ownership in this country:

After the American Revolution, lands in this state (Maryland) became
allodial, subject to no tenure nor to any services incident thereto.
in re Waltz et al., Burlow v Security Trust and Savings Bank, 240 P.
19 (1925), quoting Matthews v Ward, 10 Gill & Johnson (Md.) 443 (1839)

The tenure referred to in this case was the feudal tenure and the
services or taxes required to be paid to retain possession of the land
under the feudal system. This new type of ownership was acquired in
all thirteen states.

The basis of English land law is the ownership of the realty by the
sovereign and from the crown all titles flow. It was stated this way
in the case of McConnell v Wilcox:

From what source does the title to the land derived from a government
spring? In arbitrary governments, from the supreme head be he the
emperor king or potentate; or by whatever name he is known. In a
republic, from the law making or authorizing to be made the grant or
sale. In the first case, the party looks alone to his letters patent;
in the second, to the law and the evidence of the acts necessary to be
done under the law, to a perfection of his grant, donation or
purchase... The law alone must be the fountain from whence the
authority is drawn; and there can be no other source. McConnell v
Wilcox, 1 Scammon ILL. 344 (1837)

The American people as newly established sovereigns after the
Revolutionary War, became complete owners in their land beholden to
no lord or superior, sovereign freeholders in the land themselves.
These freeholders in the original thirteen states now held allodial
the land they possessed before the war only feudally. This new and
more powerful title protected the sovereigns from unwarranted
intrusions or attempted takings of their land. More importantly,
it secured in them a right to own land absolutely in perpetuity.
By definition, the word perpetuity means:

Continuing forever. Legally, pertaining to real property, any
condition extending the inalienability... [Black's Law Dictionary,
p. 1027 (5th ed. 1980).]

In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the property of
inalienability forever. Nothing more need be done to establish the
ownership of the sovereigns to their land, although confirmations
were usually required to avoid possible future title confrontations.

The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a convention of
the states on September 17, 1787. The Constitution and the government
formed under it were declared in effect on the first Wednesday of
March, 1789. Prior to this time, during the Constitutional Convention,
there was serious debate on the disposal of what the convention called
the "Western territories," now the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois,
Michigan, Wisconsin and part of Minnesota,, more commonly known as the
Northwest Territory, This tract of land was ceded to the new American
republic in the treaty signed with Britain in 1783.  1783.Part of the
method by which the new United states decided to dispose of its
territories, was stipulated in Article IV, Section III, Clause 2, of
the U.S. constitution:

The Congress shall have the power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property
belonging to the United States.

Thus, Congress was given the power to create a vehicle to divest the
National government of all its right and interest in the land. This
vehicle, known as the land patent, was to forever divest the
government of its land and was to place such total ownership in the
hands of the sovereign freeholders who collectively created the
government. The land patents issued prior to the initial date of
recognition of the United States Constitution were ratified by the
members of Constitutional Congress. Those patents created by statute
after March, 1789, had the Congressional intent behind such statutes
as a reference and basis for the determination of their powers and
operational effect.

There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to Art.IV Sec.
III, Cl. II. some of these statutes had very specific intents of
aiding soldiers of wars or dividing lands in a very small region of
one state, but all had the main goal of creating in the sovereigns -
freeholders on their lands - a status in which they were beholden to
no lord or superior. One of these acts however, was the main patent
statute in reference to the intent Congress had when creating the
patents. That Statute is 3 Stat.  566.

In order to understand the validity of a patent in today's property
law, it is necessary to turn to other sources than the acts
themselves. These sources include the Congressional debates and case
law citing such debates. The best source is the Abridgment of the
Debates of Congress, Monday, March 6, 1820. This abridgment and the
actual debates found in it concern 3 Stat. 566, one of the most
important of the land patent statutes.

In this important debate, the reason for such a particular act in
general and the protection afforded by the patent in particular were
discussed. As Senator Edwards stated:

But, he said, it is not my purpose to discuss, at large, the merits of
the proposed change. I will, at present, content myself with an
effort, merely, to shield the present settlers upon public lands from
merciless speculators, whose cupidity and avarice would unquestionably
be tempted by the improvements which those settlers have made with the
sweat of their brows, and to which they, have been encouraged by the
conduct of the government itself; for though they might be considered
as embraced by the letter of the law which provides against intrusion
on public lands, yet, that their case has not been considered by the
Government as within the mischiefs intended to be prevented is
manifest, not only from the forbearance to enforce the law,, but from
the positive rewards which others, in their situation, have received,
by the several laws which have heretofore been granted to them by the
same right of preemption which I now wish extended to the present
settlers.  [Id. at 456.]

Further, Senator King from New York stated:

He considered the change as highly favorable to the poor man; and he
argued at some length, that it was calculated to plant in the new
country a population of independent, unembarrassed freeholders... that
it would cut up speculation and monopoly; that the money paid for the
lands would be carried from the state or country from which the
purchaser should remove; that it would prevent the accumulation of an
alarming debt, which experience proved never would and never could be
paid. [Id. at 456-57]

In other statutes, the Supreme Court recognized much of these same
ideas.

The object of the Legislation is manifest. It was intended to prevent
speculation by dealings for rights of preference before the public
lands were in the market. The speculator acquired power over choice
spots, by procuring occupants to seat themselves on them and who
abandoned them as soon as the land was entered under their preemption
rights, and the speculation accomplished. Nothing could be more easily
done than this, if contracts of this description could be enforced,
The Act of 1830, however, proved to be of little avail; and then came
the Act of 1838 (5 stat. 251) which compelled the preemptor to swear
that he had not made an arrangements by which the title might inure to
the benefit of anyone except himself, or that he would transfer it to
another at any subsequent time. This was preliminary to the allowing
of his entry, and discloses the policy of Congress.

Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect of
titles emanating from the United States and the whole legislation of
the government must be examined in the determination of such titles.
It was clearly the policy of congress, in passing the preemption and
patent laws, to confer the benefits of those laws to actual settlers
upon the land. The intent of Congress is manifest in the
determinations of meaning, force, and vested in the patent. These
cases illustrate the power and dignity given to the patent. It was
created to divest the government of its lands, and to act as a means
of conveying such lands to the generations of people that would occupy
those lands. This formula, "or his 'legal' representatives,"  embraces
representatives of the original grantee in the land, by contract, such
as assignees or grantees, as well as by operation of law, and leaves
the question open to inquiry in a court of justice as to the party to
whom the patent, or confirmation, should enure. The Patent was and is
the document and law that protects the settler from the merciless
speculator from the people that use avarice to unjustly benefit
themselves against an unsuspecting nation. The patent was created with
these high and grand intentions, and was created with such intentions
for a sound reason.Part IV: The Power And Authority Of A Patent

Legal titles to lands cannot be conveyed except in the form provided
by law. Legal title to property is contingent upon the patent issuing
from the government.

That the patent caries the fee and is the best title known to a court
of law is the settled doctrine of this court. Marshall v Ladd, 7
Wallace (74 U.S.) 153 (1869).

A patent issued, by the government of the United States is legal and
conclusive evidence of title to the land described therein. No
equitable interest, however strong, to land described in such a
patent, can prevail at law, against the patent. [Land Patents,
opinions of the United States Attorney General's office.  (Sept.
1869)]

A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive against
the government and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until
it is set, aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal. Stone v United
States, 2 Wallace (69 U.S.) 765 (1865)

The patent is the instrument which, under the laws of Congress, passes
title from the United States and the patent when regular on its face,
is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When there is a
confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal title, the
patent is conclusive evidence as to ownership. Congress having the
sole power to declare the dignity and effect of its titles has
declared the patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence of the
legal title.


Issuance of a government patent granting title to land is 'the most
accredited type of conveyance known to our law'. (United States v
Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1935); see also United States v Cherokee
Nation, 474 F.2d 628 (1973)

The patent is the only evidence of the legal fee simple title.  These
various cases and quotes illustrate one fact that should be thoroughly
understood. THE PATENT IS THE HIGHEST EVIDENCE OF TITLE AND IS
CONCLUSIVE OF OWNERSHIP OF LAND IN COURTS OF COMPETENT 
JURISDICTION.

Part V: Treaties - The Substance of Federal Land Patents

The question of supremacy of confirmed federal patent proceedings,
pursuant to an 1851 Act that had been enacted to implement the Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, versus a claimed public trust easement
by the City of Los Angeles, and State of California, was decided by
the United States Supreme Court in April, 1984 (Summa Corporation v
State of California, 104 U.S.  1751, 31 Cal.3d 288,182 Cal. Rptr. 599,
644 P.2d 792). In this case petitioner (Summa Corporation) owned the
fee title to the Ballona Lagoon, a narrow body of water connected to a
man-made harbor located in the City of Los Angeles on the Pacific
ocean. Thelagoon became part of the united States following the war
with Mexico, which was formally ended by the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo in 1848. Petitioner's predecessors in interest had their
interest in the lagoon confirmed in federal patent proceedings
pursuant to an 1851 Act to implement the treaty, which provided that
the validity of claims to California lands would be decided according
to Mexican law. California made no claim to any interest in the lagoon
at the time of the patent proceedings, and no mention was made of any
such interest in the patent that was issued.

Los Angeles brought suit against petitioner in a California state
court, alleging that the city held an easement in the Ballona lagoon
for commerce, navigation, fishing, passage of fresh water to canals,
and water recreation; such an easement having been acquired at the
time California became a State. California was joined as a defendant
as required by state law and filed a cross-complaint alleging that it
had acquired such an easement upon its admission to the Union and had
granted this interest to the city.

The trial court ruled in favor of the city and State, finding the
lagoon was subject to the claimed public easement. The California
Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner's arguments that the
lagoon had never been tideland. Even if it had been, Mexican law
imposed no servitude on the fee interest by reason of that fact, and
such a servitude was forfeited by the State's failure to it in the
federal patent proceedings. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

The question we face is whether a property interest so substantially
in derogation of the fee interest patented to petitioner's
predecessors can survive the patent proceedings conducted pursuant to
the statute implementing the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

CALIFORNIA ARGUES THAT SINCE ITS PUBLIC TRUST SERVITUDE
IS A SOVEREIGN RIGHT, THE INTEREST DID NOT HAVE TO BE 
RESERVED EXPRESSLY ON THE FEDERAL PATENT TO SURVIVE 
THE CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS...

The necessary result of the Coronado Beach decision (U.S. v Coronado
Beach Co., 255 U.S. 472 (1921), is that even "sovereign" claims such
as, those raised by the State of California in the present case must,
like other claims, be asserted in the patent proceedings or be
barred...

Those decisions control the outcome of this case. WE HOLD THAT
CALIFORNIA CANNOT AT THIS LATE DATE ASSERT ITS PUBLIC 
TRUST EASEMENT OVER PETITIONERS PROPERTY, WHEN 
Petitioner's PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAD THEIR INTEREST
CONFIRMED WITHOUT ANY MENTION OF SUCH AN EASEMENT
in proceedings taken pursuant to the Act of 1851.  The interest
claimed by California is one of such substantial magnitude that...
(it) must have been presented in the patent proceedings or be barred.

Part VI: The Land Acquisition Treaties [C]

Northwest Ordinance:

A resolution of Congress that merely stated its intent that the
territory shall be divided into three to five states to be created
upon the existence of a certain number of inhabitants required to
become states of the Union. The Ordinance was not a treaty. Its
subject matter was part of all territory gained from Great Britain
under the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 1783, 8 Stat.80.

Treaty of Peace, 8 Stat. 80 (1783):

The boundaries of the territory are given in Article II of the treaty,
i.e., the western boundaries of those states today known as
Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota - all the
states from the Mississippi River and eastward to include the,
original 13 colonies. Therefore, every federal land patent in every
state thereof flows from that treaty.

Treaty Of Cession, 8 Stat. 200 (April 20, 1803):

This was the famous "Louisiana Purchase" from which was gained the
following states: Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska,
Iowa, Wisconsin, North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, and the
Northeast two-thirds of Colorado.

Treaty of Ghent: 8 Stat. 218 (October 20, 1818):

Merely established the northern boundary of the Louisiana Purchase as
the 49th parallel to the Rocky mountains.

An agreement with Great Britain that gave the United States undisputed
claim to the Pacific Northwest south of the 49th parallel. The states
created from this acquisition are Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and the
southwest corner of Wyoming.

Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922 (1848):

Following the War with Mexico, under this treaty, the United States
paid Mexico $15 million dollars in gold coin for reparations, and the
territory now known as the states of California, Nevada, Utah,
Arizona, and the western portions of Colorado and New Mexico.

It is noteworthy that all lands under this treaty, purchased by
private individuals from the United States, were paid for in gold and
silver coin; after which a federal land patent was confirmed and
issued to the private claimant.

Because of the confusion of land claims by the Gold Rush settlers on
Mexican land grants, Congress enacted the Act of Congress, March 2,
1851, to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the State of
California. For the first time, a Land the State of California. For
the first time, a Land Commissioner was established to confirm the
claims and the Court of Private Land Claims was established to settle
disputes before final confirmation by what is now known as the U.S.
Bureau of Land Management under the present Department of the Interior
of the United States. The Act of 1851 established a two year limit to
contest claims, after which the confirmed land claims were closed
forever by the issuance of a federal land patent that generally
included the phrase: ...given this___ day to________ his heirs and
assigns forever.

No claims could be made after the issuance date of the patent.  This
is what Summa (supra) was all about. The two year limitation on
contests of federal land patents issued to private land claimants was
extended by the Act of March 3, 1891, and is still in force today.

Gadsden Purchase, 10 Stat. 1031 (Dec. 30, 1853):

This was a treaty between Mexico and the United States in which the
U.S., paid $10 million dollars in gold coin to Mexico for that
southernmost strip, of New Mexico. The treaty is significant because
it refers back to the Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo and conferred all
the same rights and privileges to Citizens of that territory as in the
1848 treaty. Hence, that southernmost portion is, in actual fact
included in the Treaty Of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  All feudal land patents
in this area also flow from treaty law.


Cession of Texas:

Texas was annexed to the United States by the independent vote
of the inhabitants.

While the Cession of Texas is a treaty, it was annexed as a House
Joint Resolution (HJR) and it should be reasonably certain that its
inhabitants had the same protection as those given under treaty law.


Part VII: The Supremacy Clause

The lead case which said treaty law cannot be interfered with by a
state legislature is Ware v Hylton (1796), 3 Dallas (3 U.S.  199). In
this case, the Supreme Court held that a treaty is the supreme law of
the land, pursuant to Article VI, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution.

... and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in
the Constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding...

Any act of the legislature cannot stand in its way because a treaty is
the declared will of the people of all the United States and shall be
superior to the constitution and laws of any individual state. In
other words, federal land patents put into evidence by a land owner
cannot be challenged by a state court because it flows from a United
States treaty and, therefore no court has jurisdiction over title or
ownership to land traced to this paramount source of title. Only
private citizens were given federal land patents, hence the term
"private land claim," or "PLC," used by the Bureau of Land Management
as the date of the original patent.

Because all federal land patents flow from treaties that fall under
the supremacy clause, no state, private banking corporation or other
federal agency can question the superiority of title to land owners
who have "perfected" their land by federal land patent.  Jurisdiction
by any state court is invalid. Since federal land patents cannot be
collaterally attacked as to their validity or authenticity as the
highest evidence of, title, no mortgage institution can claim title to
land by its "lien." Certified federal land Patents were given free and
clear allodial title with no encumbrances, then and now!

43 USC 59 establishes duly certified copies of federal land patents
shall be evidence in all cases where originals would be evidence.
Section 57 covers the states of Oregon and California.  Section 58
covers Louisiana.

43 USC 83 covers the evidentiary effect of certified federal land
patents for all states. All the courts in the United States must take
judicial notice of these federal patents and their evidentiary effect
under these federal statutes. If the patents are not certified when
entered into evidence, any court may ignore the patent and overrule it
as evidence of superior or paramount title versus the mortgage lien,
the county tax assessment, etc..

The Act of Congress, March 3, 1851, since updated by the Act of
Congress, 1891, stated anyone who was establishing a claim had to have
it confirmed by the United States Land Commission. If no one protested
that claim within a two year period, it could no longer be attacked
under any circumstances, it was final. This is what the Summa case
addressed. When the United States Supreme Court interprets a federal
statute, the courts of every state are bound by that interpretation.

The key to finding case law in every state upholding federal treaty
and its laws can be found in its law libraries in the Key Digest under
"public lands". Am. Jur. 2d is the starting point to find the case law
on treaties as they pertain to decisions in the states.  

Part VIII: In Summary

The federal land patent is the paramount or common source of titles
from the united States government. It is the mechanism and procedure
for an individual to lay claim to his right to allodial title of land,
as was established by the Declaration of Independence (our first
organic Law) and the War for Independence that followed. A free
sovereign individual who has a perfected federal land patent in his
possession, is in a very enviable position at law.  No one can take
that land from him without first proving they have a superior vested
right in the land, and that is not possible.

For example, a title company insures "good title" and a bank has given
a farmer a loan on those grounds. Basically the title insurance
company is at fault; they did not search that title back far enough to
its original source to see who owned the land. If the bank
subsequently attempts to foreclose, the farmer, who has done his
homework properly should win. Any remaining controversy is between the
bank and the title insurance company. In this example, it appears that
it does not matter whether the farmer is an heir or assign, the bank
has to prove it has superior title in that land in order to take it
over.

Anyone who has purchased foreclosed lands has done so without guaranty
of clear title, including IRS and state taxing agency foreclosures. By
perfecting a federal land patent, a free sovereign should now be in a
position to go on the offense.





SECTION II

MEMORANDUM OF LAW HISTORY, FORCE & EFFECT OF THE 
LAND PATENT

PART I

ALLODIAL vs. FEUDAL TITLES

In America today, there is a phenomenon occurring that has
not been experienced since the mid 1930's. That phenomenon is the,
increasingly, rising number of foreclosures, both in the rural
sector and in the cities. This phenomenon is occurring because of
the inability of the debtor to pay the creditor the necessary
interest and principle on a rising debt load, that is expanding
across the country. As a defense, the land patent or fee simple
title to the land and the Congressional intent that accompanies the
patent is hereby being presented. In order to properly evaluate
the patent in any given situation, it is necessary to understand
what a patent is, why it was created, what existed before the
patent, particularly in Common Law England. These questions must
be answered in order to effectively understand the association
between the government, the land, and the people.

First, what existed before land patents? since it is
imperative to understand what the land patent is and why it was
created, the best method is a study of the converse, or the Common
Law English land titles. This method thus allows us to fully
understand what we are presently supposed to have by way of actual
ownership of land.

In England, at least until the mid-1800's, and arguably until
William Blackstone's time in the mid 1700's, property was exclu-
sively owned by the King. In arbitrary governments; the title is
held by and springs from the supreme head-be he the emperor, king,
potentate; or by whatever name he is known. McConnell v. Wilcox, I
Scammon (ILL.) 344 (1837). The king was the true and complete
owner, giving him the authority to take and grant the land from the
people in his kingdom who either lost or gained his favor. The
authority to take the land may have required a justifiable reason,
but such a reason could conceivably have been fabricated by the
king leaving the disseised former holder of the land wondering what
it was that had brought the king's wrath to bear upon him. At the
same time the beneficiary of such a gift, while undoubtedly knowing
the circumstances behind such a gift, may still not have known how
the facts were discovered and not knowing how such facts occurred,
may have been left to wonder if the same fate awaited him if ever
he fell into disfavor with the king.


The king's gifts were called fiefs, a fief being the same as a
feud, which ls described as an estate in land held of a superior on
condition of rendering him services. 2 Blackstone's commentaries,
p. 105. It is also described as an inheritable right to the use
and occupation of lands, held on condition of rendering services to
the lord or proprietor, who himself retains the ownership in the
lands, Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition p. 748 (1968).
Thus, the people had land they occupied, devised, inherited,
alienated, or disposed of as they saw fit, so long as they remained
in favor with the King.  F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism, P. 113 (1964).
"This holding of lands under another was called a tenure, and was
not limited to the relation of the first or paramount lord and
vassal, but extended to those to whom such vassal, within the rules
of feudal law, may have parted out his own feud to his own vassals,
whereby he became the mesne lord between his vassals and his own or
lord paramount. Those who held directly to the king were called
his "tenants in... chief."  1 E. Washburn, Treatise on The
American Law of Real Property, Ch. II, Section 58, p. 42 (6th Ed.
1902). In this manner, the lands which had been granted out to the
barons principal lands were again subdivided, and granted by them
to sub feudatories to be held of themselves. Id., Section 65, p.
44. The size of the gift of the land could vary from a few acres
to thousands of acres depending on the power and prestige of the
lord. See supra Ganshof at 113. The fiefs were built in the same
manner as a pyramid, with the king, the true owner of the land,
being at the top, and from the bottom up there existed a system of
small to medium sized to large to sized estates on which the
persons directly beneath one estate owed homage to the lord of that
estate as well as to the King. Id. at 114. At the lowest level of
this pyramid through at least the 14th and 15th centuries existed
to serfs or villains, the class of people that had no rights and
were recognized as nothing more than real property. F. Goodwin,
Treatise on The Law of Real Property, Ch. 1, p. 10 (1905). This
system of hierarchical land holdings required an elaborate system
of payment. These fiefs to the land might be recompenses in any
number of ways.

One of the more common types of fiefs, or the payment of a
rent or obligation to perform rural labor upon the lord's lands
known as socage, was the crops field. Id. at 8. Under this type of
fief a certain portion of the grain harvested each year would
immediately be turned over to the lord above that particular fief
even before the shares from the lower lords and then serfs of the
fief would be distributed, A more interesting type of fief for
purposes of this memorandum was the money fief. In most cases, the
source of money was not specified, and the payment was simply made
from the fief holder's treasury, but the fief might also consist of
a fixed revenue to be paid from a definite source in annual
payments in order for the tenant owner of the fief to be able to
remain on the property. Gilsbert of Mons, Chronique, Ch. 69 and
115, pp. 175 (ed. Vanderkindere)

The title held by such tenant owners over their land was
described as a fee simple absolute. "Fee simple, Fee commeth of
the French fief, i.e., praedium beneficiarium, and legally
signifieth inheritance as our author himself hereafter expoundeth
it and simple is added, for that it is descendible to his heirs
generally, that is, simply, without restraint to the heirs of his
body, or the like, Feodum est quod quis tenet ex quacunque causa
sive sit tenementum sive redditus, etc.

In Doomsday it is called feudom.  Littleton, Tenures, Sec.
lb, Fee Simple. In Section II, fee simple is described as the
largest form of inheritance. Id. In modern English tenures, the
term fee signifies an inheritable estate, being the highest and
most extensive interest the common man or noble, other than the
King, could have in the feudal system. 2 Blackstone's
commentaries, p. 106. Thus, the term fee simple absolute in
Common-Law England denotes the most and best title a person could
have as long as the king allowed him to retain possession of (own)
the land. It has been commented that the basis of English land law
is the ownership of all reality by the sovereign. From the crown,
all titles flow. The original and true meaning of the word "fee"
and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as fief or feud, this
being in contradiction to the term "allodium" which means or is
defined as a man's own land, which he possesses merely in his own
right, without owing any rent or service to any superior. Wendell
v Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491 (1848). Therefore in Common Law England
practically everybody who was allowed to retain land, had the type
of fee simple absolute often used or defined by courts, a fee
simple that grants or gives the occupier as much of a title as the
"sovereign" allows such occupier to have at that time. The term
became a synonym with the supposed ownership of land under the
feudal system of England at common law. Thus, even though the word
absolute was attached to the fee simple, it merely denoted the
entire estate that could be assigned or passed to heirs, and the
fee being the operative word; fee simple absolute dealt with the
entire fief and its divisibility, alienability and inheritability.
Friedman v Steiner, 107 ILL. 125 (1883). If a fee simple absolute
in Common-Law England denoted or was synonymous with only as much
title as the King allowed his barons to possess, then what did the
King have by way of a title?

The King of England held ownership of land under a different
title and with far greater powers than any of his subjects. Though
the people of England held fee simple titles to their land, the
king actually owned all the land in England through his allodial
title, and though all the land was in the feudal system, none of
the fee simple titles were of equal weight and dignity with the
King's title, the land always remaining allodial in favor of the
king. Gilsbert of Mons, Chronique, Ch. 43, p. 75 (ed. Vanderkind-
ere). Thus, it is relatively easy to deduce that allodial lands
and titles are the highest form of lands and titles known to
Common Law. An estate of inheritance without condition, belonging
to the owner, and alienable by him, transmissible to his heirs
absolutely and simply, is an absolute estate in perpetuity and the
largest possible estate a man can have, being in fact allodial in
its nature. Stanton v Sullivan, 63 R.I. 216, 7 A.2d 696 (1839).

"The original meaning of a perpetuity is an inalienable,
indestructible interest." Bovier's Law Dictionary, Volume III, p.
2570 (1914). The King had such a title in land. As such, during
the classical feudalistic period of Common-Law England, the King
answered to no one concerning the land.

Allodial titles, being held by sovereigns, and being full and
complete titles, allowed the King of England to own and control the
entire country in the form of one large estate belonging to the
Crown. Allodial estates owned by individuals exercising full and
complete ownership, on the other hand, existed only to a limited
extent in the County of Kent.

In summary of Common-Law England: (l) the King was the only
person (sovereign) to hold complete and full title to a land
(allodial title); (2) the people who maintained estates of land,
(either called manors or fiefs), held title by fee simple absolute
(3) this fee simple absolute provided the means by which the
"supposed" owner could devise, alienate, or pass by inheritance the
estates of land (manors or fiefs); (4) this fee simple absolute in
feudal England, being not the full title, did not protect the
"owner" if the King found disfavor with the "owner", (5) that
"owner" therefore had to pay a type of homage to the King or a
higher baron each year to discharge the obligation of his fief, (6)
this homage of his fief could take the form of a revenue or tax, an
amount of grain, or a set and permanent amount of money, (7) and
therefore as long as the "owner" of the fief in fee simple absolute
paid homage to the king or sovereign, who held the entire country
under an allodial title, then the "owner" could remain on the
property with full rights to sell, devise or pass it by inheritance
as if the property was really his.

PART II

LAND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA TODAY

THE AMERICAN FEUDALISTIC SOCIETY

The private ownership of land in America is one of those rights
people have proclaimed to be essential in maintaining this republic.
The necessary question in discussing this topic however, is whether
ownership of land in America today really ls a true and compete
ownership of land under an allodial concept, or is it something much
different. In other words, are we living in an actual allodial
freehold or are we living in an updated version of feudalistic
Common-Law. The answer is crucial in determining what rights we have
in the protection of our reality against improper seizures and
encumbrances by our government and creditors. The answer appears to
be extremely clear upon proper reflection of our rights when payments
are missed on mortgages, or taxes, for whatever reason, are not paid.
If mortgage payments are missed or taxes are not paid, we actually
fall into disfavor with the parties who have the power, and these
powers, through court proceedings or otherwise, take our land as a
penalty, when one understands if he is unable to perform as the
government or his creditors request and for such failures of
performance his land can be forfeited, then he can begin to
understand exactly what type of land-ownership system controls his
life, and he should recognize the inherent unjustness of such
constitutional violations.


The American-based system of land ownership today consists of
three key requirements. These three are the warranty deed or some
other type of deed purporting to convey ownership of land, title
abstracts to chronologically follow the development of these
different types of deeds to a piece of property, and title insurance
to protect the ownership of that land. These three ingredients must
work together to ensure a systematic and orderly conveyance of a
piece of property; none of these three by itself can act to
completely convey possession of the land from one person to another
At least two of the three are always deemed necessary to adequately
satisfy the legal system and real estate agents that the titles to
the property had been placed in the hands of the purchaser and often
times, all three are necessary to properly pass the ownership of the
land to the purchaser. Yet does the absolute title and therefore the
ownership of the land really pass from the seller to purchaser with
the use of any one of these three instruments or in any combination
thereof? None of the three by itself passes the absolute or allodial
title to the land, the system of land ownership America originally
operated under, and even combined all three can not convey this
absolute type of ownership. What then is the function of these three
instruments that are used in land conveyances and what type of title
is conveyed by the three? Since the abstract only traces the title
and the title insurance only insures the title, the most important
and therefore first group to examine are the deeds that purportedly
convey the fee from seller to purchaser.

These deeds include the ones as follows: warranty deed, quit
claim deed, sheriffs deed, trustee's deed, judicial deed, tax deed
wig or any other instrument that purportedly conveys the title. All
of these documents state that it conveys the ownership to the land.
Each of these, however, is actually a color of title. G. Thompson,
Title to Real Property, Preparation and examination of Abstracts, Ch
3, Section 73, p. 93 (1919). A color of title is that which in
appearance is title, but which in reality is not title. Wright
Mattison, 18 Howard (59 U.S.) 50 (1855). In fact, any instrument may
constitute color of title when it purports to convey the title of the
land, as well the land itself, although it is void as a muniment of
title. Joplin Brewing Co. v Payne, 197 Mo. 422, 94 S.W. 896 (1906).
The Supreme Court of Missouri has stated, "that [w]hen we say a
person has a color of title, whatever may be the meaning of the
phrase, we express the idea, at least, that some act has been
previously done,..., by which some title, good or bad, to a parcel of
land of definite extent had been conveyed to him,"  St. Louis v
Gorman, 29 Mo, 593 (1860). In other words, a color of title is an
appearance or apparent title, and "image" of the true title, hence
the phrase "color of", which, when coupled with possession purports
to convey the ownership of the land to the purchaser. This however
does not say that the color of title is the actual and true title
itself, nor does it say that the color of title itself actually
conveys ownership. In fact, the claimant or holder of a color of
title is not even required to trace the title through the chain down
to his instrument.

Rawson v Fox, 65 ILL. 200 (1872). Rather it may be said that a
color of title is prima facie evidence of ownership of and rights to
possession of land until such time as that presumption of ownership
is disproved by a better title or the actual title itself. If such
cannot be proven to the contrary, then ownership of the land is
assumed to have passed to occupier of the land.  To further
strengthen a color titleholder's position, courts have held that the
good faith of the holder to a color of title is presumed in the
absence of evidence to the contrary. David v Hall, 92 R.I. 85
(1879); see also Morrison v Norman, 47 ILL. 477 (1868) and McConnell
v Street, 17 ILL. 253 (1855).

With such knowledge of what a color of title is, it is
interesting what constitutes colors of title. A warranty deed is
like any other deed of conveyance.  Mahrenholz v County Board of
School Trustees of Lawrence County, et. al., 93 ILL. App. 3d 366
(1981). A Warranty deed or deed of conveyance is a color of title,
as stated in Dempsey v Burns, 281 ILL. 644, 560 (1917) (Deeds
constitute colors of title); see also Dryden v Newnan, 116 ILL. l86
(1886) (A deed that purports to convey interest in the land is a
color of title); Hinckley v Green 52 ILL. 223 (1869) (A deed which,
on its face, purports to convey a title, constitutes a claim and
color of title); Busch v Huston, 75 ILL. 43 (1874);  Chicking v
Failes, 26 ILL. 508 (1861). A quit claim deed is a color of title as
stated in Safford v Stubbs, 117 ILL. 389 (1886); See also Holloway v
Clark, 27 ILL. 483 (1861) and McCellan v Kellogg, 17 ILL. 498 (1855).
Quit claim deeds can pass the title as effectively as a warrant with
full covenants. Grant v Bennett. 96 ILL. 513, 525 (1880); See also
Morgan v Clayton, 61 ILL. 35 (1871); Brady v Spurck, 27  ILL. 478
(1861); Butterfield v Smith, 111. ILL. 485 (1849). Sheriffs deeds
also are colors of title. Kendrick v Latham, 25 Fla. 819 (1889); as
is a judicial deed, Huls v Buntin, 47 ILL. 396 (1865). The Illinois
Supreme Court went into detail in its determination that a tax deed
is only color of title. "There the conplainant seem to have relied
upon the tax deed as conveying to him the fee, and to sustain such a
bill, it was incumbent of him to show that all the requirements of
the law had been complied with. "A simple tax deed by itself is only
a color of title. Fee simple can only be acquired through adverse
possession via payment of taxes; claim and color of title, plus seven
years of payment of taxes. Thus any tax deed purports, on its face,
to convey title is a good color of title, Walker v Converse, 148
ILL. 622, 629 (1894); see also Peadro v Carriker, 168 ILL. 570
(1897); Chicago v Middlebrooke, 143 ILL. 25 (1892); Piatt County v
Gooden, 97 ILL. 84 (1880); Stubblefield v Borders, 92 ILL, 570
(1897); Coleman v Billings, 89 ILL. 183 1878); Whitney v Stevens, 89
ILL. 53 (1878); Thomas v Eckard, 88 ILL. 593 (1878); Holloway v
Clarke, 27 ILL. 483 (1861). A will passes only a color of title,
Baldwin v Ratcliff 125 ILL. 376 (1888); Bradley v Rees, 113 ILL.
327 (1885) (A wig can pass only so much as the testator owns, though
it may attempt to pass more). A trustee's deed, a mortgages and
strict foreclosure, Chickering v Failes, 26 ILL. 508 (1861), or any
document defining the extent of a disseisor's claim or purported
claim, Cook v Norton, 43 ILL. 391 (1867), all have been held to be
colors of title. In fact, '"[t]here is nothing here requiring a deed,
to establish a color of title, and under the former decisions of this
court, color or title may exist without a deed"  Baldwin v Ratcliff,
125 ILL. 376 (1882); County of Piatt v Goodell, 97 ILL. 84 (1880);
Smith v Ferguson, 91 ILL. 304 (1878); Hassett v Ridgely, 49 ILL. 197
(1868); Brooks v Bruyn, 35 ILL. 392 (1864); McCagg v Heacock, 34
ILL. 476 (1864); Bride v Watt, 23 ILL. 507 (1860); and Woodward v
 Blanchard, 16 ILL. 424 (1855). All of these cases being still valid
and none being overruled, in effect, the statements in these cases
are well established law. All of the documents described in these
cases are the main avenues of claimed land ownership in America
today, yet none actually conveys the true and allodial title. They
in fact convey something quite different.

When it is stated that a color of title conveys only an
appearance of or apparent title, such a statement is correct but
perhaps too vague to be properly understood in its correct legal
context. What are useful are the more pragmatic statements
concerning titles. A title or color of title, in order to be
effective in transferring the ownership or purported ownership of the
land, must be a marketable or merchantable title.

A marketable or merchantable title is one that is reasonably
free from doubt. Austin v Damum, 52 Minn. 136 (1892). This title
must be as reasonably free from doubts as necessary to not affect the
marketability or salability of the property, and must be a title a
reasonably prudent person would be willing to accept. Robert v
McFadden, 32 Tex-Civ.App. 47, 74 S.W. 105 (1903). Such a title is
often described as one which would ensure to the purchaser a peaceful
enjoyment of the property, Barnard v Brown, 112 Mich. 452, 70 N.W.
1038 (1897), and it is stated that such a title must be obvious,
evident, apparent, certain, sure or indubitable. Ormsby v Graham,
123 Ia. 02, 98 N.W. 724 (1904). Marketable Title Acts, which have
been adopted in several of the states, generally do not lend
themselves to an interpretation that they might operate to provide a
new foundation of title based upon a stray, accidental, or
interloping conveyance. Their object is to provide, for the recorded
fee simple ownership, an exemption  from the burdens of old conditions
which at each transfer of the property interferes with its
marketability. Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957). what
each of these legal statements in the various factual situations says
is that the color of title is never described as the absolute or
actual title, rather each says that it is one of the types of titles
necessary to convey ownership or apparent ownership.  A marketable
title, what a color of title must be in order to be effective, must
be a title which is good of recent record, even if it may not be the
actual title in fact. Close v Stuyvesant, 132 ILL. 607, 24 N.E. 868
(1890).

"Authorities hold that to render a title marketable it is only
necessary that it shall be free from reasonable doubt; in other
words, that a purchaser is not entitled to demand a title absolutely
free from every possible suspicion." Cummings v Dolan, 52 Wash. 496,
100 P. 989 (1909). The record being spoken of here is the title
abstract and all documentary evidence pertaining to it. "It is an
axiom of hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of recorded
instruments that are within his 'chain of title'."  1 R. Patton & C.
Patton, Patton on Land Title, Section 69, at 230-233. (2nd ed. 1957);
Sabo v Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038 (Ak. 1976). Title insurance then
guarantees that a title is marketable, not absolutely free from
doubt.Thus, under the color or title system used most often in this
country today, no individual operating under this type of title
system has the absolute or allodial title. All that is really
necessary to have a valid title is to have a relatively clean
abstract with a recognizable color of title as the operative
marketable title within the chain of title. It therefore becomes
necessarily difficult, if not impossible after a number of years,
considering the inevitable contingencies that must arise and the
title disputes that will occur, to ever properly guarantee an
absolute title. This is not necessarily the fault of the seller, but
it is the fault of the legal and real estate systems for allowing
such a diluted form of title to be controlling in an area where it is
imperative to have the absolute title. In order to correct this
problem, it is important to return to those documents the early
leaders or the nation created to properly ensure that property
remained one of the inalienable rights that the newly established
sovereign freeholders could rely on to always exist. This correction
must be in the form of restricting or perhaps eliminating the
widespread use of a marketable title and returning to the absolute
title.

Other problems have developed because of the use of a color of
title system for the conveyance of land. These problems arise in the
area of terminology that succeed in only confusing and clouding the
title to an even greater extent than merely using terms like
marketability, salability or merchantability. When a person must
also determine whether a title is complete, perfect, good and clear,
or whether it is a bad, defective, imperfect and doubtful, there is
any obvious possibility of destroying a chain of title because of an
inability to recognize what is acceptable to a reasonable purchaser.

A complete title means that a person has the possession, right
of possession and the right of property. Dingey v Paxton, 60 Miss.
1038 (1883) and Ehle v Quackenboss, 6 Hill (N.Y.) 537 (1844). A
perfect title is exactly the same as a complete title, Donovan v
Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411 (1875) and Converse v Kellogg, 7 Barb. (N.Y.)
590 (1850); and each simply means the type of title a well informed,
reasonable and prudent person would be willing to accept when paying
full value for the property. Birge v Bock, 44 Mo., App. 69 (1890).
In other words, complete or perfect title is, in reality, a
marketable or merchantable title, and is usually represented by a
color of title.


A good title does not necessarily mean one of perfect of record
but consists of one which is both of rightful ownership and rightful
possession of the property. Bloch v Ryan, 4 App. Cas. 283 (1894). It
means a title free from litigation , palpable defects and grave doubts
consisting of both legal and equitable titles and fairly deducible of
record. Reynolds v Borel, 86 Cal. 538, 25 P. 67 (1890). "A good
title means not merely a title valid in fact, but a marketable title,
which can again be sold to a reasonable purchaser or mortgaged to a
person of reasonable prudence as security for a loan of money."
Moore v Williams, 115 N.Y. 586, 22 N.E. 233 (1889). A clear title
means there are no encumbrances on the land, Roberts v Bassett, 105
Mass. 409 (1870). Thus, when contracting to convey land, the use of
the phrase "good and clear title" is surplusage, since the terms  good
title and clear title are in fact synonymous. Oakley v Cook, 41 N.J.
Eq. 350, 7 A.2d 496 (1886). Therefore, the words good title and
clear title, just like the words complete title and perfect title,
describe nothing more than a marketable title or merchantable title,
and as stated above, each can and almost always is represented in a
transaction by a color of title. None of these types of title
purports to be the absolute, or allodial title, and none of them are
that type of title. None of these actually claims to be a fee simple
absolute, and since these types of titles are almost always
represented by a color of title, none represents that it passes the
actual title. Each one does state that it passes what can be
described as a title good enough to avoid the necessity of litigation
to determine who actually has the title. If such litigation to
determine titles is necessary, then the title has crossed the
boundaries of usefulness and entered a different category of title
descriptions and names.

This new category consists of titles which are bad, defective,
imperfect or doubtful. A bad title conveys no property to the
purchaser of the estates. Heller v Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 36 N,Y.S.
668 (1895). A title is defective when the party claiming to own the
land has not the whole title, but some other person has title to a
part or portion of it. Such a title is the same as no title
whatsoever. Place v People, 192 ILL. 160, 61 N.E. 354 (1901);  see
also Cospertini v Oppermann, 76 Cal. 181, 18 P. 256 (1888). An
imperfect title is one where something remains to be done by the
granting power to pass the title to the land, Raschel v Perez, 7 Tex.
348, (1851); and a doubtful title is also one which conveys no
property to the purchaser of the estate. Heller v Cohen, 15 Misc.
378, 36 N.Y.S. 668 (1895). Every title is described as doubtful
which invites or exposes the party holding it to litigation. Herman
v Somers, 158 PA. St'. 424, 27 A. 1050 (1893). Each of these types of
titles describes exactly the same idea stated in many different ways,
that because of some problem, defect, or question surrounding the
title, no title can be conveyed, since no title exists. Yet in all
of these situations some type of color of title was used as the
operative instrument. What then makes one color of title complete,
good or clear in one situation, and in another situation the same
type of color of title could be described as bad,  defective,
imperfect or doubtful? What is necessary to make what might
otherwise be a doubtful title, a good title, is the belief of others
in the community, whether or not properly justified, that the title
is a good one which they would be wig to purchase. Moore v Williams,
115 N.Y. 586, 22 N.E. 253 (1889). The methods presently used to
determine whether a title or color of title is good enough to not be
doubtful, are the other two-thirds of the three possible requirements
for the conveyance of a good or complete (marketable) title.

These two methods of properly ensuring that a title is a good or
complete title are title abstracts, the complete documentary evidence
of title, and title insurance. The legal title to land, based on a
color of title, is made up of a series of documents required to be
executed with the solemnities prescribed by law, and of facts not
evidenced by documents, which show the claimant a person to whom the
law gives the estate. Documentary evidences of title consist of
voluntary grants by the sovereign, deeds if conveyances and wills by
individuals, conveyances by statutory or judicial permission, deeds
made in connection with the sale of land for delinquent taxes,
proceedings under the power of eminent domain, and deeds executed by
ministerial or fiduciary officers. These documentary evidences are
represented by the land patent and the colors of title. 1 G.
Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property, pp. 99-100
(5th ed. 1980). These instruments, relied upon to evidence the
title, coupled with the outward assertive acts that import dominion,
must be used by the abstractor in compiling the abstract, and the
attorney must examine in order to determine the true status of the
title. Id. The abstract is the recorded history of the land and the
various types of titles, mortgages and other liens, claims and
interests that have been placed on the property. The abstract can
determine the number of times the patent has been re-declared, who
owns the mineral rights, what color of title is operable at any
particular point in time, and what lien holder is in first position,
but it does not convey or even attempt to convey any form of the
title itself. As Thompson, supra, has stated, it is necessary when
operating with colors of titles to have an abstract to determine the
status of the operable title and determine whether that title is good
or doubtful. Id. at 101. If the title is deemed good after this
lengthy process, then the property may be transferred without doing
anything more, since it is assumed that the seller was the owner of the
property. This is not to say emphatically that the seller is the
paramount or absolute owner. This does not even completely guarantee
that he is the owner of the land against any adverse claimants. It
is not even that difficult to claim that the title holder has a good
title due to the leniency and attitude now evidenced by the judicial
authorities toward maintaining a stable and uniform system of land
ownership, whether or not that ownership is justified. This however,
does not explain the purpose and goal of a title abstract.

An abstract that has been properly brought up simply states that
it is presumed the seller is the owner of the land, making the title
marketable, and guaranteeing that he has a good title to sell.  This
is all an abstract can legally do since it is not the title itself
and it does not state the owner has an absolute title, Therefore,
the abstract cannot guarantee unquestionably that the title is held
by the owner. All of this rhetoric is necessary if the title is
good; if there is some question concerning the title without making
it defective, then the owner must turn to the last of the three
alternatives to help pass a good title, title insurance. G.
Thompson, Title to Real Property, Preparation and Examination of
Abstracts, ch. III, Section 79, pp. 99-100 (1919).

Title insurance is issued by title insurance companies to ensure
the validity of the title against any defects, against any
encumbrances affecting the designated property, and to protect the
purchaser against any losses he sustains from the subsequent
determination that his title is actually unmarketable. Id. at 100.


Title insurance extends to any defects of title. Id. It
protects against the existence of any encumbrances, provided only
that any judgments adverse to the title shall be pronounced by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Id. It is not even necessary that
a defect actually exist when the insurance policy was issued, it is
simply necessary that there exists at the time of issuance of the
policy and inchoate or potential defect which is rendered operative
and substantial by the happening of some subsequent event. Since all
one normally has is a color of title, the longer a title traverses
history, the greater the possibility that the title will become
defective. The greater the need for insurance simply to keep the
title marketable, the easier it is to determine that the title
possessed is not the true, paramount and absolute title. If a person
had the paramount title, there would be no need for title insurance,
though an abstract might be useful for record keeping and historical
purposes. Title insurance and abstract record keeping are useful
primarily because of extensive reliance on colors of title as the
operative title for a piece of property.

This then supplies the necessary information concerning colors
of title, title abstracts, and title insurance. This does not
describe the relationship between the landowner and the government,
As was stated in the introduction, in feudal England, the King has
the power, right and authority to take a person's land away from him,
if and when the King felt it necessary. The question is whether most
of the American system of land ownership and titles is in reality any
different and whether therefore the American based system of
ownership, is in reality nothing more than a feudal system of land
ownership.


Land ownership in America, presently, is founded on colors of
title, and though people believe they are the complete and total
owners of their property; under a color of title system this is far
from the truth. When people state that they are free and own their
land, they in fact own it exactly to the extent the English barons
owned their land in Common-Law England. They own their land so long
as some "sovereign", the government or a creditor, states that they
can own their land. If one recalls from the beginning of this
memorandum, it was stated that if the King felt it justified, he
could take the land from one person and give such land to another
prospective baron. Today, in American color of title property law
if the landowner does not pay income tax, estate tax, property tax,
mortgages or even a security note on personal property, then the
"sovereign", the government or the creditor, can justify the taking
of the property and the sale of that same property to another
prospective "baron", while leaving the owner with only limited defenses
to such actions. The only real difference between this and Common-Law
England is that now others besides the King can profit
from the unwillingness or inability of the "landowner" to perform the
socage or tenure required of every landowner of America. As such, no
one is completely safe or protected on his property; no one can
afford to make one mistake or the consequences will be forfeiture of
the property. If this were what the people in the mid 1700's wanted,
there would have been no need to have an American Revolution, since
the taxes were secondary to having a sound monetary system and
complete ownership of the land. Why fight a Revolutionary War to
escape sovereign control and virtual dictatorship over the land, when
in the 1990's these exact problems are prevalent with this one
exception, money now changes hands in order to give validity to the
eventual and continuous takeover of the property between the parties.
This is hardly what the forefathers strived for when creating the
United States Constitution, and what they did strive for is the next
segment of the memorandum of law, allodial ownership of the land via
the land patent. The next segment will analyze the history of this
type of title so that the patent can be properly understood, making
it possible to comprehend the patent's true role in property law
today.

PART III

LAND PATENTS AND WHY THEY WERE CREATED

As was seen in the previous sections, there is little to
protect the landowner who holds title in the chain of title, when
distressful economic or weather condition make it impossible to
perform on the debt. Under the color-of-title system, the
property, "one of those inalienable rights", can be taken for the
non performance on loan obligations. This type of ownership is
similar to the feudal ownership found in the Middle Ages.

Upon defeating the English in 1066 A.D., William the Conqueror
pursuant to his 52nd and 58th laws, "...effectually reduced the
lands of England to feuds, which were declared to be inheritable
and from that time the maxim prevailed there that all lands in
England are held from the King, and that all proceeded from his
bounty."  I.E. Washburn, Treatise on The American Law of Real
Property, section 65, p.44 (6th ed. 1902). All lands in Europe,
prior to the creation of the feudal system in France and Germany,
Were allodial. Most of these lands were voluntarily changed to
feudal lands as protection from the neighboring barons or
chieftains. Id. Section 56, at 40. Since no documents protected
one's freedom over his land, once the lands were pledged for
protection, the lands were lost forever. This was not the case in
England.

England never voluntarily relinquished its land to William I.
In fact. were it not for a tactical error by King Harold II's men
in the Battle of Hastings, England might never have become feudal.
A large proportion of the Saxon lands prior to the Conquest of A.D.
1066 "were held as allodial, that is, but an absolute ownership,
without recognizing any superior to whom any duty was due on
account thereof." Id. Section 54, at 39. The node of conveying
these allodial lands was most commonly done by a writing or
charter, called a land-boc, or land allodial charter, which, for
safekeeping between conveyances, was generally deposited in the
monasteries. Id., Section 54, at 40.  In fact, one portion of
England, the County of Kent, was allowed to retain this form of
land ownership while the rest of England became feudal. Id.,
Section 55, at 40. Therefore, when William I established feudalism
in England to maintain control over his barons, such control
created animosity over the next 2 centuries. F.L. Ganshof,
Feudalism, p. 114 (1964). As a result of such dictatorial control,

 some 25 barons joined forces to exert pressure on the then ruling
monarch, King John, to gain some rights not all of which the common
man would possess. The result of this pressure at Runnymede became
known as the Magna Carta.

The Magna Carta was the basis of modern common law, the common
law being a series of judicial decisions and royal decrees
interpreting and following that document.

The Magna Carta protected the basic rights, the rights that
gave all people more freedom and power. The rights that would
slowly erode the king's power,

Among these rights was a particular section dealing with
ownership of the land. The barons still recognized the king as the
lord paramount, but the barons wanted some of the rights their
ancestors had prior to A.D.1066. F. Goodwin, Treatise on The Law
of Real Property, Ch. 1, p. 3 (1905). Under this theory, the
barons would have several rights and powers over the land, as the
visible owners, that had not existed in England for 150 years. The
particular section of most importance was Id. Section 62 giving the
most powerful barons letters of patent, raising their land
ownership close to the level found in the County of Kent. Other
sections, Id. ie., 10, 11, 26, 27, 37, 43, 52, 56, 57, and 61 were
written to protect the right to "own" property, to illustrate how
debts affected this right to own property, and to secure the return
of property that was unjustly taken. All these paragraphs were
written with the single goal of protecting the "landowner" and
helping him retain possession of his land, acquired in the service
of the King, from unjust seizures or improper debts. The barons
attempted these goals with the intention of securing property to
Pass to their heirs.


Unfortunately goals are often not attained. Having repledged
their loyalty to King John, the barons quickly disbanded their
armies. King John died in 1216, one year after signing the Magna
Carta, and the new King did not wish to grant such privileges found
in that document.  Finally, the barons who forced the signing of
the Magna Carta died, and with them went the driving force that
created this great charter.  The Magna Carta may have still been
alive, but the new kings had no armies at their door forcing them
to follow policies, and the charter was to a great extent forced to
lie dormant.  The barons who received the letters of patent, as
well as other landholders perhaps should have enforced their
rights, but their heirs were not in a position to do so and
eventually the rights contained in the charter were forgotten.
Increasingly until the mid-1600's, the king's power waxed, abruptly
ending with the execution of Charles I in 1649.  But then however,
the original intent of the Magna Carta was in part lost and the
descendants of the original barons never required properly
protected free land ownership.  To  this day, the freehold lands in
England are still held to a great extent upon the feudal tenures.
See supra Washburn, Section 80, p. 48.  This lack of complete
ownership in the land, as well as the most publicized search
religious freedom, drove the more adventurous Europeans to the
Americas to be away from these restrictions.

The American colonists however soon adopted many of the same
land concepts used in the old world. The kings of Europe had the
authority to still exert influence, and the American version of
barons sought to retain large tracts of land. As an example, the
first patent granted in New York went to Killian Van Rensselaer
dated in 1630 and confirmed in 1685 and 1704. A. Getman, Title to
Real Property, Principles and Sources of Titles-Compensation For
Lands and Waters, Part III, Ch. 17, p. 229 (1921). The colonial
charters of these American colonies, granted by the king of
England, had references to the lands in the County of Kent,
effectively denying the more barbaric aspects of feudalism from
ever entering the continent, but feudalism with its tenures did
exist for some time, See supra Washburn, Section 55, p. 40.

"[I]t may be said that, at an early date, feudal tenures
existed in this country to a limited extent." C. Tiedeman, An
Elementary Treatise on the American Law of Real Property, Ch. II.
The Principles of the Feudal System, Section 25, p. 22 (2nd ed.
1892). The result was a newly created form of feudal land
ownership in America. As such, the feudal barons in the colonies
could dictate who farmed their land, how their land was to be
divided, and to a certain extent to whom the land should pass.
But, just as the original barons discovered, this power was
premised in part of the performance of duties for the king. Upon
the failure of performance, the king could order the grant revoked
and grant the land to another willing to acquiesce to the king's
authority. This authority, however, was premised on the belief
that people, recently arrived and relatively independent, would
follow the authority of a king based 3000 miles away. Such a
premise was ill-founded. The colonists came to America to avoid
taxation without representation, to avoid persecution of religious
freedom, and to acquire a small tract of land that could be owned
completely. When the colonists were forced to pay taxes and were
required to allow their homes to be occupied by soldiers; they
revolted, fighting the British, and declaring their Declaration of
Independence.

The Supreme Court of the United States reflected on this
independence, in Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 419 (1793),
stating: the revolution, or rather the Declaration of Independence,
found the people already united for general purposes, and at the
same time, providing for their more domestic concerns, by state
conventions, and other temporary arrangements. From the crown of
Great Britain, the sovereignty of their country passed to the
people of it; and it was then not an uncommon opinion, that the
unappropriated lands, which belonged to that crown, passed, not to
the people of the colony or states within those limits they were
situated, but to the whole people;..,"We, the people of the united
States. do ordain and establish this constitution." Here we see
the people acting as sovereigns of the whole country; and in the
language of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it
was their will, that the state governments, should be bound, and to
which the state constitutions should be made to conform. It will
age of sovereignty, establishing a constitution by which it
was their will, that the state governments, should be bound, and to
which the state constitutions should be made to conform.  It will
be sufficient to observe briefly, that the sovereignties in Europe,
and particularly in England, exist on feudal principles. That
system considers the prince as the sovereign, and the people his
subjects; it regards his person as the object of allegiance, and
excludes the idea of his being on an equal footing with a subject,
either in a court of justice or elsewhere. That system
contemplates him as being the fountain of honor and authority; and
from his grace and grant, derives all franchises, immunities and
privileges; it is easy to perceive, that such a sovereign could not
be amenable to a court of justice, or subjected to judicial control
and actual constraint, The same feudal ideas run through all their
Jurisprudence, and constantly remind us of the distinction between
the prince and the subject. No such ideas obtain here; at the
revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are
truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns
without subjects and have none to govern but themselves; the
citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint
tenants in the sovereignty. From the differences existing between
feudal sovereignties and governments founded on compacts, it
necessarily follows, that their respective prerogatives must
differ. Sovereignty is the right to govern; a nation or state
sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides. In
Europe, the sovereignty is generally ascribed to the prince; here
it rest with the people; there the sovereign actually administers
the government; here never in a single instance; our governors are
the agents of the people, and at most stand in the same relation to
their sovereign, in which the regents of Europe stand to their
sovereigns. Their princes have personal powers, dignities, and
preeminence, our rules have none but official; nor do they partake
in the sovereignty otherwise, or in any other capacity, than as
private citizens. (emphasis added). Id. at 470-47l. The Americans
had a choice as to how they wanted their new government and country to
be formed. Having broken away from the English sovereignty and
establishing themselves as their own sovereigns, they had their
choice of types of taxation, freedom of religion, and most
importantly ownership of land. The American founding fathers chose
allodial ownership of land for the system of ownership on this
country.

In the opinion of Judge Kent, the question of tenure as an
incident to the ownership of lands "has become wholly immaterial in
this country, where every vestige of tenure has been annihilated."
See supra Washburn, Section 118, p. 59. At the present day there
is little, if any, trace of the feudal tenures remaining in the
American law of property. Lands in this country are now held to be
absolutely allodial. See supra Tiedeman, Section 25, p. 22. Upon
the completion of the Revolutionary War, lands in the thirteen
colonies were held under a different form of land ownership. As
stated in re Waltz  et. al., Barlow v Security Trust & Savings Bank,
240 P. 19 (1925), quoting Matthews v Ward, 10 Gill & Johnson (Md,)
443 (1839), "after the American Revolution, lands in this state
(Maryland) became allodial, subject to no tenure, nor to any
services incident there to." The tenure, as you will recall, was
the feudal tenure and the services or taxes required to be paid to
retain possession of the land under the feudal system. This new
type of ownership was acquired in all thirteen states. Wallace v
Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492 (1863). The American people, before
developing a properly functioning stable government, developed a
stable system of land ownership, whereby the people owned their
land absolutely and in a manner similar to the king in Common Law
England. As has been stated earlier, the original and true meaning
of the word "fee" and therefore fee simple absolute is the same as
fief or feud, this being in contradistinction to the term
"allodium" which means or is defined as man's own land, which he
possesses merely in his own right, without owing any rent or
service to any superior. Wendell v Crandall, 1 N.Y. 491 (1848).
Stated another way, the fee simple estate of early England was
never considered as absolute, as were lands in allodium, but were
subject to some superior on condition of rendering him services,
and in which the such superior had the ultimate ownership of the
land. In re Waltz, at page 20, quoting 1 Cooley's Blackstone, (4th
ed.) p. 512. This type of fee simple is a Common-Law term and
sometimes corresponds to what in civil law is a perfect title.
United States v Sunset Cemetery Co., 132 F.2d 163 (1943). It is
unquestioned that the king held an allodial title which was
different than the Common Law fee simple absolute. This type of
superior title was bestowed upon the newly established American
people by the founding fathers. The people were sovereigns by
choice, and through this new type of land ownership, the people
were sovereign freeholders or kings over their own land, beholden
to no lord or superior.  As stated in Stanton v Sullivan, 7 A.2d
696 (1839), such an estate is an absolute estate in perpetuity and
the largest possible estate a man can have, being, in fact allodial
in its nature.  This type of fee simple, as thus developed, has
definite characteristics: (1) it is a present estate in land that
is of indefinite duration; (2) it is freely alienable; (3) it
carries with it the right of possession; and most importantly (4)
the holder may make use of any portion of the freehold without
being beholden to any person.  1 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the
Modern Law of real Property, Section 1856, p. 412 (1st. ed. 1924).
This fee simple estate means an absolute estate in lands wholly
unqualmed by any reservation, reversion, condition or limitation,
or possibility of any such thing present or future, precedent or
subsequent.  Id.;  Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W. 2d 800, 806 (1957).

It is the most extensive estate and interest one may possess
in real property.  Where, an estate subject to an option is not in
fee.  See supra 1 Thompson, Section 1856, p. 413.  In the case,
Bradford v Martin, 201 N.W. 574 (1925), the Iowa Supreme Court went
into a lengthy discussion on what the terms fee simple and allodium
means in American property law.  The Court stated:

The word "absolutely" in law has a varied meaning, but when
unqualifiedly used with reference to titles or interest inland,
its meaning is fairly well settled.  Originally the two titles most
discussed were 'fee simple" and "allodium" (which meant absolute).
See Bouvier's Law Dictionary, (Rawle Ed.) 134; Wallace v
Harmstead, 44 Pa. 492 (1863); McCartee v Orphan's Asylum, 9 Cow,
(N.Y.) 437, 18 Am. Dec. 516.  Prior to Blackstone's time the
allodial title was ordinarily called an "absolute title" and was
 superior to a "fee simple title," the latter being encumbered with
feudal clogs which were laid upon the first feudatory when it was
granted, making it possible for the holder of a fee-simple title to
lose his land in the event he failed to observe his feudatory oath.
The allodial title was not so encumbered. Later the term "fee
simple," however rose to the dignity of the allodial or absolute
estate, and since the days of Blackstone the word "absolute
estate" and "fee simple" seen to have been generally used
interchangeably; in fact, he so uses them, See Book II, Chap. 7,
pp.104-105.... And further the words "absolute" and "absolutely"
usually carry the fee ... By the terms "absolute interest" we
understand a complete and perfect interest,..., an estate in fee
simple is meant. Id. at 576.

The basis of English land law is the ownership of the realty
by the sovereign, from the crown all titles flow, People v.
Richardson, 269 ILL. 275, 109 N.E, 1033 (1914); see also Matthew v.
Ward, 10 Gill & Johnson (Md.) 443 (1844). The case, McConnell v.
Wilcox, I scammon (ILL.) 344 (1837), stated it this way: From what
source does the title to the land derived from a government spring?
In arbitrary governments, from the supreme hand be he the emperor,
king, or potentate; or by whatever name he is known. In a
republic, from the law making or authorizing to be made the grant
or sale. In the first case, the party looks alone to his letters
patent; in the second, to the law and the evidence of the acts
necessary to be done under the law alone must be the fountain from
donation or purchase ... The law and there can be no other source.
Id. at 367.

The American people, newly established sovereigns in this
republic after the victory achieved during the Revolutionary War,
became complete owners in their land. beholden to no lord or
superior; sovereign freeholders in the land themselves. These
freeholders in the original thirteen states now held allodial the
land they possessed before the war only feudally.  This new and
more powerful title protected the sovereigns from unwarranted
intrusions or attempted takings of their land, and more importantly
it secured in them a right to own land absolutely in perpetuity.


By definition, the word perpetuity means, "Continuing
Forever". Legally, pertaining to real property, any condition
extending the inalienability...Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1027
(5th ed. 1980). In terms of an allodial title, it is to have the
property of inalienability forever. None more need be done to
establish the ownership of the sovereigns to their land, although
confirmations were usually required to avoid possible future title
confrontations. The states, even prior to the creation of our
present Constitutional government, were issuing titles to the
unoccupied lands within their boundaries. In New York, even before
the war was won, the state issued the first land patent in 1781,
and only a few weeks after the battle and victory at Yorktown in
1783, the state issued the first land patent to an individual- A
Getinan, supra, Part III, Ch, 17, State Legislative Grants, pp,
231-232 (1921). In fact, even before the United States was created,
New York and other states had developed their own Land Offices with
Commissioners. New York was first established in 1784 and was
revised in 1786 to further provide for a more definite procedure
for the sale of unappropriated State Lands. Id, The state courts
held, "The validity of letters patent and the effectiveness of same
to convey title depends on the proper execution and record...".
It has generally been the law that public grants to be valid must
be recorded. The record is not for purposes of notice under
recording acts but to make the transfer effectual." Id. at 242.
Later, if there was deemed to be a problem with the title, the
state grants could be confirmed by issuance of a confirmatory grant
Id. at 239. This then, in part, explains the methods and
techniques the original states used to pass title to their lands,
lands that remained in the possession of the state unless purchased
by the still yet un-created federal government, or by individuals
in the respective states. To much this same extent Texas, having
been a separate country and republic, controlled and still controls
its lands. In each of these instances, the land was not originally
owned by the federal government and then later passed to the people
and states. This then is a synopsis of the transition from colony
to statehood and the rights to land ownership under each situation.
This however has said nothing of the methods used by the states in
the creation of the federal government and the eventual disposal of
the federal lands.

The Constitution in its original form was ratified by a
convention of the States, on September 17, 1787. The Constitution
and the government formed under it were declared in effect on the
first Wednesday of March, 1789. Prior to this time, during the
Constitutional Convention, there was serious debate on the disposal
of what the convention called the "Western Territories," now the
states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and part of
Minnesota, more commonly known as the Northwest Territory. This
tract of land was ceded to the new American republic in the treaty
signed with Britain in 1783.

The attempts to determine how such a disposal of the western
territories should come about was the subject of much discussion in
the records of the Continental Congress. Beginning in September,
1783, there was continual discussion concerning the acquisition of
and later disposition to the lands east of the Mississippi River.
Journals of Congress, Papers of the Continental Congress, No. 25,
II, folio 265, p. 544-557 (September 13, 1783).

And whereas the United States have succeeded to the
sovereignty over the Western territory, and are thereby vested as
one undivided and independent nation, with all and every power and
right exercised by the King of Great Britain, over the said
territory, or the lands lying and situated without the boundaries
of the several states, and within the limits above described; and
whereas the western territory ceded by France and Spain to Great
Britain, relinquished to the United States by Great Britain, and
guarantied to the United States by France as aforesaid, if properly
managed, will enable the United States to comply with their
promises of land to their officers and soldiers; will relieve their
citizens from much of the weight of taxation;..., and if cast into
new states, will tend to increase the happiness of mankind, by
rendering the purchase of land easy, and the possession of liberty
permanent; therefore... Resolved, that a committee be appointed to
report the territory lying without the boundaries of the several
states; ... ; and also to report an establishment for a land
office. Id. at 558, reported in the writing of James McHenry.

There was also serious discussion and later acquisition by the
then technically nonexistent federal government of land originally
held by the colonial governments. Id. at 562-563 As the years
progressed, the goal remained the same, a proper determination of a
simple method of disposing of the western lands. "That an
advantageous disposition of the western territory is an object
worthy the deliberation of Congress." Id. February 14, 1786, at p.
68.  In February, 1787, the Continental Congress continued to hold
discussions on how to dispose of all western territories.  As part
of the basis for such disposal, it was determined to divide the new
northwestern territories into medians, ranges, townships, and
sections, making for easy division of the land, and giving the new
owners of such land a certain number of acres in fee.  Journals of
Congress, p. 21, February 1787, and Committee book, Papers of the
continental Congress, No. 190, p. 132 (1788).

In September of that same year, there were most discussions on
the methods of disposing the land.  In those discussions, there
were debates in the validity and solemnity of the state patents
that has been issued in the past Id., No. 62, p. 546.  Only a week
earlier the constitution was ratified by the conventions of the
states.  Finally, the future Senate and House of Representatives,
though not officially a government for another 1 & 1/2 years, held
the title of lands from the new government to the people.  In these
discussions, the first patents were created and ratified, making
the old land-boc, or land-allodial charters of the Saxon nobles,
750 years earlier, and the letters patent of the Magna Carta,
guidelines by which the land would pass to the sovereign
freeholders of America.  Id., July 2, 1788, pp. 277-286.

As part of the methods by which the new United States decided
to dispose of its territories, it created in the Constitution an
article, section, and clause, that specifically dealt with such
disposal.  Article IV, Section III, clause II, states in part, "The
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States."  Thus, Congress was given the
power to create a vehicle to divest the Federal Government of all
its right and interest in the land.  This vehicle, known as the
land patent, was to forever divest the federal government of its
land and was to place such total ownership in the hands of the
sovereign freeholders who collectively created the government.  The
land patents issued prior to the initial date of recognition of the
United States Constitution were ratified by the members of
Constitutional Congress.  Those patents created by statute after
March, 1789, had only the power of the statues and the
Congressional intent behind such statutes as a reference and basis
for the determination of their powers and operational effect origi-
nally and in the American system of land ownership today.

There have been dozens of statutes enacted pursuant to Article
IV, Section III, Clause II. Some of these statutes had very
specific intents of aiding soldiers of wars, or dividing lands in a
very small region of one state, but all had the main goal of
creating in the sovereigns, freeholders on their lands, beholden to
no lord or superior. Some of the statutes include, 12 Stat. 392,
37th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 75, (1862) (the Homestead Act); 9
Stat. 520, 31st Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 85 (1850) (Military Bounty
Service Act); 8 Stat. 123, 29th Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 8, (1847)
(Act to raise additional military force and for other purposes); 5
Stat. 444, 21st Congress, Sess. II, Ch. 30 (1831); 4 Stat. 51,  18th
Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 174 (1824); 5 Stat. 52, 18th Congress, Sess.
l, Ch. 173 (1824); 5 Stat. 56, 18th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 172,
(1824); 3 Stat. 566, 16th Congress, Sess. I, Ch. 51, (1820)  (the
major land patent statute enacted to dispose of lands); 2 Stat.
748, 12th Congress, Sess. I. Ch. 99, (1812); 2 Stat. 728, 12th
Congress, Sess.1, Ch. 77, (1812); 2 Stat. 716 12th Congress, Sess.
1, Ch. 68, (1812) (the act establishing the General Land-Office in
the Department of Treasury); 2 Stat. 590, 11th Congress,  Sess II,
Ch. 3, 5,(181O); 2 Stat. 437. 9th Congress, Sess. II, Ch.31, (1807).

These, of course, are only a few of the statutes of enacted to
dispose of public lands to the sovereigns, One of these acts
however, was the main patent statute in reference to the intent
Congress had when creating the patents. That statue is 3 Stat.
566, supra.

In order to understand the validity of a patent, in today's
property law, it is necessary to turn to other sources than the
acts themselves, These sources include the Congressional debates
and case law citing such debates. For the best answer to this
question, it is necessary to turn to the Abridgment of the debates
of Congress, Monday, March 6, 1820, in the Senate, considering the
topic "The Public Lands." � Tis abridgment and the actual debates
found in its concern one of the most important of the land patent
statutes, 3 Stat. 566, 16th Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 51, Stat. I, (April
24, 1820).

In this important debate, the reason for such a particular act
in general and the protection afforded by the patent in particular
were discussed. As Senator Edwards states; But, said he, it is not
my purpose to discuss, at length, the merits of the proposed
change. I will, at present, content myself with an effort, merely,
to shield the present settlers upon public lands from merciless
speculators, whose cupidity and avarice would unquestionably be
tempted by the improvements which those settlers have made with the
sweat of their brows, and to which they have been encouraged by the
conduct of the government itself, for though they might be
considered as embraced by the letter of the law which provides
against intrusion on public lands, yet, that their case has not
been considered by the Government as within the mischiefs intended
to be prevented is manifest, not only from the forbearance to
enforce the law, but from the positive rewards which others, in
their situation, have received, by the several laws which have
heretofore been granted to them by the same right if preemption
which I now wish extended to the present settlers. Id. at 456.

Further, Senator King from New York stated; He considered the
change as highly favorable to the poor man; and he argued at some
length, that it was calculated to plant in the new country a
population of independent, unembarrassed freeholders;... that it
would cut up speculation and monopoly; that the money paid for the
lands would be carried from the State or country from which the
purchaser should remove; that it would prevent the accumulation of
an alarming debt, which experience proved never would and never
could be paid. Id. at 456-57.

In other statutes, the Court recognized much of these same
ideas. In United States v Reynes. 9 Howard (50 U.S.) 127 (1850),
the Supreme Court stated: The object of the Legislature is
manifest. It was intended to prevent speculation by dealing or
rights of preference before the public lands were in the market,
The speculator acquired power over choice spots, by procuring
occupants to seat themselves on them and who abandoned them as soon
as the land was entered under their preemption right, and the
speculation accomplished. Nothing could be more easily done than
this, if contracts of this description could be enforced. The act
of 1830, however, proved to be of little avail; and then came the
Act of 1835 (5 Stat. 251) which compelled the preemptor to swear
that he had not made an arrangement by which the title might insure
to the benefit of anyone except himself, or that he would transfer
it to another at any subsequent time. This was preliminary to the
allowing of his entry, and discloses the policy of Congress. Id. at
154.

"It Is always to be borne in mind, in construing a congressio-
nal grant that the act by which it is made is a law as well as a
conveyance and that such effect must be given to it as will carry
out the intent of Congress. That intent should not be defeated by
applying to the grant, the rules of common law..., words of present
grant, are operative, if at all, only as contracts to convey. But
the rules of common law must yield in this, as in other cases, to
the legislative will." Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v
Kansas Pacific Railway Company, 97 U.S. 491 (1878). The
administration of the land system in this country is vested in the
Executive Department of the Government, first in the Treasury and
now in the Interior Department. The officers charged with the
disposal of the public domain under the authority of acts of
Congress are required and empowered to determine the construction
of those acts so far as it relates to the extent and character of
the rights claimed under them, and to be given, through their
actions, to individuals. This is a portion of the Political power
of the Government, and courts of justice must never interfere with
it. Marks v Dickson, 61 U.S. (20 Howard) 501 (1857); see also
Cousin v Blanc's Ex., 19 Howard (60 U.S.) 206 (1866). "The power
of Congress to dispose of its land cannot be interfered with, or
its exercise embarrassed by any State legislation; nor can such
legislation deprive the grantees of the United States of the
possession and enjoyment of the property granted by reason of any
delay in the transfer of the title after the initiation of
proceedings for its acquisition."  Gibsion v Chouteau, 13 Wallace
(U.S.) 92 (1871).

State statutes that give lesser authoritative ownership of title
than the patent can not even be brought into federal court, Langdon
v Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74 (1887). These acts of Congress making grants
are not to be treated both law and grant, and the intent of Congress
when ascertained is to control in the interpretation of the law.
Wisconsin R.R. Co. v Forsythe, 159 U.S. 46 (1895). The intent to be
searched for by the courts in a government patent is the intent which
the government had at that time, and not what it would have been, had
no mistake been made, The true meaning of a binding expression in a
patent must be applied, no matter where such expressions are found in
the document. It should be construed as to effectuate the primary
object Congress had in view; and obviously a construction that gives
effect to a patent is to be preferred to one that renders it
inoperative and void. A grant must be interpreted by the law of the
country in force at the time when it was made. The construction of
federal grant by a state court is necessarily controlled by the
federal decisions on the same subject. The United States may dispose
of the public lands on such terms and conditions, and subject to such
restrictions and limitations as in its judgment will best promote the
public welfare, even if the condition is to exempt the land from sale
on execution issued or judgment recovered in a State Court for a debt
contracted before the patent issues, Miller v Little, 47 cal. 348,
(1874). Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and
effect of titles emanating from the United States and the whole
legislation of the Government must be examined in the determination
of such titles. Bagnell v Broderick, 38, U.S. 436 (1839).  It was
clearly the policy of Congress, in passing the preemption and patent
laws, to confer the benefits of those laws to actual settlers upon
the land. Close v Stuyvesant, 132 ILL. 607 (1890). The intent of
Congress is manifest in the determinations of meaning, force and
power vested in the patent.  It was created to divest the government
of its lands, and to act as a means of conveying such lands to the
generations of people that would occupy those lands. This formula,
"or his legal representatives." embraces representatives of the
original grantee in the land, by contract, such as assignees or
grantees, as well as by operation of law, and leaves the question
open to inquiry in a court of justice as to the party to whom the
patent, or confirmation, should enure.  Hogan v Page, (Wallace) 69
U.S. 605 (1864).  The patent was and is the document and law that
protects the settler from the merciless speculators, from the people
that use avarice to unjustly benefit themselves against an
unsuspecting nation.  The patent was created with these high and
grand intentions, and was created with such intentions for a sound
reason.

The settlers as a rule seem to have been poor persons, and
presumably without the necessary funds to improve and pay for their
land, but it appears that in every case where the settlement was made
under the preemption law, the settler ... entered and paid for the
land at the expiration of the shortest period at which the entry
could be made..," Close v Stuyvesant, 132 IL. 607 (1890). We must
look to the beneficent character of the acts that created these
grants and patents and the peculiar objects they were intended to
protect and secure. A class of enterprising. hardy and most
meritorious and valuable citizens has become the pioneers in the
settlement and improvement of the new and distant lands of the
government. McConnell v Wilcox, I Scammon (ILL.) 344 (1837). "In
furtherance of what is deemed a wise policy, tending to encourage
settlement, and to develop the resources of the country, it invites
the heads of families to occupy small parcels of the public land ...
To deny Congress the power to make a valid and effective contract of
this character ... would materially abridge its power of disposal,
and seriously interfere with a favorite policy of the government,
which fosters measures tending to a distribution of the lands to
actual settlers at a nominal price."  Miller v Little, 47 Cal. 348
(1874). The legislative acts, the Statutes at Large, enacted to
divest the United States of its land and to sell that land to the
true sovereigns of this republic, had very distinct intents.
Congress recognized that the average settler of this nation would
have little money, therefore Congress built into the patent, and its
corresponding act, the understanding that these lands were to be free
from avarice and cupidity, free from the speculators who preyed on
the unsuspecting nation, and forever under the control and ownership
of the freeholder, who by the sweat of his brow made the land produce
the food that would feed himself and eventually the nation, Even
today, the intent of Congress is to maintain a cheap food supply
through the retention of the sovereign farmers on the land. United
States v Kimball Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); see also Curry v
Block,. 541 F. Supp. 506 (1982). Originally, the intent of Congress
was to protect the sovereign freeholders and create a permanent
system of land ownership in the country.  Today, the intent of
Congress is to retain the small family farm and utilize the cheap
production of these situations, it has been necessary to protect the
sovereign on his parcel of land, and ensure that he remain in that
position. The land patent and the patent acts were created to
accomplish these goals. In other words, the patent or title deed
being regular in its form, the law will not presume that such was
obtained through fraud of the public right. This principle is not
merely an arbitrary rule of law established by the courts, rather it
is a doctrine which is founded upon reason and the soundest
principles of public policy. It is one which has been adopted in the
interest of peace in the society and the permanent security of
titles. Unless fraud is shown, the rule is held to apply to patents
executed by the public authorities. State v Hewitt Land Co. , 74 Wash
573, 134 P. 474 (1913). It is therefore necessary to determine the
exact power and authority contained in a patent.

Legal titles to lands cannot be conveyed except in the form
provided by law. McGarrahin v Mining Co., 96 U.S. 316 (1877).
Legal title to property is contingent upon the patent issuing from
the government. Sabo v Horvath, 559 P.2d 1038 (Ak. 1976).

"That the patent carries the fee and is the best title known to
a court of law is the settled doctrine of this court."  Marshall v
Ladd, 7 Wallace (74 U.S.) 153 (1869). "A patent  issued by the
government of the United States is legal and conclusive evidence of
title to the land described therein. No equitable interest, however
strong, to land described in such a patent, can prevail at law,
against the patent".  Land Patents, Opinions of the United States
Attorney General's office, (September, (1869).

"A patent is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive
against the government and all claiming under junior patents or
titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal."
Stone v United States, 2 Wallace (67 U.S.) 765 (1865).
The patent is the instrument which, under the laws of Congress,
passes title from the United States and the patent when regular on
its face, is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee. When
there is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior legal
title, the patent is conclusive evidence of title in the patentee.
When there is a confrontation between two parties as to the superior
legal title, the patent is conclusive evidence as to ownership.
Gibson v Chouteau, 13 Wallace (U.S.) (1871).

Congress having the sole power to declare the dignity and effect
of its titles has declared the patent to be the superior and
conclusive evidence of the legal title. Bagnell v Brodrick, 38 U.S.
438 (1839). "Issuance of a government patent granting title to land
is the most accredited type of conveyance known to our law". United
States v Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 1936); see also United States v
Cherokee Nation, 474 F.2d 628 (1973).

The patent is prima facie conclusive evidence of the title.
Marsh v Brooks, 49 U.S. 223 (1850).

A patent, once issued, is the highest evidence of title, and is
a final determination of the existence of all facts. Walton v United
States, 415 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1969); see also United States v
Beaman, 242 F 876 (1917); File v Alaska. 593 P.2d 268, 1979) (When
the federal government grants land via a patent, the patent is the
highest evidence of title). Patent rights to the land is the title
in fee, Fine v Bradshaw, 292 P.2d 539 (1956), the patent of the fee
simple, Squire v Capoeman, 351 U.S. 16 (1956), and the patent  is
required to carry the fee. Carter v Ruddy, 166 U.S. 493 (1896); see
also Klais v Danowski, 129 N.W.2d 414 (1964) (Interposition of the
patent or interposition of the fee title).

The land patent is the muniment of title, such title being
absolute in its nature, making the sovereigns absolute freeholders on
their lands. Finally, the patent is the only evidence of the legal
fee simple title, McConnell v Wilcox, 1 Scammon (ILL.) 381 (1837).

All these various cases and quotes illustrate one statement that
should be thoroughly understood at this time, the patent is the
highest evidence of title and is conclusive of the ownership of land
in courts of competent jurisdiction. This however, does not examine
the methods or possibilities of challenging a land patent.
 In Hooper Et Al v Scheimer, 64 U.S. (23 Howard) 235 (1859), the
United States Supreme Court stated; "I affirm that a patent is
unimpeachable at law, except, perhaps, when it appears on its own
face to be void; and the authorities on this point are so uniform
and unbroken in the courts, Federal and State, that little else will
be necessary beyond a reference to them." Id. at 240 (1859).

A patent cannot be declared void at law, nor can a party travel
behind the patent to avoid it. Id.

A patent cannot be avoided at law in a collateral proceeding
unless it is declared void by statute, or its nullity indicated by
some equally explicit statutory denunciations . Id.

One perfect on its face is not to be avoided, in a trial at law,
by anything save an elder patent. It is not to be affected by
evidence or circumstances which might show that the impeaching party
might prevail in a court of equity. Id. at 243.

A patent is evidence, in a court of law, of the regularity of
all previous steps to it, and no facts behind it can be investigated.
Id.

A patent cannot be collaterally avoided at law, even for fraud.
Id. at 245.

A patent, being a superior title, must of course, prevail over
colors of title; nor is it proper for any state legislation to give
such titles, which are only equitable in nature with a recognized
legal status in equity courts, precedence over the legal title in a 
court of law. Id. at 246,

The Hooper case has many of the maxims that apply to the powers
and possible disabilities of a land patent, however there is
extensive case law in this area.

The presumptions arise from the existence of a patent,
evidencing a grant of land from the United States, that all acts have
been performed and all facts have been shown, which are prerequisites
to its issuance, and that the right of the party, grantee therein, to
have it issued, has been presented and passed upon by the proper
authorities. Green v Barber, 66 N.W. 1032 (1896). As stated in
Bovier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II, p, 1834 (1914): �

Misrepresentations knowingly made by the application for a
patent will justify the government in proceedings to set it aside, as
it has a right to demand a cancellation of a patent obtained by false
and fraudulent misrepresentations. United States v Manufacturing
CO., 128 U.S. 673 (1888); but courts of equity cannot set aside,
annul, or correct patents or other evidence of title obtained from
the United States by fraud or mistake, unless on specific averment of
the mistake or fraud, supported by clear and satisfactory proof.
Maxwell Land Grant Cancellation, 11 Howard (U.S.) 552 (1850);
although a patent fraudulently obtained by one knowing at the time
that another person has a prior right to the land may be set aside by
an information in the nature of a bill in equity filed by the
attorney of the United States for the district in which the land
lies; Id. A court of equity, upon a bill filed for that purpose,
will vacate a patent of the United States for a tract of land
obtained by mistake from the officers of the land office, in order
that a clear title may be transferred to the previous purchaser;
Hughes v United States, 4 Wallace (U.S.) 232 (1866); but a patent for
land of the United States will not be declared void merely because
the evidence to authorize its issue is deemed insufficient by the
court; Milliken v Starling's lessee, 16 Ohio 61. A state can
impeach the title conveyed by it to a grantee only by a bill in
chancery to cancel it, either for fraud on the part of the grantee or
mistake of law; and until so canceled it cannot issue to any other
party a valid patent for the same land. Chandler v Manufacturing
Co., 149 U.S. 79 (1893).

Other cases espouse these and other rules of law. A patentee
can be deprived of his rights only by direct proceedings instituted
by the government or by parties acting in its name, or by persons
having a superior title to that acquired through the government.
Putnum v Ickes, 78 F.2d 223, cert denied 296 U.S. 612 (1935).

It is not sufficient for the one challenging a patent to show
that the patentee should not have received the patent; he must also
show that he as the challenger is entitled to it. Kale v United
States, 489 F.2d 449 (1973).

A  United States patent is protected from easy third party
attacks. Fisher v Rule, 248 U.S. 314 (1919); see also Hoofnagle v
Anderson, 20 U.S. (7 Wheaton) 212 (1822).

A patent issued by the United States of America so vests the
title in the lands covered thereby, that it is the further general
rule that, such patents are not open to collateral attack. Thomas v
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 139 F. Supp. 588 (1956). See also
State v Crawford, 475 P.2d 515 (Ariz. App. 1970) (A patent is prima
facie valid, and if its validity can be attacked at all, the burden
of proof is upon the defendant); State v Crawford, 441 P. 2d 586
(Ariz. App. 1968) (A patent to land is the highest evidence of title
and may not be collaterally attacked); and Dredge v Husite Company,
369 P.2d 676 (1962) (A patent is the act of legally instituted
tribunal, done within its jurisdiction, and passes the title. Such
a patent is a final judgment as well as a conveyance and is
conclusive upon a collateral attack). Absent some facial invalidity,
the patents are presumed valid. Murray v State, 596 P, 2d 805
(1979). The government retains no power to nullify a patent except
through a direct court proceeding. United States v Reimann, 604 F.2d
135 (1974); see also Green v Barker, 66 N.W. 1032 (1896) (The
doctrine announced was that the deed upon its face, purported to have
been issued in pursuance of the law, and was therefore only
assailable in a direct proceeding by aggrieved parties to set it
aside). Through these cases, it can be shown that the patent which
passes the title from the United States to the sovereigns, and was
created to keep the speculators from the land, is only liable in a
direct proceedings for fraud or mistake. In no other situation is it
allowable for the courts, to simply eliminate the patent. One
question that may arise is what do the courts mean by a collateral
attack and what can be done by courts of equity if a collateral
attack is presented?

Perhaps the easiest means of defining a collateral attack is to
show the converse corollary, or a direct attack on a patent. As was
stated in the previous paragraphs, a direct attack upon a land patent
is an action for fraud or mistake brought by the government or a
party acting in its place. Therefore, a collateral attack, by
definition, is any attack upon a patent that is not covered within
the direct attack list. Perhaps the most prevalent collateral attack
in property law today is a mortgage or deed of trust foreclosure on
a color of title. In these instances, it is determined that the
complete title and interest in the land is purchased by the mortgagee
or another in his place. Such a determination displaces the
patentee's ownership of the title without the court ever ruling that
the patent was acquired through fraud or mistake. This is against
public policy, legislative intent, and the overwhelming majority of
case law. Therefore, it is now necessary to determine the patent's
role in American property law today, to see what powers the courts of
equity have in protecting the rights of the challengers of patents.

The attitude of the Courts is to promote simplicity and
certainty in title transactions, thereby they follow what is in the
chain of title and not what is outside. Sabo v Horvath, 559 P.2d
1038 (1976). However, in equity courts, title under a patent from
the government is subject to control, to protect the rights of
parties acting in a fiduciary capacity. Sanford v Sanford, 139 U.S.
290 (1891).  This protection however dies not include the
invalidation of the patent. The determination on the land department
in matters cognizable by it, in the alienation of lands and the
validity of patents, cannot be collaterally attacked or impeached.
Id. Therefore the courts have had to devise another means to control
the patentee, if not the patent itself. As stated in Raestle v
Whitson, 582 P.2d 170 (1978), "The land patent is the highest
evidence of title and is immune from collateral attack. This does
not preclude a court from imposing a constructive trust upon the
patentee for the benefit of the owners of an equitable interest".
This then explains the most equitable way a court may effectively
restrict the sometimes harsh justice handed down by a strict court of
law. Equity courts will impose a trust upon the patentee until the
debt has been paid. As has been stated, a patent can not be
collaterally attacked, therefore the land cannot be sold or taken by
the courts unless there is strong evidence of fraud or mistake.
However, the courts can require the patentee to pay a certain amount
at regular intervals until the debt is paid, unless of course, there
is a problem with the validity of the debt itself. This is the main
purpose of the patent in this growing epidemic of farm foreclosures
that defy the public policy of Congress, the legislative intent of
the Statutes at large,  and the legal authority as to the type of land
ownership possessed in America. Why then is the rate of foreclosures
on the rise?

Titles to land today, as was stated earlier in thls memorandum,
are normally in the form of colors of title. This is because of the
trend in recent property law to maintain the status quo.

The rule in most jurisdictions, and those which have adopted a
grantor-grantee index in particular, is that a deed outside the chain
of title does not act as a valid conveyance and does not serve notice
of a defect of title on a subsequent purchaser, These deeds outside
the chain of title are known as " wilddeeds." Sabo v Horvath, 559
P. 2d 1038 (1976); See also Porter v Buck, 335 So. 2d 369 (1976); The
Exchange National Bank v Lawndale National Bank, 41 ILL.2d 316 N.E.
2d 193 (1968) (The chain of title for purposes of the marketable
title act, may not be founded on a wild deed. These stray,
accidental, or interloping conveyances are contrary to the intent of
the marketable title act, which is to simplify and facilitate land
title transactions); and Manson v Berknan, 356 ILL, 20, 190 N.E. 77
(1934). This liberal construction of what constitutes a valid
conveyance has led to a thinning of the title to a point where the
absolute and paramount title is almost impossible to guarantee. This
thinning can be directly attributed to the constant use of the colors
of title. Under the guise of being the fee simple absolute, these
titles have operated freely, but in reality, they evidence something
much different.

It was said in Common-Law England, that when a title was not
completely unalienable and not the complete title it was not a fee
simple absolute. Rather it was some type of contingent conveyance
that depended on the performance of certain tasks before the title
was considered to be absolute. In fact, normally the title never did
develop into a fee simple absolute. These types of conveyance were
evidenced in part by the operable word sin, the conveyance and in
part by manner in which the granter could reclaim the property.

If the title automatically reverted to the grantor upon the
happening of a contingent action, then the title was by a fee simple
determinable, Scheller v Trustees of Schools of Township 41 North,
67 ILL. App.3d 857 (1978). This is evidenced most closely today by
deeds of trust in some states. If it required a court's ruling to
reacquire the land and title, then the transaction and title were
held by a fee simple with a condition subsequent. Mahrenholz v
County Board of Trustees of Lawrence County, 93 ILL. App.3d 366, 370
(1981). This is most closely evidenced by a mortgage in a lien or
intermediate theory state. These analogies may be somewhat startling
and new to some, but the analogies are accurate. When a mortgage is
acquired on property, the mortgagee steps into the position of a
grantor with the authority to create the contingent estate as
required by the particular facts. This is exactly what the grantor
in Common Law property law could acquire.  All the grantor had to do
was choose a particular type of contingency and use the necessary
catch-words, and almost invariably the land would on day be refused
due to a violation of the contingency.

In today's property law, the color of title has little power to
protect the landowner. When the sovereign is unable to pay the
necessary principal and interest on the debt load, then the catch
words and phrases found in the deed of trust or mortgage become
operational. Upon the occurrence of that event, the mortgagee or
speculator, having through a legal myth acquired the position of a
grantor, is in a position to either automatically receive the
property simply by advertising and selling it, or can acquire the
position of the grantor and eventually the possession of the property
by a court proceeding. In Comnon-Law, the grantor of a fee simple
determinable where the contingency was broken or violated, could
automatically take the land from the grantee holder, by force if
necessary. If however, the grant was a fee simple upon condition
subsequent the grantor, when the contingency broken, had to bring a
legal proceeding to declare the contingence broken, to declare the
g grantee in violation, and to order the grantee to vacate the
premises. These situations, though under different names and
proceedings, occur every day in America. Is there really any serious
debate therefore, that the colors of title used today, with the
creation of a lien upon the property, become fee simple determinable
and fee simples upon condition subsequent? Is this a legitimate
method of ensuring a stable and permanent system of land ownership?
If the color of title is weak, then how strong is a mortgage or deed
of trust placed on the property?

Fee simple estates may be either legal or equitable. In each
situation it is the largest estate in the land that the law will
recognize, Hughes v Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 246 S.W. 23
(1922). If a mortgagee, upon the creation of a mortgage or deed of
trust, steps into the shoes of the grantor upon a conditional fee
simple, does it then mean the mortgagee has acquired one of the two
halves of a fee simple, when cases have shown the fee simple is only
evidenced by a patent? Actually, courts have held in many states
that a mortgage is only a lien, United States v Certain Interests in
Property in Champaign County, State of Illinois, 165 F. Supp. 474
(1958) (In Illinois and other lien theory states, the mortgagee has
only a lien and not a vested interest in the leasehold); See also
Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v Ganswer, 146 Neb. 635, 20 N.W, 2d 689
(1945) (Even after a condition is broken or there is a default on a
mortgage, a mortgagee only has an equitable lien which can be
enforced in proper proceedings); South Omaha Bank v Levy, 95 N.W. 603
(1902) Strict foreclosure will not lie when mortgagor holds the
legal title); First National Bank v Sergeant, 65 Neb. 394, 91 N.W.
595 (1902) (Mortgagee cannot demand more than is legally due);
Morrill v Skinner, 57 Neb, 164, 77 N.W. 375 (1898) (Mortgage conveys
no estate but merely creates a lien); Barber v Crowell, 55 Neb. 571,
75 N.W. 1109 (1898) (Mortgage is mere security in form of conditional
conveyance), Speer v Hadduck, 31 Freeman (ILL.) 439  (1663)
(Assignments or conveyances of mortgages do not convey the fee
simple, rather they hold only security interests). These cases amply
illustrate that a mortgage or deed of trust is only a lien in lien
and intermediate-theory states.

Even in title theory of mortgages states, courts of equity have
determined that the fee simple title is not really conveyed, either
in its equitable or legal state. See supra Barber, at 1110. A fee
simple estate still exists even though the property is mortgaged or
encumbered. Hughes v Miller's Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 246 S.W. 23
(1922). In fact, a creditor asserting a lien (mortgage) must
introduce evidence or proof that will clearly demonstrate the basis
of his lien, United States v United States Chain Company, 212 F.
Supp. 171 (N.D. II 1962). If a mortgagee, even in the title theory 
states, has only a lien, yet when the mortgage or deed of trust is
created he has a fee simple determinable or condition subsequent,
then obviously the color of title used as the operative title has
little force or power to protect the sovereign freeholder. Nor can
it be said that such a color of title is useful in the maintenance of
stable and permanent titles. The patent, in almost all cases, has
been originally issued to the first purchaser from the government.
Theoretically then, the public policy, Congressional intent from the
1800's, and the Congressional intent of the last few decades should
protect the sovereign in the enjoyment and possession of his
freehold. This however is not the case. Instead, vast mortgaging of
the land has occurred. The agriculture debt alone has risen to over
$220,000,000,000 in the past three decades. This is in part due to
the vast expansion of mortgaged holdings and in part due to the rural
sector's inability to repay existing loans requiring the increased
mortgaging if the land. This is in exact contradiction to the public
policy and legislative intent if maintaining stable and simplistic
land records, yet marketable titles (colors of title) were supposed
to guarantee such records. Wichelman v Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800
(1957). Colors of title are ineffective against mortgages and
promote the instability and complexity of the records of land titles
by requiring abstracts and title insurance simply to guarantee a
marketable title. Worse, a practice has prevailed in some of the
states... of permitting actions to determine titles to be maintained
upon warrants for land (warranty deeds) and other titles not complete
or legal in their character. This practice is against the intent of
the Constitution and the Acts of Congress. Bagnel v Broderick, 38
U.S. 438 (1839). Such lesser titles have no value in actions brought
in federal courts not withstanding a State legislature which may have
provided otherwise, Hooper Et. Al, v Scheimer , 64 U.S. (23 Howard)
235 (1859). It is in fact possible that the state legislatures have
even violated the Supremacy-clause of the United States Constitution.
These actions are against the intent of the founding fathers and
against the legislative intent of the Congressman who enacted the
statutes at large creating the land patent or land grant. This
patent or grant, since the land grant has been stated to be another
name for the patent, the terms being synonymous, Northern Pacific
Railroad Co. v Barden, 46 F 592 (1891); prevented every problem that
was created by the advent of colors of title, marketable titles, and
mortgages. Therefore it is necessary to determine the validly of 
returning to the patent as the operative title.

Patents are issued (and theoretically passed) between sovereigns
... and deeds are executed by persons and private corporations
without these sovereign powers. Leading Fighter v County of
Gregory, 230 N.W.2d 114 (1975). As was stated earlier, the American
people in creating the Constitution and the government formed under
it, made such a document and government as sovereigns, retaining that
status even after the creation of the government.  Chisholm v
Georgia, 2 Dallas (2 U.S.) 419 (1793). The government as sovereign
passes the title to the American people creating in them sovereign
freeholders.  Therefore, it follows that the American people, as
sovereigns, would also have this authority to transfer the fee simple
title, through the patent, to others. Cases have been somewhat
scarce in this area, but there is some case law to reinforce this
idea. In Wilcox v Calloway, 1 Wash. (Va.) 38, 38 (1823), the
Virginia Court of Appeals heard a case where the patent was brought
up or reissued to the parties four separate times, some patents were
issued before the creation of the Constitutional United States
government, and some occurred during the creation of that government.
The courts determined the validity of those patents, recognizing each
actual acquisition as being valid, but reconciling the differences by
finding the first patent, properly secured with all the necessary
requisite acts fulfilled, carried the title. The other patents and
the necessary requisition of anew patent each time yielded the phrase
"lapsed patent." A lapsed patent being one that must be required to
perfect the title, Id. Subsequent patentees take subject to any
reservations in the original patent.  State v Crawford 441, P. 2d
586, 590 (1968). A patent regularly issued by the government is the
best and only evidence of a perfect title, The actual patent should
be secured to place at rest any question as to validity of entries
(possession under a claim and color of title). Young v  Miller, 125
So. 2d 257, 258 (1960). Under the color of title act, the Secretary
of Interior may be required to issue a patent if certain conditions
have been met, and the freeholder and his predecessors in title are
in peaceful, adverse possession under claim and color of title for
more than a specified period, Beaver v. United States, 350 F. 2d 4,
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1966). A description which will identify
the lands (and possession) is all that is necessary for the validity
of the patent Lossing v. Shull, 173 S.W. 2d 1, Mo. 342 (1943), A
patent to two or more persons creates presumptively a tenancy in
common in the patentees. Stoll v. Gottbreht, 176 N.W. 932, 45 N.D.
158 (1920). A patent to be the original grantee or his legal
representatives embrace the representatives by contract as well as by
law. Reichert v. Jerome H. Sheipp, Inc., 131 So. 229, 222 Ala.  133
(1930). A patent has a double operation, In the first place, it is
documentary evidence having the dignity of a record of the evidence
of the title or such equities respecting the claim as to justify its
recognition and later confirmation.  In the second place, it is a
deed of the United States, or a title deed. As a deed, its operation
is that if a quitclaim or rather of a conveyance of such interest as
the United States possess in the land, such interest in the land
passing to the people or sovereign freeholders. 63 Am. Jur. 2d
Section 97, p. 566. Finally, the United States Supreme Court, in
Summa Corporation v. California ex ral.  State Lands commission,
etc., 80 L.ed.2d 237 (1984), made determinations as to the validity
of a patent confirmed by the United States through the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 stat. 631 (1851).  The State of California
attempted to acquire land that belonged to the corporation.  The
State maintained that there was a public trust easement granting to
the State authority to take the land without compensation for public
use. The corporation relied in part on the intent of the treaty, in
part on the intent of the patent and the statute creating it, and in
part in the requisite challenge date of the patent expiring.  The
Summa Court followed the lengthy dissertation of the dissenting judge
on the California Supreme Court, See 31 Cal.3d 288, dissenting
opinion, in determining that the patent which had been the apparent
operative title throughout the years, was paramount and the actions
by the State were against the manifest weight of the Treaty and the
legislative intent of the patent statutes. Id. at 244-246. In each
of these cases it is states that the patent, through possession, or
claim and color of title, or through the term "his heirs and assigns
forever", or through the necessary passage of title at the death of
a joint tenant or tenant in common, is still the operable title and
is required to secure the peaceful control of the land. These same
ideas can also apply to state patents for lands that went to the
state or remained in the hands of the state upon admission into the
Union. Oliphant v. Frazho, 146 N.W. 2d 685 (1966); Fiedler v Pipers,
107 So.2d 409, 411 (1958) (Not even the State could be heard to
question the validity of a patent signed by the Governor and the
Register of the State Land Office). No government can object to the
intent and creation of a patent after such is issued, unless issued
through fraud or mistake. The patent, either federal or state, has
an intent to create sovereign freeholders in the land protected from
the speculators. (any lending institution speculates upon land), and
a public policy to maintain a simplistic, stable and permanent system
if land records. Land patents were designed to effectively insure
that this intent and policy were retained.  Colors of title cannot
provide this type of stability, since such titles are powerless
against liens, mortgages, when the freeholder is unable to repay
principle and interest on the accompanying promissory note.  Equity
will entertain jurisdiction at the instance of the owner of fee of
lands to remove a cloud upon his title created by the sale of the
premises and a deed issued thereto under a decree of foreclosure of
a mortgage thereon. Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Free. (ILL.) 431 (1871)
(though this case dealt with an improper sale of land covered by a
patent, any forced sales of lands covered by a patent is improper in
view of the policy and intent of Congress). Equity however will
protect the mortgagee who stands to lose his interest in the
property, thereby requiring a trust to be created until the debt is
erased, making partners of the creditor and debtor . What then exists
is a situation where the patent should be declared (confirmed or
reissued), to protect the sovereign freeholder and to re-institute
the policy and intent of Congress.

The patent is the paramount title, fee simple absolute, can not
be collaterally attacked, but when a debt can not be paid immediately
placing the creditor in jeopardy, the courts will impose a
constructive trust until the new "partners" can mutually eliminate
the debt. If the debt can not be satisfactorily removed, it is still
possible, considering the present intent of the government, to
maintain sovereign freeholders on the property immune from the loss
of the land, since it is Congress' intent to Keep the family farm in
place, The use of colors of title to act as the operative title is
inappropriate considering the rising number of foreclosures and the
inability of the colors of title to restrain a mortgage or lien.
However, the lending institutions, speculators on the land, maintain
that the public policy of the country includes the eradication of the
sovereign freeholders in the rural sector in an effort to implant
upon the country, large corporate holdings. This last area must be
effectively met and eliminated. 

To those who framed the Constitution, the rights of the States
and the rights of the people were two distinct and different things.
Throughout their debates they had two objects foremost in their
minds. First, to create a strong and effective national government,
and secondly to protect the people and their rights from usurpation
and tyranny by government. The people's liberties and individual
rights and safeguards were to be kept forever beyond the control and
dominion of the legislatures of the States, Whom they distrusted, and
against whom they so carefully guarded themselves. If such control
and domination and unlimited powers were given to a few legislatures
they could override every one of the reserved rights covered by the
first ten Amendments (the Bill of Rights); they could change the
government of limited powers to one of unlimited powers; they could
declare themselves hereditary rulers; they could abolish religious
freedoms; they could abolish free speech and the right of the people
to petition for redress; they could not only abolish trial by jury,
but even the rights to a day in court; and most importantly they
could abolish free sovereign ownership of the land. The whole
literature of the period of the adoption of the Constitution and the
first ten amendments is one great testimony to the insistence that
the Constitution must be so amended as to safeguard unquestionably
the rights and freedoms of the people so as to secure from any future
interference by the new government, matters the people had not
already given into its control, unless by their own consent United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1930). The problem was not in the
lending institutions that simply practice good business on their
part. The problem in the loss of freedoms by this present
interference with allodial sovereign ownership lies with the state
legislatures that created law, or marketable title acts, that claimed
to enact new simplistic, stable land titles and actually created a
watered down version of the fee simple absolute that requires
complicated tracing and protection, and is ineffective against
mortgage foreclosures.

None of these problems would occur if the patent were the operable
title again, as long as the sovereigns recognized the powers and
disabilities of their fee simple title. The patent was meant to keep
the sovereign freeholder on the land, but the land was also to be
kept free of debt, since that debt was recognized in 1820 as un-
repayable. and today is un-repayable. The re-declaration of the
patent is essential in the protection of the rural sector of
sovereign freeholders, but also essential is the need to impress the
state legislatures that have strayed from their enumerated powers
with the knowledge that they have enacted laws that have defeated the
intent and goal of man since the middle ages. That intent, of
course, is to own a small tract of land absolutely, whether by land-
boc or patent, on which the freeholder is beholden to no lord or
Superior. The patent makes sovereign freeholders of each person who
own his/her land. A return to the patent must occur if those
sovereign freeholders wish to protect that land from the encroachment
of the state legislators and the speculators that benefit from such
legislation.

PART IV

CONCLUSION

As has been seen, man is always striving to protect his rights,
the most dear being the absolute right to ownership of the land, This
right was guaranteed by the land patent, the public policy of the
Congress, and the legislative intent behind the Statutes at Large.
Such rights must be reacquired through the re-declaration of the
patent in the color of title claimant's name, based on his color of
title and possession, with such reborn rights, the land is protected
from the forced sale because of delinquency on a promissory note and
foreclosure on the mortgage. This protected land will not eliminate
the debt, a trust must be created whereby "partners" will work
together to repay it. These rights must be recaptured from the state
legislated laws, or the freedoms guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and
Constitution will be lost.  Once lost, those rights will be exceedingly
hard to reclaim, and quite possibly, as Thomas Jefferson said, the
children of this generation may someday wake up homeless on the land
their forefathers founded.
SECTION III

INTERVIEW: CAROL LANDI ON LAND PATENTS AND TREATY LAW

In an effort to track a big story called land patents, Acres
U.S.A., has covered both miles and monumental telephone tabs,
Tucked into the paragraphs of the newly released Land Patents,
Memorandum of Law, History, Force and Effect is a reference to a case
styled Summa Corporation v The State of California. It is this case
and the implications it holds, that prompted her to raise a family,
but she is back--in her words, "an advocate," meaning she fights for
causes and principles often left unattended by ordinary lawyers. She
enjoys her role as a researcher because it keeps her in touch with
the real scholarship of the profession. Since this tape is long, we
will now terminate introductory remarks and get down to bare facts.

ACRES U.S.A., Carol Landi, in the course of this business of
being an advocate, you have come in contact with the land patent--the
law, the concept, and what's being done. So, Carol, will you review
for our readers what is the background of the land patent?

LANDI. When I spoke to you before I talked about the
Summa Corporation decision in the U.S. Supreme Court this past
spring. This is styled Summa Corporation v State of California. I
hung my hat on the Summa Corporation decision that just came down
from the high court. I've been working with federal land patents in
California and in Utah. I'm doing the historical research on the
federal patents in California. We have what are called ranchos
confirmed by the U.S. government after the conquest of the western
states. And these grants are comprised of anywhere from 5,000,
6,000, 10,000, 23,000, maybe up to 100,000 acres in one shot. A
section consists of only 640 acres. When I read the Summa
Corporation decision, I had known about the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo through researching a case right here in Contra Costa county.
The case is a trial court case and it cannot be found in any
reporters, so I just went over to the court with the name. I found
the case and low and behold it was an eminent domain case, under the
fifth amendment. In California it's under the California eminent
domain laws, and this lady, Virginia Stetson, held off the
redevelopment agency by presenting as evidence in court a copy of the
patent and the lands that they were trying to take. It also gave
quite a liability on the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

ACRES U.S.A.: What law was the decision based on?

LANDI: Treaty Law.

ACRES U.S.A.: What is treaty law?

LANDI: The substance of al federal land patents is
based upon treaty law. Treaty law is the law of the nations. It is
embraced by the United States Constitution Article 1. Section 10,
Clause 1.**************************************************************
THE TREATY POWER

The treaty-making power is an extraordinary power, liable to
abuse. Treaties make international law and they also make domestic
law. Under our Constitution treaties become the supreme law of the
land. They are indeed more supreme than ordinary laws, for
congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the
Constitution, whereas treaty laws can override the Constitution.
Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress
and give them to the president. They can take powers from the state
and give then, to the federal government or to some international
body and they can cut across the rights given the people by the
Constitutional Bill Of Rights. --John Foster Dulles
**************************************************************

ACRES U.S.A. Which makes a treaty the law of the land?

LANDI: Yes. The Judges of all states shall be bound by
treaty law.

ACRES U.S.A.: And the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo made secure
these grants? Is that what you're saying?

LANDI: That's right. Let me stray from the Treaty of
Guadalupe for a moment and give you a little historical background on
treaty laws. Now to begin with, our entire country was acquired
through treaties with other countries as our young nation conquered
lands from the original 13 colonies and westward, to California.
Every inch of land in our country comes under treaty law.

ACRES U.S.A.: Because of the Louisiana Purchase or the Treaty
of Cession, 1803? The Treaty of Ghent? The Texas Treaty?

LANDI: That's rights. Let me parade you through the
historical sequence. Let's take the Northwest Ordinance. This was
a resolution of Congress that merely stated the intent of Congress
that the territory shall be divided into three to five states to be
created upon the existence of a certain number of inhabitants
required to become states of the union nothing more, nothing less.
The Ordinance was not a treaty. It was part of those unknown lands
that were part of all that territory gained from Great Britain
under the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 1783 (8 Stat. 801, in
which the original 13 colonies derived their independence together
with lands Britain gave to the original 13 colonies of territory
westward to the Mississippi River. The boundaries of that
territory is given in Article II of the treaty, that is, the
western boundaries of those states today known as Tennessee,
Kentucky, Illinois and Minnesota. All the states from the
Mississippi River and the states mentioned above, and eastward to
include the original 13 colonies comprise all those lands that come
under the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, therefore, every
federal land patent in every state thereof flows from that treaty.

ACRES U.S.A.: Is there any case law saying the treaty is
paramount?

LANDI: Yes. The lead case that said treaty law cannot
be interfered with by a state legislature in Ware v Hylton, (1796)
3 Dallas (3 U.S. 199). In this, the Supreme Court held that a
treaty is the supreme law of the land (Article VI, Section 2: "and
the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
Constitution or the laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding"!) ...that any act of the legislature cannot stand
in its way because a treaty is the declared will of the people of
all the United States and shall be superior to the constitution and
laws of any individual State." [Emphasis by the court, ] In other
words, federal land patents put into evidence by a land owner
cannot be challenged by a state court because it flows from a
United States treaty, and therefore, no court has jurisdiction over
title or ownership to land that traces its source to the paramount
or common source of title from the United States government, banks
and private corporations notwithstanding, because federal land
patents were never given to corporations, only to private citizens
hence the tern 'private land claim" or "PLC" (as we call it) used
by the Bureau of Land Management as the date of the original
patent.

ACRES U.S.A.: And then there was the Louisiana Purchase?

LANDI: Yes! The very next treaty of the United States
from which all land patents flow under the supremacy clause is the
Louisiana Purchase from France under the Treaty of Cession, April
20, 1803, 8 Stat. 200 signed at Paris in which our young nation
gained the territory of the following states. Louisiana, Arkansas,
Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, Wisconsin, North and South
Dakota, Montana and Wyoming and the Northeast two thirds of
Colorado. After that we had the Treaty of Ghent, October 20, 1818,
8 Stat, 2181. It merely established the northern boundary of the
Louisiana Purchase as the 4th parallel to the Rocky Mountains,
nothing more, nothing less. The lead case for the Louisiana
Purchase States is American Insurance Company v Canter (1828), 1
Peters (26 U.S.) 511 in which Justice Marshall held the power to
make treaties is an absolute power of the United States government
and from that power arises the right to govern it, i.e., treaty law
is superior to any state laws and is the supreme law of the land.
"Zoning law" included.

ACRES U.S.A.: And Texas is in a class by itself?

LANDI: That's right Texas was annexed to United States
by the independent vote of the inhabitants. While the Cession of
Texas is a treaty, it Was annexed as a House Joint Resolution (HJR)
and it would be fairly certain that the citizens had the same
protection as those given under treaty law. I have not searched
out the HJR as yet, although the HJR would be a simple matter to
locate in the United States Statutes by year of annexation, month
and day in the statutes. It is interesting to note that as an
annexed state, it is the only state that has the power to secede
from the United States. Hawaii is the last state with that power
to secede.

ACRES U.S.A.: What did the Oregon Treaty do?

LANDI: The Oregon Treaty of 1846 was an agreement with
Great Britain that gave the U.S. undisputed claim to the Pacific
Northwest south of the 49th parallel. The states carved out of this
treaty are the present states of Oregon. Washington, Idaho and the
southwest corner of Wyoming.' This treaty with Great Britain was
signed on June 15, 1846 [9 Stat, 8691, and all federal land patents
of these states flow from the treaty and fall under the supremacy
clause of the constitution therefore, no state, private banking
corporation or other federal agency can question the superiority of
title to land owners who have "perfected" their land by federal land
patent. Jurisdiction by any state court is invalid, and since
federal land patents cannot be collaterally attacked as to their
validity or authenticity as highest evidence of title, no mortgage
institution can claim title to land by its "lien." Certified federal
land patents were given free and clear title with no encumbrances,
then or now!

ACRES U.S.A.: And this brings us to the Treaty of Guadulupe
Hidalgo, 1848.

LANDI: This had to do with the Mexican War following the
War with Mexico, under this treaty,, the United States paid Mexico
$15 million dollars in gold coin for reparations and all that
conquered territory now known as the states of California, Nevada,
Utah, Arizona, and the western portions of Colorado and New Mexico.
All lands purchased from the United States as private land claims
were paid for in gold and silver coin, after which a federal land
patent was confirmed and issued to the private claimant. This is a
point to keep in mind regarding "loans of credit" by financial
institutions in violation of Article 1, Section 10. 31 USC 463(a).

ACRES U.S.A.: � How did the Act of Congress, March 3, 181 figure
in all of this?

LANDI: Because of the confusion of land claims by the
Gold Rush settlers on Mexican land grants, Congress enacted this act
to ascertain and settle the private land claims in the state of
California. For the first time, a Land Commission was established to
confirm the claims and the Court of Private Land Claims was
established to settle disputes before final confirmation by what is
now known as the U.S. Bureau of Land Management under the present
Department of Interior of the United States. The act of 1851
established a two year limit to contest claims after which the
confirmed land claims were closed forever by the issuance of federal
land patent that generally included the phrase: "given this
day________________to____________________his heirs and assigns
forever."  No claims could be made after the issuance date of the
Patent. This is what Summa (104 U.S. 1754] was all about. The two
year limitation on contest of federal land patents issued to private
land claimants was extended by the Act of March 3, 1891, still in
 force today!

ACRES U.S.A.: And of some importance, is the Gadsden Purchase,
December 30, 1853 [10 Stat. 1031].

LANDI: This was a treaty between Mexico and the United
States in which the U.S. paid $10 million dollars in gold coin to
Mexico for that southernmost strip of New Mexico. The treaty is
significant because it refers back to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and conferred all the same rights and privileges to citizens
of that territory as in the 1848 treaty. Hence, that southernmost
portion is, in actual fact, included in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. All federal land patents in this area also flow from treaty
law, still the supreme law of the land by which all judges in all
states shall be bound as to the validity of the patents. 43 USC 59
establishes that duly certified copies of federal land patents shall
be evidence in all cases where the originals would be
evidence. Section 57 covers the states of Oregon and California.
Section 58 covers the Louisiana Purchase. Section 83 of Title 43
covers the evidentiary effect of certified federal land patents for
all states, and all the courts in the United States must take
judicial notice of these federal patents and their evidentiary effect
under these federal statutes. If the Patents are not certified when
entered into evidence, the court may ignore the patent and overrule it
as evidence of superior or paramount title versus the mortgage
lien the banks use to lay claim to the land. *Assuming "lien" was NOT
"Ultra Vires.

ACRES U.S.A.: How, does this figure in lien theory states?

LANDI: If the bank, or lending institution lays claim to
the land by the lien theory, it must have been presented in the
contest of the federal land patent within the two years after the
last act of 1891, supra, or forever be barred. In point of fact, as
against a federal land patent, it is extremely doubtful that any of
the present lending institutions were in existence in 1891 in order
to present any claim against the owner of land under a federal land
patent flowing from a United States treaty, also known as the Law of
Nations, in which no private citizen can dispute the terms of a
treaty or act of Congress.

ACRE. U.S.A.: What about state conflicts and attorney general
opinions, and the general attitude we find among attorney generals,
such as General Stephens in Kansas?

LANDI: You can print an excerpt from a document I
submitted to the state court, one referring to the California Supreme
Court decision which Summa over turned. What is shown is the dissent
of the California Supreme Court justice(s) that was ultimately upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court (unanimously).

ACRES U.S.A.: � o where are we?

LANDI: There is nothing arcane or esoteric about
federal land patents, treaty law and the law of nations. I'll send
a news article from Northern California in which the BLM had to
participate and obtain an act of Congress to clear the way for
clear title under treaty and patent law. California is more than
familiar with the obligations of treaty law, and the requirements
of federal patent law under federal Title 43 USCA public Lands. We
have more than a passing acquaintance stare decisis law on the
subject up to date in the April 1984 case. Courts will resist it,
or be confused by it. However, if nine justices of the United
States Supreme Court are not confused by it, under the supreme law
of the land, why should a state judge be permitted to ignore it?
In point of fact, the state of California has just recently begun
to acknowledge U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Because of the great
socialist experiment in California, (courtesy of our unusual
Senator Alan Cranston), California and Justice Rose Bird are not
convinced yet that California is a part of the United States.
However, we do have case decisional law recently reaffirmed by its
appellate courts that when the United States Supreme Court
interprets a federal statute, the courts of this state are bound by
it. The key to finding case law in every state upholding federal
treaty and its laws can be found in its law libraries in the Key
Digest under Public Lands. I have had opposing attorneys searching
through American Jurisprudence under Public Lands, which is the
starting point, however, the attorneys are still baffled by it all.
Am. Jur. 2d. is the best starting point to find the case law on
treaties as they pertain to decisions in the states. It is all so
simple, you can expect judges to be confounded by it; as the
scriptures say, "God takes the foolish things of the world to
confound the wise, and God *takes the weak things of the world to
confound the strong." To abide by , decided cases.

ACRES U.S.A.: Earlier you said every inch of land was
acquired by treaty and falls under land patent, Even the original
13 colonies?

LANDI: I have the treaty with Great Britain, upon
which we founded our original 13 colonies and gained our
independence, a treaty dated 1783. And I have the leading case law
on that, their treaty, which covers land from not only the original
13 colonies, but all the land west to the Mississippi River.

ACRES U.S.A.: In other words, the British were giving away
something by treaty they really didn't have?

LANDI: They didn't know it was out there. They knew
about the Mississippi River, I believe. They knew about it as a
result of their trade with France. The Louisiana Purchase goes
from the Mississippi River and covers your Midwest states. The
Louisiana Purchase, of course, was the Treaty with France. That
was in 1803, signed at Paris. Some government people who are a bit
busy nowadays, filling land patent orders are telling people there
were no patents in the original 13 colonies. Let me say this for
the record, right out of my survey book. The first patent issued in
New York City on March 4, 1788 to John Martin and is simply for Lot
number 20, Township 7, Range 4. And he paid $640 for that section.
That was the very first patent in this country.

ACRES U.S.A.:   Who patented that to him?

LANDI: The United States Government.

ACRES U.S.A.: And what does it really mean?

LANDI: John Martin apparently squared off or surveyed a
plat of land, a public layer, that did not belong to a private owner.
He squared it out. He applied to Congress and said, I would like to
settle on this land and whatever provision you require for me to
settle on this land I would like to have it confirmed and have a
patent (in those days they didn't know about deeds, so they called
them patents) so that it will be mine, in my name, and it will be my
private claim, And Congress said, Okay, we'll have somebody check on
it. They checked on it, and they agreed with his surveys and gave
him a federal patent.

ACRES U.S.A.: � And what does the patent mean? It is just a
simple title, no different from any other title, or does it have a
special character to it?

LANDI: It has a special character to it, The federal
land patent is the paramount common source of titles from the United
States government. All public land originates from the U.S.
government. Even today, any public land in any state is still under
the United States Government.

ACRES U.S.A.: Does this patent inure to heirs and assigns?

LANDI: Yes. Forever. And that is a long time.

ACRES U.S.A.: Okay, this is really the case for the land patent
then, isn't it?

LANDI, That's the essence of it.

ACRES U.S.A.: Why does the treaty confer superior status to the
land patent, a status that cannot be retreated from by lessor
courts, even the Supreme Court.

LANDI: It pertains to the pecking order or authority.
Potential land belongs to the person who receives it and his assigned
heirs forever. It doesn't matter who is on that land today. No one
can touch that federal land patent, except the United States Govern-
ment. No one can challenge it. Let me bring you up to date from the
Treaty of Great Britain. The Act of 1851 which has been updated in
the Act of Congress, 1891 has to be reviewed.  California, you will
remember, was badly turned upside down between the Mexican
Government, Spanish Government, and the Gold Rush.  The Act of 1851
stated that anyone who was establishing a claim had to have it
confirmed by the United States Land Commission.  It was a commission
of three men. If no one protested that claim within a three year
period from the date of the Act, It could no longer be attacked under
any circumstance!  It was final.  And this is what Summa Corporation
was talking about.

JUSTICE KAUS'S OPINION

I confess to a growing u-ease about what I view as an
accelerating erosion of private property rights of California
citizens. We need to look no further than the first section of the
very first article of the state Constitution to learn that the
sovereign people of California have proclaimed "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these
are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property and obtaining safety, happiness, and
privacy." (Italics added) From this solemn pronouncement of the
people, identifying the protection of their property with the defense
of their lives and liberty and describing such interests as
"inalienable," I conclude that preserving the
sanctity of a citizen's private property is a singular responsibility
of government and its courts. When, therefore, that government
itself seeks to trench on 'such constitutionally protected and
"inalienable rights", of its own people, its conduct must be closely
scrutinized and its reach carefully measured by the rule of law."
from the Venice Properties decision.


The state of California has been trying to grab land - federal
land and offshore drilling land. With the Department of Interior
they have tried to say. well these are swamplands, these are
tidelands, and they belong to us because, as we became a state, these
lands automatically became ours. The courts have consistently said,
NO. Nothing passes to you unless the United States government grants
you this land and it belongs to you, then you can do whatever you
want.

ACRES U.S.A.: What practical application does this knowledge
bring to farmers who are now being foreclosed on by government
agencies, namely FmHA and PCA and Land Bank? Jenny Mae? Freddie Mac?


LANDI: Some are backed by the full face and credit of
the United States government, some are not. If somebody has a claim ,
if the bank says, they have a claim on..that land, they are going to
foreclose. How are they going to prove that they have title to the
land from the United States government?  Was title given to them in
their name? No, it wasn't! It was given to Corporal John Smith in
a land patent 120 years ago, or some such person. It doesn't matter
whether you're an heir. It doesn't matter whether you were an
assign. The bank has to prove it has title, to the land, in order to
take it over.

ACRES U.S.A.:  And so people who filing and getting certified
patents and registering them in the court house are doing something
that is proper, for now, pending  disposition of this whole matter.

LANDI: Absolutely.

ACRES U.S.A.: But you see the judges in these equity courts are not
looking at it that way. They say to themselves. We've got to protect
the creditors. It's much easier on the community to let this farmer go
down the tube than it is to put the bank in jeopardy, to a point where
there is a run on the bank. How do you face that proposition?

LANDI: Well, number one, I would ask you how the case
was filed? Is the farmer a defendant in the action?

ACRES U.S.A.: Usually he's a defendant.

LANDI: If he's a defendant, and he has a patent on his
land he says to the bank: you are making a claim on my land, you
want to foreclose on it. Sorry, you can't do that. You come up with
a superior title to my patent, something superior to my land patent,
then, I'll give it to you.

ACRES U.S.A.: But, you see, the judge won't even entertain that
particular point. He is shown the contract and he rules on the
contract, and that's it.

LANDI: No, It's not a contract!.

ACRES U.S.A.: Well, what is it, when you have a mortgage?
Isn't that a contract?

LANDI: That's a loan of credit. It is not a contract.

ACRES U.S.A.: Just for the sake of argument, would you set up,
for me, in as good a narrative as you can, the defense that the
farmer has? Let me give you a hypothetical situation. This farmer
purchased some land. He now has some sort of title on it. He went
to the bank and he borrowed some money because he wasn't making
enough, and he had been promised that land values would be increasing.
So "consequently he was able to borrow money to keep on farming, to
grow more so he could sell it for less and lose money. And it
finally came to a terminal point because the land values have
dropped. So the bank says: You don't have the collateral you had
last year. I guess I'm going to have to foreclose on you.

LANDI: My first question! What does the bank call as
collateral?

ACRES U.S.A.: The land, the building and the cows.


LANDI: Okay, now let me explain something to you. I
don't know how it is in much of the country, but I'm pretty sure it's
the same as in California, because property, real estate law, is no
more screwed up in the whole country than in California.  If you look
at your tax bill I'm sure even in your state you will see that the
land is assessed at one amount and the improvements at another
amount. I attribute that to, my background information as, being an
Assistant Deputy Tax Collector. I know the difference. So there is
a difference between land and its improvements. If you look on the
title insurance of the American Land Title Assurance Association
standard forms-uniform forms-abbreviated ALTA- you'll see that the
title company insures absolutely nothing but the land! Four little
letters LAND. I looked and searched those
insurance policies. They will not insure anything. All they insure
is good title. And on those grounds, the bank has given the farmer
a loan. Basically, the title insurance company is at fault . They
did not search that title back far enough to its original source to
see who owned that land.

ACRES U.S.A. : Okay, and it came to the United States by treaty.

LANDI: Right, But the bank can make no claim on that - No one
can make any claims on that land with a federal land patent on it,
unless he brought up that claim during the patent proceedings in 1851
under that two year statute of limitations.

ACRES U.S.A.: What about that Mexican family that owned land in
New Mexico? Suddenly, that family found itself in the United States.
The title that came into the United States would be secure under
treaty, wouldn't it?

LANDI: Absolutely! No question about it.

ACRES U.S.A.:  But the land that no biological person had laid
claim to was just wilderness, claimed by Mexico. That land ceded to
the United States by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Then the
government patented it over to somebody--a soldier, perhaps! You're
saying, that this land, to that man, and to his heirs and assigns is
secure forever?

LANDI: Forever.

ACRES U.S.A.: So, now we've arrived to 1984, and this farmer,
who has that piece of land, originally patented to someone, is being
foreclosed, and they haul him into court. They've got maybe 50
head breakers out in the yard to seize his equipment and to take him
off in cuffs if he resists. And they go in front of a judge and
the judge hands it over to the John Hancock Insurance Company or
some bank, or whatever. What is the defense? What can this man do?

LANDI: I think the problem that you're having out there right now is
getting the patent recognized in court.


LANDI: You MUST record a certified copy with the
recorder or register of deeds.

ACRES U.S.A.:  In other words, you get this  original
information, put it on the appropriate document, and then have it
recorded in the courthouse. What does that do?LANDI: There is a
copyrighted form that has all the state decisions case law.
 No one can attack a federal land patent. To abide by, adhere to, 
decides cases.

ACRES U.S.A.: Yes, but they recruit the head breakers and come
out. A judge has told them to throw you out. What does this rancher
do?

LANDI: Number one, you tell the court it doesn't have
jurisdiction over federal land patents.

ACRES U.S.A.: And he ignores that. He says, objection
overruled!

LANDI: Say, fine, I'm going to appeal it.

ACRES U.S.A.: Where do you appeal it?

LANDI: You appeal it right then and there. I don't
know if you have what is called a demurrer, a declaratory plea.
You bring that up. In California a declaratory plea is called a
demurrer. It's attacking the legal proficiency of the plaintiff's
pleading. As a defendant, you can attack that and you can say
right off, the court does not have jurisdiction over this federal
patent. This is a state court! This is a federal land patent.
Case law says; state or federal courts cannot touch land patents.
You don't have jurisdiction. You can't rule on it. Boom. it's
finished! It's over! If you say, No I'm going to appeal it to the
highest court in the state, even the highest court in the land. I
don't know of any court that will foreclose on a property without
some kind of notice to the farmer that a court proceeding is taking
place, or in the alternative, the farmers don't know what to do
when the default notice comes that the farm is going up for sale.
I am dealing with residential foreclosures presently, including
those under FNMA (Fannie Mae) and FHLMC (Freddie Mac) both and all
of which come under Title 42 USCS "Banks and Banking". I am presently
researching these federal mortgages, and fighting some
with federal land patents. Farmers cannot be lawyers, and lawyers
cannot be farmers, there's no question. But someone should be able
to tell the farmers what signs to watch for and when to take action
before the action hits them. I suspect that the only problem the
farmers are having with the courts is purely procedural. I have
seen my share of dishonest judges but, I have also learned how to
force there hand in court, on the record.

LANDI: After recording the land patent, the important
thing is to know the law of the treaty that covers your state.
Every protection a farmer needs is in that treaty and the judge
knows that the by Supreme Law of the Land, he cannot touch or have
any jurisdiction over it. When the banks are faced with the fact
that the court has no jurisdiction over their foreclosure action,
due to a federal land patent recorded on the property, and treaty
law preempts state and/or federal law, the court will make a
mistake of ruling against the farmer, which in itself, is good,
because now you can appeal and buy more time to keep the bank at
arms length. I would want to look at a court file, to see what
really went wrong, and how. If a defendant is not responding, or
if he is responding, then he doesn't know his appeal rights. Any case
on federal patent could end up in the U.S. Supreme Court. just as
Summa did in California. Appeals are all done on paper. No court
appearances. Everything on appeal is done in writing, as there are
no oral arguments allowed. [Wis. Stat. 407. 103 + 401, 201)

ACRES U.S.A.: What about those who have lost their farms?

LANDI: As to those who have already lost their farms,
my position is that, whoever the bank conned into buying the
foreclosed farm, has bought a farm without warranty or guarantee of
clear title. Look at the fine print in a trustee deed sale notice.
IRS does the sane thing! IRS sells foreclosed property with that
particular statement! So, no guarantee goes with purchase of
foreclosed lands, except, that you put a federal land patent on it.
I would have no compunction about even IRS auctioning off my land
because, as long as I have they patent recorded, on it, then I can
challenge the new buyer that IRS didn't guarantee clear title, and
that I still own my land. Therefore, if I were the new buyer, I
would tell IRS, I want my money back for fraud for not telling me
that there was a federal land patent on the land, that I can't
fight to get off my land. Incidentally, even IRS cannot supersede
federal treaty law or the provisions of any treaty of this country.

ACRES U.S.A.: � How do you handle the matter of non-real
property seizure?

LANDI: We told the banks that, my federal land patent
granted land only, and that is all I'm claiming is land. If they
have a lien against something on my land, then please get it off, but
don't trespass in the process--not on my land.  I have offered banks
to take their buildings away, board by board, just let me know,
otherwise, they will be trespassing. Farm equipment cannot be seized
on federally patented land without trespassing. They must have a
court order. And if someone is not defending, in court, against a
court order, on grounds of jurisdiction and statue of limitations,
someone needs help, but not from a lawyer, unless the lawyer is
totally dedicated. Let me tell you about a case up in Oregon.  This
is heresy on my part, but I can report what I learned from sources I
believe to be sound.  A landowner up in Oregon was foreclosed on by
the bank. The court wouldn't listen to his arguments, so a federal
land patent was laid on that property. By that time the bank had
foreclosed. The sheriff sale had been held. Now, he went back into
court and he said: That sale is illegal. The state had no
jurisdiction over the federal land patent and the court said, oh
really? Where's your proof? How do I know this land patent, that
you're talking about, did not come under my jurisdiction? How do I
know it is correct? The land owner said, Well It's certified! I
will bring a witness out from the Bureau of Land Management, and he
will testify and witness that this is an exact duplicate of the
original document which is admissible, as evidence, in the state
court. And that is precisely what they did. They brought in the
Chief of Records, as a witness, to testify that the document was
true, and certified, and was absolutely correct. It could not be
changed under any circumstances, by any court.


ACRES U.S.A.: So, what happened?

LANDI: The judge dismissed the case and said, you are
absolutely right. You own the land. You have perfect title to it.
You traced it to its original source. You own the land!

ACRES U.S.A.: But in the mean time they have carted a farmer's
cattle, as they did in Illinois.

LANDI: He has to bring suit for trespass.

ACRES U.S.A.: OK, now where does he bring this suit?

LANDI: He brings it right to state court. This is what
happened. The landowner sued the bank for trespassing. He Won!  You
see, this man could sue the bank.  He could sue the judge for
involving himself in a case in which he did not have jurisdiction.

ACRES U.S.A.: For now, what do we do?  Step by Step.

LANDI: What you do is build a sandwich.  You've got your
federal land patent on the bottom. You got that certified at the
Bureau of Land Management.  You have to ask for it.  The bureau of
Land Management, I believe, will charge a dollar or so to certify.
If you don't want it, they won't do it, and you don't pay.  It's part
of their service.  It must be certified!  That's the first layer of
the sandwich.  That makes it admissible evidence in the state court.

ACRES U.S.A.: What's the next layer?

LANDI: The next piece of paper is your declaration.
Number three, the top of the sandwich, will be your ordinary deed,
whatever it is you call it in your state.  You can grant it to
yourself.  It could almost be a simple thing, such as a will.  Those
are the three pieces of paper. Now you waltz up to the courthouse
and say, I want this stuff a matter of record and I want to know
where you record this.  And they give you the reference of where they
recorded it.  Always take an extra COPY to the recorder and say, Would
you endorse a copy for me?  And of course, they will send the
original back to you with a book and a page number on it.

ACRES U.S.A.: Do all of these pieces of paper have to be
certified?

LANDI: No. Just the federal land patent.  If you have a
certified document that purports to be a lost or destroyed piece of
paper, and someone certifies it as true and correct copy, this is
admissible as evidence in a court.

ACRES U.S.A.: Thousands of people are asking for a copy of
land patent covering their acres. But the problem is, it seems  to
bog down at that point. They get into court and they get clobbered
something awful. Either they don't  know the procedure or what issue
to bring, in what way. at what time, in what court.

LANDI: If you don't know how to go into court, you're in
the position of the fellow who goes into farming without knowing a
tractor from a disc. The law won't protect you if you don't know how
to use it.
 SECTION IV

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A REPUBLIC UNDER GOD

LAND PATENTS, EJECTMENT, AND ESTOPPEL


l. In case of ejectment, where the question is who has the legal
title, the patent of the government is unassailable. Sanford v
Sanford, 139 US 642.

2. The transfer of legal title (patent) to public domain gives the
transferee the right to possess and enjoy the land transferred.
Gibson v Chouteau, 80 US 92.

3. A patent for land is the highest evidence of title and is
conclusive as against the government and all claiming under junior
patents or titles. United States v Stone, 2 US 525.

4. The presumption being that it (patent) is valid and passes the
legal title. Minter v Crommelin, 18 US 87.

5. Estoppel has been sustained as against a municipal corpora-
tion (county), Beadle v Smyser, 209 US 393.

6. A court of law will not uphold or enforce an equitable title
to land as a defense to an action of ejectment. Johnson v.
Christian, 128 US 374, Doe v Aiken, 31 F. 393.

7. When congress has prescribed the conditions upon which
portions of the public domain may be alienated (to convey, to
transfer), and has provided that upon the fulfillment of the
conditions the United States shall issue a patent to the purchaser,
then such land is not taxable by a state. Sargent v Herrick &
Stevens, 221 US 404, Northern P.R. CO. v Trail County, 115 US
600.

8. The patent alone passes land from the United States to the
grantee and nothing passes a perfect title to public lands but a
patent. Wilcox v Jackson, 13 Peter (US) 498.

9. Patents and other evidences of title from the United States
government are not controlled by state recording laws and shall be
effective, as against subsequent purchasers, only from the time of
their record in the county. Lomax v. Pickering, 173 US 26.

10. In federal courts the patent is held to be the foundation of
title at law. Fenn v Holmes, 21 Howard 481.

11. Congress has the sole power to declare the dignity and effect
of titles emanating from the United States and the whole
legislation of the government, in reference to the public lands,
declare the patent to be the superior and conclusive evidence of
the legal title. Until it issues, the fee is in the Government,
which by the patent passes to the grantee, and he is entitled to
enforce the possession in ejectment. Bagnell v Broderick. 13 Peter
(US) 450.

12. In ejectment the legal title must prevail, and a patent of
the United States to public lands pass that title: it can not be
assailed collaterally on the ground that false and perjured
testimony was used to secure it. Steel v St. Louis Smelting and
Refininq Co., 106 US 417.

13. A patent certificate, or patent issued, or confirmation made
to an original grantee or his legal representatives of the grantee
or assignee by contract, as well as by law. Hogan v Pace, 69 US
605.

14. In federal courts, the rule that ejectment cannot be main-
tained on a mere equitable title is strictly enforced, so that
ejectment cannot be maintained on a mere entry made with a register
and receiver, but only on the patent, since the certificates of the
officers of the land department vest in the locator only equitable
title, This rule prevails in the federal courts even when the
statute of the state in which the suit is brought provides that a
receipt from the local land office is sufficient proof of title to
support the action. Langdon v Sherwood, 124 U.S. 74, Carter v
Ruddy, 166 US 493.

15. The plaintiff in ejectment must in all cases prove the legal
title to the premises in himself, at the time of the demise laid in
the declaration, and evidence of an equitable title will not be
sufficient for a recovery. The practice of allowing ejectment to
be maintained in state courts upon equitable titles cannot effect
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. Fenn v
Holmes, 21 Howard 41.

16. Under USCA Constitution, Article 4, section 3, clause 2,
Congress, in exercise of its discretion in disposal of public
lands, had power, by this section, to restrict alienation of
homestead lands after conveyance by United states in fee simple, by
providing no, such lands shall become liable to satisfaction of
debts contracted prior to issuance of patent. Ruddy v Rossi, (1918)
248 US 104.

17. Patents are tied to the Bible, in Genesis 47 by way of the
word assigned in italicized print. Also note in later verses the
beginning of sharecropping, BC 1701.

18. The right to the ownership of property and to contract with
respect of its use is unalienable. Golding v Schubac, 93 U.S. 32:
Saville v Corless, 46 U.S. 495.

19. Parties in possession of real property have the right to
stand on their possessions until compelled to yield to the rule
title determined by trial by jury. 47 Am. Jur. 2d 45.20. Giving a note
 does not constitute payment. Echart v Commissioners, I.R.S.
 42 F2d 158; 283 U.S. 140.

21. Actual or threatened exercise of power over the property of
another is coercion and duress which will render the payment
involuntary. Cleveland v Richardson, 132 US 318.

22. Property value means the price the property will command in
the market, or its equivalent in lawful money. People v Hines, 89
P. 858. 5 Cal. App. 122

23. Neither a town nor its officers have any right to appropriate
or interfere with private property. Mitchell v City of Rockland,
46 Me. 496.

24. A state may provide for the collection of taxes in gold and
silver only, State Treasurer v Wright, 28 ILL. 509: Whitaker v
Haley, 2 Ore. 128.

25. Taxes lawfully assessed, are collectible by agents in money
and notes, cannot be accepted in payment. Town of Frankfort v
Waldo, 128 Me. 1.

26. There must be strict compliance with statutory requirements
to divest property owners of their property titles for non payment
of taxes. McCarthy v Greenlawn Cem., 168 Me. 388 (1962).

27, At common law there was no tax lien. Cassidy v Aroostook,
134 Me. 341 (1936).

28. A tax on real estate to one not the owner is not valid.
Barker v Blake, 36 Me. 433 (1853).SECTION V

PROPERTY OWNERS RECEIVE DEEDS TO ANGELS LAND

ANGELS CAMP. The first of local property owners who for
decades have been paying taxes on land actually owned by the
federal government were to receive title to their property last
night.

At the City Council meeting, the five landowners were to
receive quit-claim deeds from the city and the federal government,
which until recently was the rightful owner of the land.

The parcels in question were created when old mines, with
federally-owned claims, were gradually worked out and broken up for
sale.

Mine owners apparently never went through the formality of
patenting the land before they sold it. The buyers built homes on
the land and paid taxes on it.

The problem came to light, some three years ago, when a local
surveyor, trying to determine title for a land division he had
surveyed, found out the property still was federally owned and
under jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Land Management.

BLM officials agreed to cooperate to make sure the land became
the legal property of those who had purchased it from the mines,
however, an Act of Congress was necessary to clear the way.

Congressman Norm Shumway introduced the necessary legislation
and it was passed by Congress last year.

The legislation turned title of the land over to the City of
Angels Camp, which in turn is issuing quit-claim deeds to the
property owners.

A total of about 80 acres involving 20 plots of land are
involved.

From the Calaveras (California) Enterprise.


LAND PATENT STOPS BIDDING AT SHERIFF SALE

Robert Deardorff of Indianapolis, Ind. had filed a DECLARATION
OF LAND PATENT with a certified copy of the original patent. In a
Sheriff's Sale, which took place last August, Mr. Deardorff and a
witness went to the Sheriff's Sale and met with the sheriff. He
had previously warned the sheriff that if he went ahead with the
Sheriff's Sale, he would go to the U.S. Attorney and swear out a
warrant for his arrest for Criminal Trespass on his Land Patent.
However, the sheriff's counsel advised him to go ahead with the
Sheriff's Sale anyway. So, on the day of the sale and while he and
a witness were in the sheriff's office, he called the Federal Clerk
of Courts and told him what was happening.

The Federal court Clerk told Mr. Deardorff that, if the
sheriff went ahead and sold the property, with a Land Patent on it,
that inside of three days, there would be a U.S. Marshall there to
arrest the sheriff.  Mr. Deardorff then told the sheriff this, word
for word.

Later, at the sale, the sheriff told the bidders, including
the bank's attorney, that there was a Land Patent on the property
and that if they bought it, they could never be able to get a clear
title and would never be able to get a loan on the land. As a
result, no one bid. Under Indiana Law, when no bids are placed on
a property, the property reverts back to the owner after 4 p.m. the
same day. No new Sheriff's Sale was ever scheduled and there is no
pending action of any kind in the courts. (Robert Deardorff, 7002
N. Graham Rd., #128 Indianapolis, IN. 46220; Phone (317)325 2505).

SECTION VI

PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A UNITED 
STATES LAND PATENT OR LAND GRANT

Instructions to give the Sheriff, Judge, County Attorney and
Bidders of your property. Present all concerned parties with a
copy of your Certified Land Patent and declaration of Land Patent.

l. The Land Patent, issued by the Bureau of Land Management,
Department of the Interior, of the United States Government; is the
highest and best Title at Law. The holder of a Declaration of Land
Patent, as an Assign, is the absolute owner of the property as
described on that Patent. No court in the United States can change
a Declaration of Land Patent, without the express permission of the
holder of that patent. A Declaration of Land Patent being the
highest Title at Law is superior to any other type of deed.
Included, in this in a "Warranty Deed" and "Sheriff's Deed". Once
a Declaration of Land Patent is in place and duly recorded it
cannot be removed.

2. The only authority responsible to the holder of a Declaration
of Land Patent is the United States Government. A Patent cannot be
violated or transferred without the permission of the Assign.
Enforcement of a Patent must come from the United States Govern-
ment.

3. Should a Declaration of Land Patent be violated. It is the
responsibility of the Assign's to file charges with the Justice
Department of the United States Government. Specifically, the
Attorney General. Criminal Trespass Charges, Civil Charges and
Charges for Fraud should be included in your statement of Charges.
This being in violation of a United States (Federal) patent.

4. The Sheriff should be notified before the sale, but near the
time the sale is to start, he must notify each and every bidder of
the following:


A. The Declaration of Land Patent is the Highest and Best
Title at Law.

B. Once this sale is complete, the property can never be
resold.

C. A Warranty Deed, can never be drafted on this property.
The buyer or successful bidder of the property will not be able to
borrow or get a mortgage against the land.

D. Title insurance cannot be obtained for this property.

E. The Declaration of Land Patent "CLOUDS" title to the land
forever.F. The successful bidder of the property will not get
possession of the property.

G. The Declaration of Land Patent stops ejectment.

H. A "Sheriff's Deed" or other type of document transfer
shall be proof of fraud. The notification that a Patent exists
before the transfer shall be sufficient for this charge.

I. Criminal Trespass, Civil and charges for Fraud will be
filed against the successful bidder and all those who took a part
in the forced transfer of the property.  The notification that a
Patent existed before the transfer shall be sufficient for the
charges stated.

J, Obtain a certified copy of the  "Deed of Transfer" or
"Sheriff's Deed". Proof of the charges stated will be necessary for
the Attorney General.

K. Mortgage or lending institutions may bid the existing
mortgage or lien. This shall not be sufficient notice for fraud.
The transfer of the property to a second person or persons in the
form of that stated above is what will be necessary to obtain.
Bidding of mortgage or lien is not sufficient and cannot cancel a
Declaration of Land Patent. While a "No Bid" is better - for a
lending concern to bid the existing lien is a formality and is not
powerful enough to overcome a Patent.

L. The holder of a land patent, which has been certified.
The filing of a Declaration of Land Patent shall present to the
holder all of the rights and privileges forever. This is stated on
the front of the Certified copy of the Land Patent, which was
obtained through the Bureau of Land Management, Department of the
Interior of the United states of America.Q: Why send the Bureau of 
Land Management $20.?

A: This is the approximate cost for most land patents. This
includes $4.25 for the patent plus a search fee. A copy of the
County Plat Map where you circle the part you want them to find the
patent on makes the search job easier. In your letter, be sure to
ask for a Certified copy of the Land Patent. You should receive it
in 4 to 6 weeks. (Note: if you need the land patent faster, like
in a week or so, go directly to the Bureau of Land Management in
your area (see List) and it can be had in one hour.

Q: Is there another Way to update a land Patent in my name
other than filing a Declaration of Land Patent?

A: Yes, In some parts of he country, Court Clerks are
refusing to file Declaration of Land Patents even though they will
file a copy of the Land Patent itself, Here is what you do.
First, file the Certified Copy of the Land Patent by itself. Then
fill out a Quit Claim deed (available from, local book stores or Title
Companies) and name yourself as the first and the second
party in the deed. After filing in the legal description of your
property, add the following language in the Quit claim Deed:  "The
first party to this deed, (name) grants and deeds to the second
party (name), with all rights, privileges and immunities, Land
Patent #______ per the above legal description and updates the
Land Patent in the second party(s) name and to his heirs and
assigns forever." (Note: a variation of the above when two people
own a property is for one to file ... the land patent and then file
a Quit Claim Deed and assign the Land Patent to the second party.
Example, a wife filing a Quit Claim Deed to her husband and in it
assigning her interest in the Land Patent to her husband. Once
this is filed, the Land Patent is updated in her husbands name).